The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory
Abstract
John Nash's formulation of noncooperative game theory was one of the great breakthroughs in the history of social science. Nash's work in this area is reviewed in its historical context to better understand how the fundamental ideas of noncooperative game theory were developed and how they changed the course of economic theory.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Svolik, M. W. (2012) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139176040 · Cited by 2,611
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model
Harsanyi, J. C. (2004) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0270 · Cited by 2,127
Economic Analysis of Social Interactions
Manski, C. F. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.115 · Cited by 2,064
Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications
Crawford, V. P., Costa-Gomes, M. A., & Iriberri, N. (2013) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.51.1.5 · Cited by 505
Data, information and knowledge: have we got it right?
Boisot, M., & Canals, A. (2004) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s00191-003-0181-9 · Cited by 266
Metadata
- Authors
- Myerson, R. B.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Literature
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1999-09-01
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1067-1082
- ISSN
- 0022-0515 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2097300295
- Cited by
- 349
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 20.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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