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Cited by 30Neural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceMemory Processes and Influences

Metacognition and mentalizing are associated with distinct neural representations of decision uncertainty

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Jiang, Shaohan, Wang, Sidong, Wan, Xiaohong·2022·PLOS Biology
DOI 10.1371/journal.pbio.3001301PMC PMC9132335
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Abstract

Metacognition and mentalizing are both associated with meta-level mental state representations. Conventionally, metacognition refers to monitoring one's own cognitive processes, while mentalizing refers to monitoring others' cognitive processes. However, this self-other dichotomy is insufficient to delineate the 2 high-level mental processes. We here used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to systematically investigate the neural representations of different levels of decision uncertainty in monitoring different targets (the current self, the past self [PS], and others) performing a perceptual decision-making task. Our results reveal diverse formats of internal mental state representations of decision uncertainty in mentalizing, separate from the associations with external cue information. External cue information was commonly represented in the right inferior parietal lobe (IPL) across the mentalizing tasks. However, the internal mental states of decision uncertainty attributed to others were uniquely represented in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), rather than the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) that also represented the object-level mental states of decision inaccuracy attributed to others. Further, the object-level and meta-level mental states of decision uncertainty, when attributed to the PS, were represented in the precuneus and the lateral frontopolar cortex (lFPC), respectively. In contrast, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) represented currently experienced decision uncertainty in metacognition, and also uncertainty about the estimated decision uncertainty (estimate uncertainty), but not the estimated decision uncertainty per se in mentalizing. Hence, our findings identify neural signatures to clearly delineate metacognition and mentalizing and further imply distinct neural computations on internal mental states of decision uncertainty during metacognition and mentalizing.

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  • Recent brain imaging studies suggest that propositional confidence formation in self and other draws on distinct brain networks, but dorsomedial PFC may act as a common node for furnishing model-based information for both metacognition and mentalizing.

    “Recent brain imaging studies suggest that propositional confidence formation in self and other draws on distinct brain networks (Bang et al. 2022, Jiang et al. 2022), but dorsomedial PFC may act as a common node for furnishing model-based information for both metacognition and mentalizing ( Jiang et al. 2022, Wittmann et al. 2016).”

    From Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis (2024) · cites this paper as Jiang et al. 2022

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Authors
Jiang, S., Wang, S., & Wan, X.
Affiliations
Beijing Normal University (CN)
Corresponding author
Wan, Xiaohong
ORCID
Venue
PLOS Biology
Publisher
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
Published
2022-05-13
Volume
20
Issue
5
Pages
e3001301
ISSN
  • 1544-9173 (ISSN-L)
  • 1545-7885
DOI
10.1371/journal.pbio.3001301
PMC
PMC9132335
OpenAlex
W4280575679
Cited by
30
References
57
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 1
FWCI
3.48
Type
journal article
Language
en
Update notices
new_version (2022-05-25)
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • PLoS Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China (2016YFE0129100)
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (31471068)
  • Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (2017EYT33)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
Keywords
metacognition, mentalization, decision uncertainty, perceptual decision making, past self, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction, precuneus, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, inferior parietal lobule
MeSH terms
Metacognition, Mentalization, Brain Mapping, Gyrus Cinguli, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Uncertainty

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