The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
Open accessAbstract
We present a refinement of the set of sequential equilibria [Kreps & Wilson (1982)] for generic signaling games based on rationality postulates for off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. This refinement concept eliminates equilibria which Kreps (1985) and others dismiss on intuitive grounds. In addition, we derive a characterization of the set of stable equilibria [Kohlberg and Mertens (1982)] for generic signaling games in terms of equilibrium strategies and restrictions on beliefs. Examples are given which differentiate the predictions of these equilibrium concepts.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Banks, J. S., & Sobel, J.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1987-05
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 647
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2119040993
- Cited by
- 919
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 36.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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