Approval Voting
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Abstract
Approval voting is a method of voting in which voters can vote for (“approve of”) as many candidates as they wish in an election. This article analyzes properties of this method and compares it with other single-ballot nonranked voting systems. Among the theorems proved is that approval voting is the most sincere and most strategyproof of all such voting systems; in addition, it is the only system that ensures the choice of a Condorcet majority candidate if the preferences of voters are dichotomous. Its probable empirical effects would be to (1) increase voter turnout, (2) increase the likelihood of a majority winner in plurality contests and thereby both obviate the need for runoff elections and reinforce the legitimacy of first-ballot outcomes, and (3) help centrist candidates, without at the same time denying voters the opportunity to express their support for more extremist candidates. The latter effect's institutional impact may be to weaken the two-party system yet preserve middle-of-the-road public policies of which most voters approve.
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“Approval voting is particularly useful for efficiently identifying the most acceptable choice [37], as it has been deemed the most “sincere and strategy proof” form of voting [38].”
From A refined compilation of implementation strategies: results from the Expert Recommendations for Implementing Change (ERIC) project (2015) · cites this paper as [38]
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Individual Behavior Under Evaluative Voting: A Comparison Between Laboratory and In Situ Experiments
Igersheim, H., Baujard, A., Gavrel, F., Laslier, J., & Lebon, I. (2016) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-40573-5_13 · Cited by 23
Kamiński, M. M. (2018) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-018-0565-x · Cited by 23
“Even the highest profile cases have limited nationwide consequences (e.g., Brams and Fishburn 1978).”
BackgroundGoodin, R. E., & Tanasoca, A. (2014) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.913300 · Cited by 23
Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
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Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting
Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (2010) · Studies in choice and welfare · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_3 · Cited by 23
Self-citationSelecting the Condorcet Winner: single-stage versus multi-stage voting rules
Peress, M. (2008) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9321-y · Cited by 22
A collaborative ant colony metaheuristic for distributed multi-level uncapacitated lot-sizing
Buer, T., Homberger, J., & Gehring, H. (2013) · International Journal of Production Research · doi:10.1080/00207543.2013.802822 · Cited by 22
“3.6.1 Complete approval voting In approval voting, each agent can vote for as many candidate solutions in B as he or she wants and the solution with the most approvals wins (Brams and Fishburn 1978).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialMassó, J., & Vorsatz, M. (2007) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-007-0263-2 · Cited by 22
“Approval Voting (see, Brams and Fishburn (1978)) is perhaps the most well known voting procedure that has been proposed as an alternative to the Plurality Rule. For example, in a recent survey Brams and Fishburn (2005) lay out that the United Nations General Assembly, several scientific institutions (among others the…”
BackgroundInfluentialAxiomatizations of Approval Voting
Xu, Y. (2010) · Studies in choice and welfare · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_5 · Cited by 22
Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records
Baharad, E., Goldberger, J., Koppel, M., & Nitzan, S. I. (2011) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-010-9240-5 · Cited by 22
“This is the balloting method used in approval voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 2005), in which the object is to determine some set of winners when voters’ dichotomous preferences are defined on the set of alternative candidates.”
Approval voting in scientific and engineering societies
Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (1992) · Group Decision and Negotiation · doi:10.1007/bf00562689 · Cited by 22
Self-citationAggregation Theorems and the Combination of Probabilistic Rank Orders
Marley, A. A. J. (1993) · Lecture notes in statistics · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-2738-0_12 · Cited by 22
Coupé, T., Gergaud, O., & Noury, A. G. (2017) · Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1111/obes.12201 · Cited by 21
A social choice-based methodology for treated wastewater reuse in urban and suburban areas
Mahjouri, N., & Pourmand, E. (2017) · Environmental Monitoring and Assessment · doi:10.1007/s10661-017-6039-7 · Cited by 21
“In the approval voting method (Brams and Fishburn 1978), an approval border (1 p m) is considered.”
MethodScoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
Buenrostro, L., Dhillon, A., & Vida, P. (2011) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-011-0602-x · Cited by 21
Brams, S. J., & Kilgour, D. M. (2010) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781118853887.ch11 · Cited by 21
Self-citationExpected utility and approval voting
Fishburn, P. C., & Brams, S. J. (1981) · Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830260206 · Cited by 20
Self-citationStrategic voting and nomination
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“See (Hoag and Hallett 1926, pp. 162–195) Formally, in each round r = 1, . . . ,C−1, Hare performs the following calculations: fvc = 1{[Ec = 0] ∧ [Rvc Rvx ,∀x : (Ex = 0 ∧ x = c)]},∀v, c. Fc = V∑ v=1 fvc + τc + Ec,∀c. z = argmin(F).”
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Pourmand, E., & Mahjouri, N. (2018) · Environmental Monitoring and Assessment · doi:10.1007/s10661-018-6813-1 · Cited by 20
Felsenthal, D. S., & Maoz, A. Z. (1988) · Systems Research and Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830330204 · Cited by 20
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Self-citationNew interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission
Yamazaki, A., Inohara, T., & Nakano, B. (2000) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/s0096-3003(99)00008-9 · Cited by 19
“Readers may think that the framework for approval voting [2], that for ̄exible voting [6], that for Yes-no voting [3] and so on, have already treated the voters' ̄exibility in the sense of the preceding paragraph.”
