Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 80 of the 80 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 32 of the 112 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
In everyday life, we have to decide whether it is worth exerting effort to obtain rewards. Effort can be experienced in different domains, with some tasks requiring significant cognitive demand and others being more physically effortful. The motivation to exert effort for reward is highly subjective and varies considerably across the different domains of behaviour. However, very little is known about the computational or neural basis of how different effort costs are subjectively weighed against rewards. Is there a common, domain-general system of brain areas that evaluates all costs and benefits? Here, we used computational modelling and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the mechanisms underlying value processing in both the cognitive and physical domains. Participants were trained on two novel tasks that parametrically varied either cognitive or physical effort. During fMRI, participants indicated their preferences between a fixed low-effort/low-reward option and a variable higher-effort/higher-reward offer for each effort domain. Critically, reward devaluation by both cognitive and physical effort was subserved by a common network of areas, including the dorsomedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the intraparietal sulcus, and the anterior insula. Activity within these domain-general areas also covaried negatively with reward and positively with effort, suggesting an integration of these parameters within these areas. Additionally, the amygdala appeared to play a unique, domain-specific role in processing the value of rewards associated with cognitive effort. These results are the first to reveal the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective cost-benefit valuation across different domains of effort and provide insight into the multidimensional nature of motivation.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
Using computational modeling and fMRI, this study found that subjective devaluation of rewards by cognitive and physical effort engages largely overlapping domain-general valuation regions, but the right amygdala uniquely tracks cognitive-effort value. Cognitive and physical effort discounting were best described by different functions (hyperbolic vs. parabolic), suggesting partly separable valuation mechanisms.
Key findings
- A domain-general valuation network—dorsal ACC/dmPFC, right dlPFC, intraparietal sulcus, and right anterior insula—tracked subjective value (SV) for both cognitive and physical effort in conjunction analyses (whole-brain FWE-corrected p < .05). Activity in many of these regions covaried negatively with reward and positively with effort.
- The right amygdala showed domain-specific sensitivity to cognitive over physical effort valuation (MNI 22, −12, −10; Z = 4.11; cluster pFWE = .04); the reverse contrast (physical > cognitive) revealed no suprathreshold amygdala activity.
- The winning computational model used separate discounting parameters and separate softmax βs for the two domains: cognitive effort was best fit by a hyperbolic function and physical effort by a parabolic function. Cognitive and physical discounting parameters were not significantly correlated (ρ = 0.22, p = .20), and softmax βs did not differ significantly (βcog = 10.29 [SE 3.87]; βphys = 6.82 [SE 3.04]; t(33) = 0.84, n.s.).
- Effort negatively predicted choice (cognitive: t = −1.92, Z = −4.69, p < .0001; physical: t = −1.86, Z = −4.59, p < .0001), reward positively predicted choice (cognitive: t = 1.90, Z = 4.88, p < .0001; physical: t = 1.81, Z = 4.78, p < .0001), while training reinforcement rates did not (cognitive p = .28; physical p = .94).
Methods
- 38 healthy right-handed participants were recruited; 4 were excluded (2 for missing >9% of scanned trials, 2 for head motion >5 mm), leaving 34 participants (23 females; mean age 24 y, range 19–39).
- Participants were trained outside the scanner on a cognitive RSVP task with 1–6 attentional switches and a physical dynamometer task at 8%, 13%, 18%, 23%, 28%, and 33% of individually calibrated maximal voluntary contraction. During fMRI, they chose between a fixed low-effort/low-reward baseline and a variable higher-effort/higher-reward offer (2, 4, 6, 8, or 10 credits; effort levels 2–6) separately for each domain; choices were not executed in the scanner.
- Model-based fMRI fitted linear, hyperbolic, parabolic, and exponential discount functions using softmax and maximum likelihood estimation, compared 36 models with AIC/BIC, and used the SV difference between chosen offer and baseline as a parametric regressor at offer cue onset in SPM8 GLMs; whole-brain FWE-corrected p < .05 and an amygdala small-volume correction were used.
Limitations
- The paper states that the amygdala domain-specificity finding deserves replication and would be more compelling if demonstrable at a whole-brain level; it also states that future studies should verify the conclusions using cognitive and physical effort tasks best described by identical discounting functions, and that the exploratory single-function analyses were based on models that may not have been the most appropriate fits.
