Cited by 65Visual perception and processing mechanismsNeural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

How Awareness Changes the Relative Weights of Evidence During Human Decision-Making

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de Lange, Floris P., van Gaal, Simon, Lamme, Victor A. F., Dehaene, Stanislas·2011·PLoS Biology

Abstract

Human decisions are based on accumulating evidence over time for different options. Here we ask a simple question: How is the accumulation of evidence affected by the level of awareness of the information? We examined the influence of awareness on decision-making using combined behavioral methods and magneto-encephalography (MEG). Participants were required to make decisions by accumulating evidence over a series of visually presented arrow stimuli whose visibility was modulated by masking. Behavioral results showed that participants could accumulate evidence under both high and low visibility. However, a top-down strategic modulation of the flow of incoming evidence was only present for stimuli with high visibility: once enough evidence had been accrued, participants strategically reduced the impact of new incoming stimuli. Also, decision-making speed and confidence were strongly modulated by the strength of the evidence for high-visible but not low-visible evidence, even though direct priming effects were identical for both types of stimuli. Neural recordings revealed that, while initial perceptual processing was independent of visibility, there was stronger top-down amplification for stimuli with high visibility than low visibility. Furthermore, neural markers of evidence accumulation over occipito-parietal cortex showed a strategic bias only for highly visible sensory information, speeding up processing and reducing neural computations related to the decision process. Our results indicate that the level of awareness of information changes decision-making: while accumulation of evidence already exists under low visibility conditions, high visibility allows evidence to be accumulated up to a higher level, leading to important strategical top-down changes in decision-making. Our results therefore suggest a potential role of awareness in deploying flexible strategies for biasing information acquisition in line with one's expectations and goals.

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  1. [25]Nisbett R Wilson T 1977 Telling more than we can know. Psychological Review 84 231 295

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Authors
de Lange, F. P., van Gaal, S., Lamme, V. A. F., & Dehaene, S.
Affiliations
  • University of Amsterdam (NL)
  • Université Paris-Sud (FR)
Venue
PLoS Biology
Published
2011-11-22
Volume
9
Issue
11
Pages
e1001203
ISSN
  • 1544-9173 (ISSN-L)
  • 1545-7885
OpenAlex
W2146870963
Cited by
65
References
64
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 4
FWCI
3.57
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • PLoS Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
  • Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
  • FP7 Ideas: European Research Council (230355)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
awareness, evidence accumulation, decision-making, top-down modulation, visual masking, stimulus visibility, perceptual decision making, decision confidence, decision-making speed, priming, parieto-occipital cortex, strategic bias, information acquisition
MeSH terms
Adult, Awareness, Behavior, Brain Mapping, Consciousness, Decision Making, Female, Humans, Learning, Male, Perception, Magnetoencephalography, Observer Variation

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