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Corruption and Growth: Evidence from the Italian regions
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of corruption on economic growth in the Italian Regions. We estimate a dynamic growth model for the period 1980-2004 addressing both the potential bias of the measures of corruption and the endogeneity between corruption and economic development. We find strong evidence of a negative correlation between corruption and growth. Moreover, since government intervention has been traditionally used to reduce income differentials between the Northern and the Southern regions, we also analyze the interaction between corruption and government expenditure. Our results indicate that corruption undermines the positive impact that public expenditures have on economic growth.
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“Prior work also describes how corruption can weaken the public goods necessary for growth (e.g., Del Monte and Papagni 2001Papagni , 2007;;Paserman et al. 2008, Fiorino et al. 2012), with Italian regional variation being frequently exploited.”
From Taxation, Corruption, and Growth (2016) · cites this paper as Fiorino et al. 2012
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Klitgaard, R. (2019) · doi:10.1525/9780520911185 · Cited by 1,423
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Cited by
Taxation, Corruption, and Growth
Aghion, P., Akcigit, U., Cagé, J., & Kerr, W. (2016) · doi:10.3386/w21928 · Cited by 28
Metadata
- Authors
- Fiorino, N., Galli, E., & Petrarca, I.
- Venue
- European Journal of Government and Economics
- Publisher
- Universidade da Coruna
- Published
- 2012-12-31
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 126-144
- ISSN
- 2254-7088
- Cited by
- 38
- References
- 1
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