The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Supply Disruptions, Asymmetric Information, and a Backup Production Option
Open accessAbstract
We study a manufacturer that faces a supplier privileged with private information about supply disruptions. We investigate how risk-management strategies of the manufacturer change and examine whether risk-management tools are more or less valuable in the presence of such asymmetric information. We model a supply chain with one manufacturer and one supplier, in which the supplier's reliability is either high or low and is the supplier's private information. On disruption, the supplier chooses to either pay a penalty to the manufacturer for the shortfall or use backup production to fill the manufacturer's order. Using mechanism design theory, we derive the optimal contract menu offered by the manufacturer. We find that information asymmetry may cause the less reliable supplier type to stop using backup production while the more reliable supplier type continues to use it. Additionally, the manufacturer may stop ordering from the less reliable supplier type altogether. The value of supplier backup production for the manufacturer is not necessarily larger under symmetric information; for the more reliable supplier type, it could be negative. The manufacturer is willing to pay the most for information when supplier backup production is moderately expensive. The value of information may increase as supplier types become uniformly more reliable. Thus, higher reliability need not be a substitute for better information.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Myerson, R. B. (1981) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.6.1.58 · Cited by 5,920
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
Laffont, J.-J., & Martimort, D. (2002) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400829453 · Cited by 2,106
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Myerson, R. B. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912346 · Cited by 1,983
Managing Risk To Avoid Supply-Chain Breakdown
Chopra, S., & Sodhi, M. S. (2004) · MIT Sloan Management Review · Cited by 1,859
Robust strategies for mitigating supply chain disruptions
Tang, C. S. (2006) · International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications · doi:10.1080/13675560500405584 · Cited by 1,336
Hendricks, K. B., & Singhal, V. R. (2005) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/j.1937-5956.2005.tb00008.x · Cited by 1,303
The resilient enterprise: overcoming vulnerability for competitive advantage
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-3481 · Cited by 1,207
The effect of supply chain glitches on shareholder wealth
Hendricks, K. B., & Singhal, V. R. (2003) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2003.02.003 · Cited by 1,074
Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions
Che, Y. (1993) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555752 · Cited by 836
The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
Dasgupta, P., Hammond, P., & Maskin, E. (1979) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297045 · Cited by 809
Association Between Supply Chain Glitches and Operating Performance
Hendricks, K. B., & Singhal, V. R. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0353 · Cited by 755
Commissioned Paper: Capacity Management, Investment, and Hedging: Review and Recent Developments
Mieghem, J. A. V. (2003) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.5.4.269.24882 · Cited by 587
Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry
Corbett, C. J., Zhou, D., & Tang, C. S. (2004) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1030.0173 · Cited by 536
Competition and Diversification Effects in Supply Chains with Supplier Default Risk
Babich, V., Burnetas, A. N., & Ritchken, P. H. (2007) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.1060.0122 · Cited by 397
Self-citationThe Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
Maskin, E. S., & Jean Tirole, Z. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938208 · Cited by 391
Information, Contracting, and Quality Costs
Baiman, S., Fischer, P. E., & Rajan, M. V. (2000) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.46.6.776.11939 · Cited by 358
On the Value of Mix Flexibility and Dual Sourcing in Unreliable Newsvendor Networks
Tomlin, B., & Wang, Y. (2005) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.1040.0063 · Cited by 332
Corbett, C. J. (2001) · Operations Research · doi:10.1287/opre.49.4.487.11223 · Cited by 264
Sourcing decisions with capacity reservation contracts
Serel, D. A., Dada, M., & Moskowitz, H. (2001) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/s0377-2217(00)00106-5 · Cited by 181
A Bargaining Model for a First-Time Interaction Under Asymmetric Beliefs of Supply Reliability
Gurnani, H., & Shi, M. (2006) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1050.0498 · Cited by 157
Kouvelis, P., & Milner, J. M. (2002) · IIE Transactions · doi:10.1080/07408170208928907 · Cited by 155
Dasgupta, S., & Spulber, D. F. (1989) · Information Economics and Policy · doi:10.1016/0167-6245(89)90030-9 · Cited by 144
Efficient Auction Mechanisms for Supply Chain Procurement
Chen, R. R., ROUNDY, R. O., Zhang, R. Q., & Janakiraman, G. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0329 · Cited by 116
Imhoff, D. (2007) · Cited by 116
Vulnerable options in supply chains: Effects of supplier competition
Babich, V. (2006) · Naval Research Logistics (NRL) · doi:10.1002/nav.20181 · Cited by 111
Self-citationImplications of Breach Remedy and Renegotiation Design for Innovation and Capacity
Plambeck, E. L., & Taylor, T. A. (2007) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1070.0730 · Cited by 79
Risk, Financing and the Optimal Number of Suppliers
Babich, V., Aydın, G., Brunet, P.-Y., Keppo, J., & Saigal, R. (2011) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-0-85729-778-5_8 · Cited by 77
Self-citationCorbin, A. L. (1952) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 58
Optimal Mechanisms with Finite Agent Types
Lovejoy, W. S. (2006) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1050.0502 · Cited by 34
Risk, Financing and the Optimal Number of SuppliersPreprint
Babich, V., Aydın, G., Brunet, P.-Y., Keppo, J., & Saigal, R. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.912679 · Cited by 18
Self-citation
Cited by
Supply chain risk management: a literature review
Ho, W., Zheng, T., Yildiz, H., & Talluri, S. (2015) · International Journal of Production Research · doi:10.1080/00207543.2015.1030467 · Cited by 1,363
Review of quantitative methods for supply chain resilience analysis
Hosseini, S., Ivanov, D., & Dolgui, A. (2019) · Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review · doi:10.1016/j.tre.2019.03.001 · Cited by 1,275
The influence of relational competencies on supply chain resilience: a relational view
Wieland, A., & Wallenburg, C. M. (2013) · International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management · doi:10.1108/ijpdlm-08-2012-0243 · Cited by 1,060
OR/MS models for supply chain disruptions: a review
Snyder, L. V., Atan, Z., Peng, P., Rong, Y., Schmitt, A. J., & Sinsoysal, B. (2016) · IIE Transactions · doi:10.1080/0740817x.2015.1067735 · Cited by 854
Babich, V., & Hilary, G. (2020) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.2018.0752 · Cited by 782
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Yang, Z. (., Aydın, G., Babich, V., & Beil, D. R.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2009-02
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 192-209
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W3122719071
- Cited by
- 389
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 27.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.