The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie
Open accessAbstract
This paper studies lying. An agent randomly picks a number from a known distribution. She can then report any number and receive a monetary payoff based only on her report. The paper presents a model of lying costs that generates hypotheses regarding behavior. In an experiment, we find that the highest fraction of lies is from reporting the maximal outcome, but some participants do not make the maximal lie. More participants lie partially when the experimenter cannot observe their outcomes than when the experimenter can verify the observed outcome. Partial lying increases when the prior probability of the highest outcome decreases. (JEL C91, D12, D90, Z13)
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Abeler, J., Nosenzo, D., & Raymond, C. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2840132 · Cited by 840
Civic honesty around the globe
Cohn, A., Maréchal, M. A., Tannenbaum, D., & Zünd, C. L. (2019) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aau8712 · Cited by 322
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gneezy, U., Kajackaite, A., & Sobel, J.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2018-02-01
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 419-453
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2568738663
- Cited by
- 481
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 90.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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