Why Prosocial Referral Incentives Work: The Interplay of Reputational Benefits and Action Costs
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
While selfish incentives typically outperform prosocial incentives, in the context of customer referral rewards, prosocial incentives can be more effective. Companies frequently offer “selfish” (i.e., sender-benefiting) referral incentives, offering customers financial incentives for recruiting new customers. However, companies can alternatively offer “prosocial” (i.e., recipient-benefiting) referral incentives. In two field experiments and an incentive-compatible lab experiment, recipient-benefiting referrals recruited more new customers than sender-benefiting referrals. In five additional experiments, we test a process account that invokes two countervailing forces: reputational benefits and action costs. First, at the referral stage, senders anticipate reputational benefits for referring when recipients receive a reward. As a result, recipient-benefiting referrals are just as effective as sender-benefiting referrals at this stage. Second, at the uptake stage, recipient-benefiting referrals are more effective than sender-benefiting referrals: recipient-benefiting referrals directly incentivize uptake (i.e., signing up for a new product or service), which is a high-effort action in referral programs. The preponderance of sender-benefiting (vs. recipient-benefiting) referral offers in the marketplace suggests these effects are unanticipated by marketers who design incentive schemes.
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Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Abhijit Banerjee, 2010, Improving Immunization Coverage in Rural India: Clustered Randomised Controlled Evaluation of Immunization Campaigns with and without Incentives, BMJ
- Ravi Bapna, 2014, Analyzing the Impact of Incentive Structure on the Diffusion of Mobile Social Games: A Randomized Field Experiment, Workshop on Information Systems and Economics (WISE)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gershon, R., Cryder, C., & John, L. K.
- Affiliations
- University of California San Diego (US)
- Washington University in St. Louis (US)
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Gershon, Rachel
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2018
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122393733
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 57
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Digital Marketing and Social Media
- Keywords
- referral rewards, customer referral programs, reputational benefits, action costs, customer acquisition, referral uptake, incentive design
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- Gershon, R., Cryder, C., & John, L. K. (2018). Why Prosocial Referral Incentives Work: The Interplay of Reputational Benefits and Action Costs. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3176019
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