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Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
Open accessAbstract
A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of participants is large. Under some regularity conditions, we show that the fraction of participants with incentives to misrepresent their preferences when others are truthful approaches zero as the market becomes large. With an additional condition, truthful reporting by every participant is an approximate equilibrium under the student-optimal stable mechanism in large markets. (JEL C78)
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Self-citation
Cited by
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Self-citationThe Boston Public School Match
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E., & Sönmez, T. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805774669637 · Cited by 530
Self-citationAbdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.5.1954 · Cited by 500
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Kojima, F., & Pathak, P. A.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2009-05-01
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 608-627
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2158281340
- Cited by
- 362
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 46.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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