Approval Voting
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Abstract
Approval voting is a method of voting in which voters can vote for (“approve of”) as many candidates as they wish in an election. This article analyzes properties of this method and compares it with other single-ballot nonranked voting systems. Among the theorems proved is that approval voting is the most sincere and most strategyproof of all such voting systems; in addition, it is the only system that ensures the choice of a Condorcet majority candidate if the preferences of voters are dichotomous. Its probable empirical effects would be to (1) increase voter turnout, (2) increase the likelihood of a majority winner in plurality contests and thereby both obviate the need for runoff elections and reinforce the legitimacy of first-ballot outcomes, and (3) help centrist candidates, without at the same time denying voters the opportunity to express their support for more extremist candidates. The latter effect's institutional impact may be to weaken the two-party system yet preserve middle-of-the-road public policies of which most voters approve.
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“Approval voting is particularly useful for efficiently identifying the most acceptable choice [37], as it has been deemed the most “sincere and strategy proof” form of voting [38].”
From A refined compilation of implementation strategies: results from the Expert Recommendations for Implementing Change (ERIC) project (2015) · cites this paper as [38]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Pennsylvania State University (US)
- ORCID
- Brams, Steven J.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1978-09
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 831-847
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W4253543286
- Cited by
- 446
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 33 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 28 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 6
- FWCI
- 31.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Keywords
- approval voting, strategy-proofness, dichotomous preferences, voter turnout, second-round election, two-party system
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.