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Impact of Performance-Based Contracting on Product Reliability: An Empirical Analysis
Open accessAbstract
Using a proprietary data set provided by a major manufacturer of aircraft engines, we empirically investigate how product reliability is impacted by the use of two different types of after-sales maintenance support contracts: time and material contracts (T&MC) and performance-based contracts (PBC). We offer a number of competing arguments based on the theory of incentives that establish why product reliability may increase or decrease under PBC. We build a two-stage econometric model that explicitly accounts for the endogeneity of contract choices, and find evidence of a positive and significant effect of PBC on product reliability. The estimation of our model indicates that product reliability is higher by 25%–40% under PBC compared to under T&MC, once the endogeneity of contract choice is taken into account. Our results are consistent with two mechanisms for reliability improvement under PBC: more frequent scheduled maintenance and better care performed in each maintenance event. This paper was accepted by Martin Lariviere, operations management.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Guajardo, J. A., Cohen, M. A., Kim, S.-H., & Netessine, S.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2012-05
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 961-979
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2126562596
- Cited by
- 259
- References
- 57
- FWCI
- 38.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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