The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation
Abstract
The World Trade Organization (WTO) lacks the power to directly enforce agreements. It is therefore important to understand what role the WTO can play to facilitate international cooperation, and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements. This paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution: first, verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties, thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms; second, promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations. The model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships. (JEL F13)
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.215 · Cited by 1,022
Büthe, T., & Milner, H. V. (2008) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00340.x · Cited by 914
De-globalization: Theories, predictions, and opportunities for international business research
Witt, M. A. (2019) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-019-00219-7 · Cited by 680
The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond
Hoekman, B. M., & Kostecki, M. M. (2009) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199553761.001.0001 · Cited by 627
How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory
Guzman, A. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305562.001.0001 · Cited by 510
The Meaning of Social Capital and its Link to Collective Action
Ostrom, E., & Ahn, T. K. (2009) · Handbook of Social Capital · doi:10.4337/9781848447486.00008 · Cited by 409
Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment
Tomz, M., Goldstein, J. L., & Rivers, D. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.5.2005 · Cited by 323
A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements
Maggi, G., & Rodríguez-Clare, A. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.4.1374 · Cited by 316
Self-citationWhat Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.4.1238 · Cited by 258
Bagwell, K., Bown, C. P., & Staiger, R. W. (2016) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20151192 · Cited by 122
The Purpose of Trade Agreements
Grossman, G. M. (2016) · Handbook of Commercial Policy · doi:10.1016/bs.hescop.2016.04.016 · Cited by 77
Metadata
- Authors
- Maggi, G.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1999-03-01
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 190-214
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2106135443
- Cited by
- 412
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 47.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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