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Cited by 740Feminism, Gender, and Sexuality StudiesDiscrimination and Equality LawFeminist Theory and Gender Studies

Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory

Harris, Angela P.·1990·Stanford Law Review
DOI 10.2307/1228886
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Abstract

knew by heart the forms of the southern clouds at dawn on the 30th of April, 1882, and could compare them in his memory with the mottled streaks on a book in Spanish binding he had only seen once and with the outlines of the foam raised by an oar in the Rio Negro the night before the Quebracho uprising. These memories were not simple ones; each visual image was linked to muscular sensations, thermal sensations, etc. He could reconstruct all his dreams, all his half-dreams. Two or three times he had reconstructed a whole day; he never hesitated, but each reconstruction had required a whole day.3

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  • These marks may not even be visible unless we focus on specific race-class-gender groups.

    “But these marks of the female condition are nevertheless race or class specific-they are not shared by all women, and may not even be visible unless we focus on specific race-class-gender groups.”

    From The Structure of Intersectionality: A Comparative Politics of Gender (2006) · cites this paper as Harris 1990

  • In some ways, women of color are disadvantaged as women of color.

    “In some ways, women of color are disadvantaged as women of color; poor women are disadvantaged as poor women.”

    From The Structure of Intersectionality: A Comparative Politics of Gender (2006) · cites this paper as Harris 1990

  • These marks of the female condition are race or class specific-they are not shared by all women.

    “But these marks of the female condition are nevertheless race or class specific-they are not shared by all women, and may not even be visible unless we focus on specific race-class-gender groups.”

    From The Structure of Intersectionality: A Comparative Politics of Gender (2006) · cites this paper as Harris 1990

  • Poor women are disadvantaged as poor women.

    “In some ways, women of color are disadvantaged as women of color; poor women are disadvantaged as poor women.”

    From The Structure of Intersectionality: A Comparative Politics of Gender (2006) · cites this paper as Harris 1990

  • We cannot understand the ways that women are disadvantaged as women nor the ways that people of color are oppressed unless we examine the ways these structures interact.

    “Indeed, theorists of intersectionality insist that we cannot understand the ways that women are disadvantaged as women nor the ways that people of color are oppressed unless we examine the ways these structures interact.”

    From The Structure of Intersectionality: A Comparative Politics of Gender (2006) · cites this paper as Harris 1990

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Harris, A. P.
Corresponding author
Harris, Angela P.
ORCID
Harris, Angela P.
Venue
Stanford Law Review
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1990-02
Volume
42
Issue
3
Pages
581
ISSN
0038-9765 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/1228886
OpenAlex
W177543178
Cited by
740
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 36 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 40 · 2021: 51 · 2020: 27 · 2019: 45 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 30 · 2016: 32 · 2015: 26 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 21
FWCI
12.29
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Stanford Law Review (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Feminism, Gender, and Sexuality Studies
  • Social Sciences › Law › Discrimination and Equality Law
  • Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Feminist Theory and Gender Studies
Keywords
race, essentialism, feminist legal theory, race and gender

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