- Evident from the text: the final sample was limited to young, healthy, right-handed adults (n = 34; mean age 24; 23 females), so generalizability to other populations is unclear.
- Evident from the text: participants did not execute their chosen effort while being scanned, and the specific tasks (RSVP attention switching and grip-force exertion) may limit generalizability to other cognitive or physical effort domains.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Figures

![Fig 2 Group data reveal similar choice behaviour for cognitive and physical effort. Proportion of accepted offers (±1 standard error of the mean [SEM]) as a function of (A) effort and (B) reward for the cognitive and physical effort tasks. Underlying data for panels A–B can be found in S1 Data.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/ab3bac285dff441990966485afd74eb3/neurocomputational-mechanisms-underlying-subjective-valuation-of-effort-costs-figure-2.jpg)



Verification
Claims the paper makes
11 Valid · 1 Not valid · 39 Not checked · 119 Own results and interpretations
Some cited sources support this claim and some don’t — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Recently, several human studies have also shown this region to be important in calculating choice value for effortful rewards. Although the majority of these have been in the physical domain [11, 13, 14], a recent investigation reported a similar pattern for cognitive effort [56].”
§ Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs > Discussion
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [11] P Croxson, 2009, Effort-based cost-benefit valuation and the human brain, Journal of Neuroscience source
Croxson et al. (2009) is a human fMRI study in the physical-effort domain (repeated trackball target canceling) whose Abstract reports that 'Activity in ACCd also reflected the interaction of both expected reward and effort costs', i.e. cue-locked signals carrying the net value of a course of action available to guide choice. The Discussion states explicitly that 'the role of ACCd in action valuation reflects not just the level of reward and likelihood associated with a course of action, but also the effort costs intrinsic to the action', and that 'ACCd integrates information about both reward benefits and effort costs of an action'. This supports the attributed content (dACC involved in calculating choice value for effortful rewards in humans); the only element the paper alone does not carry is the plural 'several human studies' and the dmPFC label, which the surrounding citations supply. (LLM, conf=0.85)
- Disputedcites [13] I Kurniawan, 2010, Choosing to make an effort: the role of striatum in signaling physical effort of a chosen action, Journal of Neurophysiology sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy of Kurniawan et al. (2010) is a human fMRI study of physical effort-based choice, but it does not support a dACC/dmPFC role in computing choice value for effortful rewards — it reports the opposite. The DISCUSSION states that paradigm differences 'explain the absence of a high > low effort or low > high effort signal in the ACC', and the INTRODUCTION restricts prior human ACC effort effects to nonchoice contexts (passive action valuation, Croxson et al. 2009; mental load, Botvinick et al. 2009). Instead, RESULTS > Effort-related activity localizes effort signaling of the chosen action to the left putamen (with SMA/cingulate motor area), and the only ACC effect was a persistence-trait modulation in right dorsal ACC when rejecting a low-effort option — not a choice-value computation for effortful rewards. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
- Partly supportedcites [14] C Prévost, 2010, Separate valuation subsystems for delay and effort decision costs, Journal of Neuroscience sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy supports the ACC half of the attribution: this is a human model-based fMRI study of physical (handgrip) effort in which a negative correlation with the subjective value of the effortful reward was found in the ACC (Table 1, MNI 6/24/28, i.e. dorsal ACC; ROI analyses) and the Discussion states 'a critical role of the ACC-anterior insula network for evaluating whether or not it is worth producing a given effort for the reward at stake', with the ACC response better accounted for by subjective value than by effort level alone. What the source does not support is the dmPFC part of 'dACC/dmPFC': no passage of our copy attributes effort-related choice value to dorsomedial PFC, and the paper instead reports that during the effort condition vmPFC (and ventral striatum) responses did not correlate with the subjective value of the effortful reward, while its medial-prefrontal value signal (vmPFC, Table 1) tracked the delayed reward. The 'several human studies' quantifier is also carried by the other citations in the group, not by this one study. (LLM, conf=0.72)
- Partly supportedcites [56] S Massar, 2015, Separate and overlapping brain areas encode subjective value during delay and effort discounting, Neuroimage sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Massar et al. (2015) support the ACC half of the claim: the discussion 'A fronto-parietal network involved in cognitive effort discounting' states that previous human (Kurniawan et al., 2010; Prevost et al., 2010) and animal work pointed to an important role for the ACC in integrating effort and reward information (in the physical-effort domain), and that their own results show ACC activation increased proportionally to choice value during cognitive-effort decisions, specific to effort- but not intertemporal-choice (also Abstract; Conclusion). However, the paper never localises this to dorsal ACC, and the dmPFC half is not supported: dmPFC is reported for delay discounting (subjective value of the delayed option, and chosen value during DD trials), while in the effort-discounting subjective-value analysis the vmPFC/dmPFC clusters appeared only at a lower threshold (p<.005 voxel, p<.05 cluster). The plural 'several human studies' is also largely this paper's own single experiment plus its citations of physical-effort work. (LLM, conf=0.72)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Interestingly, although the ventral striatum (VS) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) have been previously implicated in value-based decisions, we did not detect any statistically significant clusters of activity within these regions, even when they were specifically probed using regions of interest (ROIs) based on recent studies [20, 39] (see Materials and Methods).”
§ Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs > Results > Imaging results
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [20] L Schmidt, 2012, Neural mechanisms underlying motivation of mental versus physical effort, PLoS Biol source
The citation supports the sentence’s background statement that the ventral striatum and ventral prefrontal cortex have been implicated in valuation: the Introduction (page unavailable) identifies both as parts of the brain valuation system. The subsequent finding of no significant clusters is the citing authors’ own result, not a finding attributed to this paper. (LLM, conf=0.90)
- Supportedcites [39] J Clithero, 2014, Informatic parcellation of the network involved in the computation of subjective value, Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience source
The citation supports the background and ROI basis, not the citing authors’ report that they detected no significant clusters. In “Regions that reliably correlate with the value of stimuli” (page unavailable), the source identifies significant VMPFC and ventral-striatal value-related clusters; in “Distinct subnetworks co-activate with the VMPFC stimulus value regions” (page unavailable), it describes VMPFC ROIs defined around those findings. (LLM, conf=0.91)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“To date, most research on effort-based decision making has either focused on the cognitive or physical domains in isolation [4, 17–19].”
§ Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs > Introduction
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [4] M Apps, 2015, The role of cognitive effort in subjective reward devaluation and risky decision-making, Scientific Reports source
The Abstract (p.1) states that 'until recently, research examining effort-discounting has overwhelmingly focused on how physical effort devalues rewards', with cognitive effort only an emerging line of work — i.e. the two domains were studied separately. The Discussion reinforces this: 'only a handful of studies have systematically explored how rewards are subjectively weighed against cognitive costs', prior cognitive-effort work did not exclude physical confounds (saccades), and only one previous study (Nagengast et al.) examined risky effort costs, using physical effort. The paper therefore treats effort-based decision-making research as largely confined to one domain at a time, which supports the paraphrased background claim. (LLM, conf=0.80)
- Could not verifycites [17] M Apps, 2014, The anterior cingulate gyrus signals the net value of others' rewards, Journal of Neuroscience sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy of Apps & Ramnani (2014) contains no statement that most effort-based decision-making research has focused on the cognitive or physical domains 'in isolation'. The Discussion ('ACC s and first-person effort processing') merely lists prior fMRI work on the number of actions (Croxson et al., 2009; Kurniawan et al., 2010; Prévost et al., 2010) alongside work on the amount of cognitive effort (Botvinick et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2012), without characterising the literature as treating these domains separately; the 'Effort task' section similarly reviews action/lever-press studies only. The gap the paper actually asserts (Introduction) is social — that cost-benefit decisions 'are not made in a social vacuum' — not a cognitive-versus-physical domain split. Searches for 'cognitive or physical domains in isolation', 'cognitive effort / physical effort', and 'previous studies focused on self-oriented decisions' returned nothing on the claim's point. (LLM, conf=0.70)
- Not checked yetcites [18] V Bonnelle, 2016, Individual differences in premotor brain systems underlie behavioral apathy, Cerebral Cortex
- Could not verifycites [19] TT-J Chong, 2015, Dopamine enhances willingness to exert effort for reward in Parkinson's disease, Cortex sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy of Chong et al. (2015) contains no statement about effort-based decision-making research being confined to the cognitive or the physical domain in isolation; searches for 'cognitive effort / physical effort / domain / in isolation' returned only the paper's own grip-force paradigm (Method, dynamometer/MVC effort levels) and its results. The closest passages make a different point: the Introduction contrasts their choice-based measure with 'many previous studies, especially those in animals, which have inferred the motivational effects of dopamine on behaviour by examining the effort manifest in the actions themselves', and the Discussion notes 'Few studies to date have examined impairments in effort-based decision-making in PD' — i.e., a measurement-level and a PD-specific scarcity claim, not a cognitive-vs-physical domain claim. Since no passage addresses the attributed point, it can be neither confirmed nor contradicted here. (LLM, conf=0.65)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“However, preferences vary depending on subject-specific cost–benefit valuations, and SVs potentially afford a more sensitive measure of capturing individual differences in motivation [9, 22, 23, 45].”
§ Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs > Discussion
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [9] D Levy, 2012, The root of all value: a neural common currency for choice, Current Opinion in Neurobiology source
The Conclusions section (p. 'Transformation of value to common currency representation' / 'Conclusions') states that a subregion of the vmPFC/OFC represents 'subject-specific reward value in a common neural currency' and that equal desirability for two disparate rewards yields equal activity in a given individual. The 'fMRI and the representation of value' section records activity correlating with 'the subject-specific valuations of gains and losses' and subject-specific discounted value, and the 'Different choice tasks within an individual' section reports Basten et al. (2010) showing medial frontal activity tracking the integrated difference between monetary gains (benefit) and losses (cost); the 'Multiple reward types in the same task' section likewise describes Talmi et al.'s interactive cost–benefit signals. Together our copy supports the paraphrase that preferences/choice depend on subject-specific cost–benefit valuations; the citing sentence's further point about subjective values as a sensitive measure of individual differences in motivation is the citing authors' own inference, not something this source is offered for. (LLM, conf=0.85)
- Not checked yetcites [22] N Kolling, 2015, What's worth the risk? A neural circuit for trade-offs, Cell source
- Partly supportedcites [23] T Schonberg, 2014, Changing value through cued approach: an automatic mechanism of behavior change, Nature Neuroscience sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy supports the subject-specific side of the claim: the Online Methods (Item selection; Auction) rank and split each participant's 60 snack items by that individual's own willingness-to-pay, explicitly 'to allow assessment of differential effects based on individual item preferences', and participants whose bids lacked sufficient range were excluded — i.e. value is indexed per person by a monetary bid. But no passage frames preferences as varying as a function of 'cost–benefit valuations': the closest general statement, in the Abstract/introduction, is that 'choices are a reflection of the values that the decision maker places on the available options', which the paper itself credits to Samuelson 1938 (its ref. 1), and the paper's own contribution is that values can be *changed* by cue-approach (Discussion), not that they vary with subject-specific cost-benefit trade-offs. The cost–benefit framing and the general preference-variation proposition are therefore not supported by this source. (LLM, conf=0.68)
- Not checked yetcites [45] C Padoa-Schioppa, 2006, Neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex encode economic value, Nature source
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“In addition, single-unit studies have shown that dACC/dmPFC neurons signal the net value of rewards associated with effort, and the necessity of this region in cost–benefit valuation has been demonstrated by lesion studies that report that inactivation of medial prefrontal cortex impairs an animal’s ability to overcome effort costs [15, 16, 25, 48, 55].”
§ Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs > Discussion
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [15] V Skvortsova, 2014, Learning to minimize efforts versus maximizing rewards: computational principles and neural correlates, Journal of Neuroscience sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Discussion reports rodent studies in which a cingulate lesion prevented physical cost from being integrated into decision value. This supports a role for the region in effort-related valuation, but the paper does not report that medial prefrontal cortex inactivation impaired animals’ ability to overcome effort costs; its own experiment used fMRI in humans. (LLM, conf=0.83)
- Supportedcites [16] M Walton, 2002, The role of rat medial frontal cortex in effort-based decision making, Journal of Neuroscience source
The Abstract reports that rats with medial frontal cortex lesions shifted from climbing a barrier for a larger reward to choosing a smaller reward requiring less effort. The Discussion says the lesions shifted the rats’ decision criterion, not that they became unable to exert effort under any conditions. (LLM, conf=0.91)
- Partly supportedcites [25] S Floresco, 2007, Amygdala-prefrontal cortical circuitry regulates effort based decision making, Cerebral Cortex sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Abstract and Discussion report that disconnecting the basolateral amygdala from the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a medial prefrontal region, reduced rats’ willingness to climb a barrier for a larger reward. But the paper did not find that ACC inactivation alone caused this impairment: it says unilateral ACC inactivation did not alter choice behavior. It also reports impairments from ACC lesions in other studies, rather than demonstrating that result itself. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Not checked yetcites [48] P Rudebeck, 2006, Separate neural pathways process different decision costs, Nature Neuroscience source
- Could not verifycites [55] S Kennerley, 2009, Neurons in the frontal lobe encode the value of multiple decision variables, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction describes single-neuron recordings during choices involving effort costs, and the Discussion’s Conclusion reports effort-value encoding by ACC neurons. Neither passage reports that inactivating medial prefrontal cortex impairs an animal’s ability to overcome effort costs; searches for inactivation, lesions, and effort-related impairment did not find that result in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.75)
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
105 more claims · 1 with their cited sources checked
Create a free account to see all 170 claims and to verify the 80 references still open.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 37
- It may state two separate claims as one. 27
- The quote only partly states this claim. 3
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Similarly, greater aMCC activity during cost/benefit comparison is associated with a greater willingness to exert effort (Bonnelle et al., 2016; Chong et al., 2017).”
From Motivation in the Service of Allostasis: The Role of Anterior Mid-Cingulate Cortex (2019) · cites this paper as Chong et al., 2017
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Statistics that don’t add up
Each reported p-value recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
“Z = 0.54, p = .28”
§ Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs > Results > Behavioural results
Reported p = .28 · recomputed p = .589
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- Doesn’t add upz = 0.54reported p = .28 · recomputed p = .589
“Z = 0.54, p = .28”
- ConsistentF(1.7, 57.2) = 7.48reported p < .005 · recomputed p = .001
“F(1.7, 57.2) = 7.48, p < .005”
- ConsistentF(2.05, 67.6) = 89.1reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(2.05, 67.6) = 89.1, p < .001”
- ConsistentF(2.04, 67.3) = 93.1reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(2.04, 67.3) = 93.1, p < .001”
- Consistentz = -4.69reported p < .0001 · recomputed p < .001
“Z = -4.69, p < .0001”
7 more recomputed tests
Create a free account to see every test the Stats check recomputed.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs > Results > Behavioural results
“During the trial, a central “3” was a cue to switch attention to the opposite target stream.”
§ Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs > Materials and methods > Method
“Importantly, during the trial, they were required to switch their attention to the opposite target letter stream at the onset of a number “7” that appeared centrally.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs > Results > Behavioural results
“the offer presented a higher number of credits (2, 4, 6, 8, or 10 credits) for having to invest a greater amount of effort (levels 2–5).”
§ Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs > Materials and methods > Method
“One option was a high-effort/high-reward “offer,” which varied from effort level 2–6 and could be worth 2, 4, 6, 8, or 10 credits.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs > Results > Behavioural results
“the same discounting parameter but distinct softmax parameters across both tasks (equal motivation but distinct stochasticity across domains)”
§ Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs > Materials and methods > Analyses
“A further 16 modelled effort discounting with separate discounting parameters but a single softmax β for both domains.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs > Results > Imaging results
“| Left IPS | 24, –60, 42 | 1,467 | 6.48 | < .001 |”
§ Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs > Results > Imaging results
“| Right IPS | 24, –60, 40 | 1,267 | 6.29 | < .001 |”
Citations
Cites
A new look at the statistical model identification
Akaike, H. (1974) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.1974.1100705 · Cited by 51,879 · cited 2×
“Model fits were compared with the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Fig 3) [34] and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (S5 Fig) [35], both of which converged on identical results.”
MethodResultEstimating the Dimension of a Model
Schwarz, G. (1978) · The Annals of Statistics · doi:10.1214/aos/1176344136 · Cited by 47,033 · cited 1×
“Model fits were compared with the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Fig 3) [34] and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (S5 Fig) [35], both of which converged on identical results.”
