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Approval Voting

Brams, Steven J., Fishburn, Peter C. · 1978 · American Political Science Review

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Approval voting is a method of voting in which voters can vote for (“approve of”) as many candidates as they wish in an election. This article analyzes properties of this method and compares it with other single-ballot nonranked voting systems. Among the theorems proved is that approval voting is the most sincere and most strategyproof of all such voting systems; in addition, it is the only system that ensures the choice of a Condorcet majority candidate if the preferences of voters are dichotomous. Its probable empirical effects would be to (1) increase voter turnout, (2) increase the likelihood of a majority winner in plurality contests and thereby both obviate the need for runoff elections and reinforce the legitimacy of first-ballot outcomes, and (3) help centrist candidates, without at the same time denying voters the opportunity to express their support for more extremist candidates. The latter effect's institutional impact may be to weaken the two-party system yet preserve middle-of-the-road public policies of which most voters approve.

Overview

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Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/1955105

Cites

29 of 29 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 29 references

Research works printed but not linked: 13

  1. Keech, 1976, The Party's Choice
  2. Kiewiet, 1977, Approval Voting: The Case of the 1968 Presidential Election
  3. Fishburn, 1977, Aggregation and Revelation of Preference
  4. Borda, 1781, Histoire de l'Académie Royale des Sciences
  5. Condorcet, 1785, Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix
  6. Weber, 1977, Comparison of Voting Systems
  7. Boehm, 1976, One Fervent Vote against Wintergreen.
  8. Weber, 1977, Multiple-Weighted Voting Systems
  9. Merrill, 1978, Mathematics Magazine
  10. Scammon, 1970, The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination of the American Electorate
  11. Brams, 1977, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems: Mathematical Economics and Game Theory: Essays in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, 564
  12. Pazner, 1978, Theory and Decision
  13. Brams, 1976, One Man, N Votes

Cited by

Items 201–300 of 449

Metadata

Authors
Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C.
Affiliations
  • New York University (US)
  • Pennsylvania State University (US)
Venue
American Political Science Review
Published
1978-09
Volume
72
Issue
3
Pages
831-847
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
OpenAlex
W4253543286
Cited by
446
References
28
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 33 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 28 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 6
FWCI
31.71
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Keywords
approval voting, strategy-proofness, dichotomous preferences, voter turnout, second-round election, two-party system

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