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Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
Abstract
It has been conjectured that no system of can preclude strategic voting-the securing by a voter of an outcome he prefers through misrepresentation of his preferences. In this paper, for all significant systems of in which chance plays no role, the conjecture is verified. To prove the conjecture, a more general theorem in game theory is proved: a gameform is a game without utilities attached to outcomes; only a trivial game form, it is shown, can guarantee that whatever the utilities of the players may be, each player will have a dominant pure strategy. I SHALL PROVE in this paper that any non-dictatorial scheme with at least three possible outcomes is subject to individual manipulation. By a voting I mean any scheme which makes a community's choice depend entirely on individuals' professed preferences among the alternatives. An individual manipulates the scheme if, by misrepresenting his preferences, he secures an outcome he prefers to the outcome-the choice the community would make if he expressed his true preferences. The result on schemes follows from a theorem I shall prove which covers schemes of a more general kind. Let a gameform be any scheme which makes an outcome depend on individual actions of some specified sort, which I shall call strategies. A scheme, then, is a game form in which a strategy is a profession of preferences, but many game forms are not schemes. Call a strategy dominant for someone if, whatever anyone else does, it achieves his goals at least as well as would any alternative strategy. Only trivial game forms, I shall show, ensure that each individual, no matter what his preferences are, will have available a dominant strategy. Hence in particular, no non-trivial scheme guarantees that honest expression of preferences is a dominant strategy. These results are spelled out and proved in Section 3. The theorems in this paper should come as no surprise. It is well-known that many schemes in common use are subject to individual manipulation. Consider a rank-order scheme: each voter reports his preferences among the alternatives by ranking them on a ballot; first place on a ballot gives an alternative four votes, second place three, third place two, and fourth place one. The alternative with the greatest total number of votes wins. Here is a case in which an individual can manipulate the scheme. There are three voters and four alternatives; voter a ranks the alternatives in order xyzw on his ballot; voter b in order wxyz; and voter c's true preference ordering is wxyz. If c votes honestly, then, the winner is his second choice, x, with ten points. If c pretends that x is his last choice by giving his preference ordering as wyzx, then x gets only eight points, and c's first choice, w, wins with nine points. Thus c does best to misrepresent his
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gibbard, A.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1973-07
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 587
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2043715088
- Cited by
- 3,202
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 44.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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