ResultDevelopment of NASA-TLX (Task Load Index): Results of Empirical and Theoretical Research
(1988) · Advances in Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0166-4115(08)62386-9 · Cited by 15,003
The expected value of control: an integrative theory of anterior cingulate cortex function
Shenhav, A., Botvinick, M. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2013) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2013.07.007 · Cited by 2,321 · cited 2×
“The study reported here extends this notion by showing that this region not only processes the SV of an offer but also integrates effort and reward information independent of the nature of the effort cost [50, 52, 54].”
BackgroundBartra, O., McGuire, J. T., & Kable, J. W. (2013) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.02.063 · Cited by 1,927
The neural correlates of subjective value during intertemporal choice
Kable, J. W., & Glimcher, P. W. (2007) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn2007 · Cited by 1,916 · cited 1×
“The duration of each of the cognitive and physical effort trials was identical (14 s), ensuring that participants’ choices were not due to temporal discounting [30, 31].”
BackgroundValid conjunction inference with the minimum statistic
Nichols, T., Brett, M., Andersson, J., Wager, T., & Poline, J.-B. (2005) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.12.005 · Cited by 1,880
The multiple-demand (MD) system of the primate brain: mental programs for intelligent behaviour
Duncan, J. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.01.004 · Cited by 1,846
Neural correlates of decision variables in parietal cortex
Platt, M. L., & Glimcher, P. W. (1999) · Nature · doi:10.1038/22268 · Cited by 1,721
Neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex encode economic value
Padoa-Schioppa, C., & Assad, J. A. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04676 · Cited by 1,598 · cited 1×
“However, preferences vary depending on subject-specific cost–benefit valuations, and SVs potentially afford a more sensitive measure of capturing individual differences in motivation [9, 22, 23, 45].”
Background
Cited by
The Effort Paradox: Effort Is Both Costly and Valued
Inzlicht, M., Shenhav, A., & Olivola, C. Y. (2018) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.01.007 · Cited by 863
Neuroscience of apathy and anhedonia: a transdiagnostic approach
Husain, M., & Roiser, J. P. (2018) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-018-0029-9 · Cited by 640
Self-citationTowards a neuroscience of active sampling and curiosity
Gottlieb, J., & Oudeyer, P.-Y. (2018) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-018-0078-0 · Cited by 494
The anatomy of apathy: a neurocognitive framework for amotivated behaviour
Le Heron, C., Apps., M. A. J., & Husain, M. (2018) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.07.003 · Cited by 380
Self-citationKool, W., & Botvinick, M. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0401-9 · Cited by 288
Metadata
- Authors
- Chong, T. T.-J., Apps, M., Giehl, K., Sillence, A., Grima, L. L., & Husain, M.
- Affiliations
- John Radcliffe Hospital (GB)
- University of Oxford (GB)
- University of Cologne (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Chong, Trevor T.-J.
- Apps, Matthew
- Venue
- PLOS Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2017-02-24
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- e1002598
- ISSN
- 1544-9173 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-7885
- PMC
- PMC5325181
- OpenAlex
- W2590825925
- Semantic Scholar
- 2eebb50d679376a644f004e363c3c97e02c32848
- Cited by
- 415
- References
- 80
- Citations by year
- 2026: 34 · 2025: 42 · 2024: 46 · 2023: 120 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 36 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 20 · 2018: 33 · 2017: 15
- FWCI
- 15.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- PLoS Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Monash University Research Portal (Monash University) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Kölner Universitäts PublikationsServer (Universität zu Köln) (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- National Health and Medical Research Council (1053226)
- Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BB/M013596/1)
- Wellcome Trust (098282)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience › Neurotransmitter Receptor Influence on Behavior
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- reward devaluation, cost-benefit valuation, cognitive effort, physical exertion, motivation, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, intraparietal sulcus, anterior insula, amygdala, neural basis of decision making
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Amygdala, Brain, Choice Behavior, Cognition, Computer Simulation, Physical Exertion, Female, Humans, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Male, Models, Neurological, Reaction Time, Reward, Risk, Task Performance and Analysis, Logistic Models, Young Adult
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-07, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-07 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (qwen3.8-omni-flash and gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1371/journal.pbio.1002598
- The paper
- Chong, T. T.-J., Apps, M., Giehl, K., Sillence, A., Grima, L. L., & Husain, M. (2017). Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying subjective valuation of effort costs. PLOS Biology. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1002598
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.