The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Repeated Moral Hazard
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device
Shapiro, C., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1986) · Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511559594.004 · Cited by 4,652
The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Rogerson, W. P. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913212 · Cited by 868
Self-citationRepeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
Rubinstein, A., & Yaari, M. E. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90094-7 · Cited by 265
Cited by
Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets
Spence, M. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260136200 · Cited by 2,435
The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001 · Cited by 1,494
Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Abreu, D., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938299 · Cited by 1,203
Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555457 · Cited by 1,171
Contracting theory and accounting
Lambert, R. A. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00037-4 · Cited by 1,050
Lambert, R. A., & Larcker, D. F. (1987) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491081 · Cited by 1,046
Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships
Sappington, D. E. M. (1991) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.2.45 · Cited by 838
Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (1994) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2527003 · Cited by 827
Earnings Management in an Overlapping Generations Model
Dye, R. A. (1988) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491102 · Cited by 730
A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
SANNIKOV, Y. (2008) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00486.x · Cited by 716
Lazear, E. P. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296345 · Cited by 708
Agency research in managerial accounting: A second look
Baiman, S. (1990) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/0361-3682(90)90023-n · Cited by 679
Reciprocity without commitment
Coate, S., & Ravallion, M. (1993) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3878(93)90102-s · Cited by 651
Is Pay for Performance Detrimental to Innovation?
Ederer, F., & Manso, G. (2013) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1683 · Cited by 646
CEO reputation and stock-based compensation
Milbourn, T. T. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00066-7 · Cited by 639
On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
Spear, S. E., & Srivastava, S. (1987) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297484 · Cited by 637
Consumption Insurance: An Evaluation of Risk-Bearing Systems in Low-Income Economies
Townsend, R. M. (1995) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.9.3.83 · Cited by 601
Consumption and Saving: Models of Intertemporal Allocation and Their Implications for Public Policy
Attanasio, O. P., & Weber, G. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.3.693 · Cited by 538
Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
Fudenberg, D., Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1990) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90048-o · Cited by 483
Chapter 2 The theory of the firm
Holmstrom, B. R., & Tirole, J. (1989) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(89)01005-8 · Cited by 442
Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03027-5 · Cited by 420
The Simple Microeconomics of Public‐Private Partnerships
IOSSA, E., & MARTIMORT, D. (2015) · Journal of Public Economic Theory · doi:10.1111/jpet.12114 · Cited by 344
Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
Abreu, D., Milgrom, P., & Pearce, D. (1991) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938286 · Cited by 315
Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information
ALBANESI, S., & SLEET, C. (2006) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00367.x · Cited by 286
Optimal Retention in Agency Problems
Banks, J. S., & Sundaram, R. K. (1998) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1998.2422 · Cited by 276
The norm of restaurant tipping
Conlin, M., Lynn, M., & O’Donoghue, T. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00030-1 · Cited by 268
EDMANS, A., GABAIX, X., SADZIK, T., & SANNIKOV, Y. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01768.x · Cited by 263
Productivity Shocks, Long-Term Contracts, and Earnings Dynamics
Balke, N., & Lamadon, T. (2022) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20161622 · Cited by 53
Gerhardt, R., & Hackethal, A. (2009) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1343607 · Cited by 52
Dynamic Moral Hazard: A Longitudinal Examination of Automobile Insurance in Canada
Shi, P., Zhang, W., & Boucher, J. (2018) · Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.1111/jori.12172 · Cited by 8
Metadata
- Authors
- Rogerson, W. P.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1985-01
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 69
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2056393422
- Cited by
- 589
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 16.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.