The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Good of Wrath: Supernatural Punishment and the Evolution of Cooperation
Abstract
Human cooperation remains a puzzle because it persists even in contexts where traditional theories predict it should not do so (i.e. among unrelated strangers, who never meet again and where reputation effects are absent). The leading explanation argues that cooperation occurs only if non-cooperators are punished. However, punishment is costly, so ‘second-order’ non-cooperators may arise who defect from contributing to punishment, thus unravelling this solution. We propose an alternative: during our history, the fear of supernatural punishment (whether real or not) deterred defectors and may therefore represent an adaptive trait favoured by natural selection. Supernatural beliefs are universal among human societies, commonly connected to taboos for public goods, so it seems plausible that they serve an important function in fostering cooperation. This hypothesis offers an explanation for (a) geographic variation in religious practices as solutions to local cooperation problems; and (b) the power of political appeals to religion to elicit cooperation.
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Cites
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
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Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
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Gervais, W. M., Shariff, A. F., & Norenzayan, A. (2011) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0025882 · Cited by 495
McKay, R. T., & Dennett, D. C. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09990975 · Cited by 474
Bering, J. M. (2006) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x06009101 · Cited by 458
Evolutionary Theory and the Ultimate–Proximate Distinction in the Human Behavioral Sciences
Scott-Phillips, T. C., Dickins, T. E., & West, S. A. (2011) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691610393528 · Cited by 442
Ritual, emotion, and sacred symbols: The evolution of religion as an adaptive complex
Alcorta, C. S., & Sosis, R. (2005) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-005-1014-3 · Cited by 365
Metadata
- Authors
- Johnson, D., & Krüger, O.
- Venue
- Political Theology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2004-02-10
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 159-176
- ISSN
- 1462-317X (ISSN-L)
- 1743-1719
- OpenAlex
- W2116469295
- Cited by
- 228
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 17.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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