The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions
Abstract
We use data from highway procurement auctions subject to California's Small Business Preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes. Our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms' bidding and participation decisions, which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs. We show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of preferential treatment policies. (JEL D44, H76, R42)
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Cited by
Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs
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(2010) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta5434 · Cited by 276
Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes
Decarolis, F., Giuffrida, L., Iossa, E., Mollisi, V., & Spagnolo, G. (2018) · doi:10.3386/w24201 · Cited by 88
Metadata
- Authors
- Krasnokutskaya, E., & Seim, K.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2011-10-01
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2653-2686
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2060947088
- Cited by
- 300
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 25.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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