The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation
Abstract
The World Trade Organization (WTO) lacks the power to directly enforce agreements. It is therefore important to understand what role the WTO can play to facilitate international cooperation, and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements. This paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution: first, verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties, thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms; second, promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations. The model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships. (JEL F13)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911462 · Cited by 1,998
Milgrom, P. R., North, D. C., & Weingast*, B. R. (1990) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00020.x · Cited by 1,793
Social Norms and Community Enforcement
Kandori, M. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297925 · Cited by 1,574
Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior
Bernheim, B. D., & Whinston, M. D. (1990) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555490 · Cited by 1,300
Rubinstein, A., & Osborne, M. J. (1990) · Cited by 1,270
On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
Abreu, D. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911077 · Cited by 1,252
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild
Greif, A., Milgrom, P., & Weingast, B. R. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261953 · Cited by 1,220
Oye, K. A. (1986) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691186702 · Cited by 1,131
Renegotiation in repeated games
Farrell, J., & Maskin, E. (1989) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(89)90021-3 · Cited by 602
Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation
Johnson, H. G. (1973) · Readings in Welfare Economics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15492-0_9 · Cited by 475
Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern Gatt Legal System
Hudec, R. (1993) · Cited by 451
World Trade and the Law of GATT
Evans, J. W., & Jackson, J. H. (1971) · Columbia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1121282 · Cited by 442
Reshaping the World Trading System : A History of the Uruguay Round
Croome, J. (1999) · Cited by 323
Strategic aspects of trade policy
Dixit, A. K. (1987) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/ccol0521340446.009 · Cited by 246
Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
Douglas Bernheim, B., & Ray, D. (1989) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(89)90020-1 · Cited by 241
Goyal, S., & Joshi, S. (2006) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00395.x · Cited by 207
Multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of customs unions
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (1997) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(96)01443-2 · Cited by 199
Politically realistic objective functions and trade policy PROFs and tariffs
Baldwin, R. (1987) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(87)90132-7 · Cited by 181
GATT: A cooperative equilibrium in a noncooperative trading regime?
Hungerford, T. L. (1991) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/0022-1996(91)90044-7 · Cited by 133
International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy
Staiger, R. W. (1994) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4962 · Cited by 131
Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and Cooperation
Bendor, J., & Mookherjee, D. (1990) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036990 · Cited by 122
Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations
Conconi, P., & Perroni, C. (2002) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(01)00157-x · Cited by 91
Optimal international trade agreements and dispute settlement procedures
Ludema, R. D. (2001) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/s0176-2680(01)00031-3 · Cited by 83
Cited by
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.215 · Cited by 1,022
Büthe, T., & Milner, H. V. (2008) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00340.x · Cited by 914
De-globalization: Theories, predictions, and opportunities for international business research
Witt, M. A. (2019) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-019-00219-7 · Cited by 680
The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond
Hoekman, B. M., & Kostecki, M. M. (2009) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199553761.001.0001 · Cited by 627
How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory
Guzman, A. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305562.001.0001 · Cited by 510
Metadata
- Authors
- Maggi, G.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1999-03-01
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 190-214
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2106135443
- Cited by
- 412
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 47.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.