The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Anomalies: Cooperation
Abstract
Much economic analysis -- and virtually all game theory -- starts with the assumption that people are both rational and selfish. The predictions derived from this assumption of rational selfishness are, however, violated in many familiar contexts. In this column and the next one, the evidence from laboratory experiments is examined to see what has been learned about when and why humans cooperate. This column considers the particularly important case of cooperation vs. free riding in the context of public good provision.
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Citations
Cites
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Cited by
Trust And Distrust: New Relationships and Realities
Lewicki, R. J., McAllister, D. J., & Bies, R. J. (1998) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1998.926620 · Cited by 3,091
Social norms and human cooperation
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.02.007 · Cited by 1,615
Explaining altruistic behavior in humans
Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., & Fehr, E. (2003) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(02)00157-5 · Cited by 1,037
The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global
Held, V. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0195180992.001.0001 · Cited by 615
A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence
Falkinger, J., Fehr, E., Gächter, S., & Winter-Ebmer, R. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.247 · Cited by 338
Voluntary provision of threshold public goods with continuous contributions: experimental evidence
Cadsby, C. B., & Maynes, E. (1999) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00049-8 · Cited by 279
Open collaboration for innovation: Principles and performance
Levine, S. S., & Prietula, M. J. (2014) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2013.0872 · Cited by 263
“Do the right thing:” The effects of moral suasion on cooperation
Dal Bó, E., & Dal Bó, P. (2014) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.05.002 · Cited by 157
Cooperation in the Climate Commons
Carattini, S., Levin, S., & Tavoni, A. (2019) · Review of Environmental Economics and Policy · doi:10.1093/reep/rez009 · Cited by 134
Singer, T., & Steinbeis, N. (2009) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04733.x · Cited by 86
Salvato, C., Reuer, J. J., & Battigalli, P. (2017) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/annals.2014.0001 · Cited by 86
Subtle social cues, explicit incentives, and cooperation in social dilemmas
Boone, C., Declerck, C. H., & Suetens, S. (2008) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.005 · Cited by 43
Are perceptions of fairness relationship-specific? The case of noblesse oblige
Fiddick, L., & Cummins, D. (2007) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/17470210600577266 · Cited by 40
A study of dynamic information display and decision-making in abstract trust games
Schaffer, J., O’Donovan, J., Marusich, L., Yu, M., Gonzalez, C., & Höllerer, T. (2018) · International Journal of Human-Computer Studies · doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2018.01.002 · Cited by 10
Effects of parity, sympathy and reciprocity in increasing social welfare
Sen, S., Crawford, C., Dees, A., Nanda Kumar, R., & Hale, J. (2020) · The Knowledge Engineering Review · doi:10.1017/s0269888920000120 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Dawes, R. M., & Thaler, R. H.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1988-08-01
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 187-197
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4248869758
- Cited by
- 621
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 21.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
