CoChat

Performance in Principal-Agent Dyads: The Causes and Consequences of Perceived Asymmetry of Commitment to the Relationship

Ross, William T., Anderson, Erin, Weitz, Barton · 1997 · Management Science
Cited by 142

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We focus on the principal-agent relationship in a distribution channel. In a services context (insurance), we examine how two facets of performance, from the point of view of both the principal and the agent, are influenced by the perceiver's belief that it is more committed to the relationship than is the other party. Using primary data from 255 insurance agent-insurance provider dyads, we show that each side's assessment of how much it benefits from the dyad is related in a potentially dysfunctional manner to its perception of asymmetric commitment. Perceivers rate their performance outcomes from the dyad (i.e., harmony and profit) highest when they believe they are less committed than their counterpart. Conversely, they rate their own performance outcomes lowest when they believe they are more committed than the other party. We explain this finding in terms of suspected opportunism and offer a partial test of this explanation compared with explanations from theories of equity and power/dependence. Further, we demonstrate that each party's perception of asymmetric commitment partially reflects actual asymmetry, as measured by confidential data collected from both sides. Perceived asymmetric commitment is also shown to be related to levels of communication and dependence in the dyad. Managerial implications for reducing perceived asymmetric commitment and improving the performance outcomes of each dyad member are discussed.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1287/mnsc.43.5.680

Cites

11 of 11 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 11 references

Cited by

See all 142

Metadata

Authors
Ross, W. T., Anderson, E., & Weitz, B.
Venue
Management Science
Published
1997-05
Volume
43
Issue
5
Pages
680-704
ISSN
  • 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
  • 1526-5501
OpenAlex
W2061069071
Cited by
142
References
11
FWCI
5.36
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Performance in Principal-Agent Dyads: The Causes and Consequences of Perceived Asymmetry of Commitment to the Relationship. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1287/mnsc.43.5.680
The paper
Ross, W. T., Anderson, E., & Weitz, B. (1997). Performance in Principal-Agent Dyads: The Causes and Consequences of Perceived Asymmetry of Commitment to the Relationship. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.5.680

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.