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Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Abstract
Games in which one party conveys private information to a second through messages typically admit large numbers of sequential equilibria, as the second party may entertain a wealth of beliefs in response to out-of-equilibrium messages. By restricting those out-of-equilibrium beliefs, one can sometimes eliminate many unintuitive equilibria. We present a number of formal restrictions of this sort, investigate their behavior in specific examples, and relate these restrictions to Kohlberg and Mertens' notion of stability.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1987-05
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 179
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2109183455
- Cited by
- 3,201
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 68.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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