BackgroundPossible Winners in Approval Voting
Barrot, N., Gourvès, L., Lang, J., Monnot, J., & Ries, B. (2013) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_5 · Cited by 18
“While most voting rules take as input a collection of rankings over candidates, approval voting stands as an exception and takes as input a collection of subsets of candidates [7].”
BackgroundWine Ratings: Seeking a Consensus among Tasters via Normalization, Approval, and Aggregation
Gergaud, O., Ginsburgh, V. A., & Moreno‐Ternero, J. D. (2021) · Journal of Wine Economics · doi:10.1017/jwe.2021.15 · Cited by 18
“The votes are then added candidate by candidate, and the winner is the one who gets the largest number of votes.8 Under plausible assumptions,Approval Voting compares favorably with both the plurality rule or Borda’s rule (Weber, 1995).”
BackgroundApproval voting under dichotomous preferences: A catalogue of characterizations
Brandl, F., & Peters, D. (2022) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2022.105532 · Cited by 18
“Fishburn (1978) uses “disjoint equality”, which prescribes that for two voters with disjoint approval ballots, the ballot aggregation function should declare a tie between all candidates in the union of their ballots.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialResearch in decision theory: A personal perspective
Fishburn, P. C. (1983) · Mathematical Social Sciences · doi:10.1016/0165-4896(83)90014-8 · Cited by 19
Self-citationWhen costly voting is beneficial
Chakravarty, S., Kaplan, T. R., & Myles, G. D. (2018) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.08.013 · Cited by 18
Nagel, J. H. (1984) · PS Political Science & Politics · doi:10.1017/s1049096500023829 · Cited by 18
A generic framework to include belief functions in preference handling and multi-criteria decision
Destercke, S. (2018) · International Journal of Approximate Reasoning · doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2018.04.005 · Cited by 18
“In fact Pl ( { a } ) can be considered as the number of focal elements “voting” for a in a setting of approval voting [7] where voters (the sets H i ) can separate desirable candidates (the sets Max P i ) from the undesirable ones; • for an alternative a ∈ A , the interval [ Bel ( { a } ) , Pl ( {…”
BackgroundDeveloping Community Software in a Commodity World
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The Eurovision Song Contest: voting rules, biases and rationality
Ginsburgh, V. A., & Moreno‐Ternero, J. D. (2022) · Journal of Cultural Economics · doi:10.1007/s10824-022-09456-5 · Cited by 21
“Finally, Approval Voting (Brams & Fishburn, 1978) is another voting method in modern social choice theory (currently in practice in some US local elections, as well as to elect officers in numerous professional organizations).”
Approval Voting in Germany: Description of a Field Experiment
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“The official election results for the whole state of Hesse show the following patterns: (1) the CDU and the SPD are the two major parties; (2) neither of the “standard” coalitions, CDU + FDP and SPD + the Greens, could reach an absolute majority; and (3) the so-called ‘big coalition’ (CDU + SPD) would have had an abso…”
MethodResultZhang, J. (2004) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2003.12.002 · Cited by 17
“An alternative to the binary choice paradigm is the ‘‘subset choice’’ paradigm (Brams & Fishburn, 1978, 1983, Falmagne & Regenwetter, 1996, Doignon & Regenwetter, 1997, Regenwetter, Marley, & Joe, 1998, Doignon & Regenwetter, 2002, Doignon & Fiorini, to appear.”
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Barberà, S., & Bossert, W. (2023) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2023.105654 · Cited by 16
Brams, S. J. (1994) · Handbook of game theory and economic applications · doi:10.1016/s1574-0005(05)80062-1 · Cited by 16
Self-citationScoring rules on dichotomous preferences
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“In particular, we assume that the reflexive, complete, and transitive preference relation Ri defined on 2K \{∅} satisfies the subsequent properties proposed by Brams and Fishburn (1978): 1.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialBrams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400228463 · Cited by 16
“We give several empirical examples in our book that support this theoretical result (Brams & Fishburn, 1983), as do Merrill (1981), De Maio and Muzzio (1981), De Maio, Muzzio, and Sharrard (1983), Nagel (1984), and Chamberlin, Cohen, and Coombs (1984).”
BackgroundResultSelf-citationWould Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential Election Under Approval Voting?
Brams, S. J., & Merrill, S. (1994) · PS Political Science & Politics · doi:10.1017/s104909650003986x · Cited by 16
Self-citationExtension of an order on a set to the power set: some further observations
Bandyopadhyay, T. (1988) · Mathematical Social Sciences · doi:10.1016/0165-4896(88)90031-5 · Cited by 16
Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting
Fishburn, P. C., & Brams, S. J. (1981) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00133743 · Cited by 16
Self-citationStability in electoral competition: A case for multiple votes
Xefteris, D. (2015) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.003 · Cited by 15
“In particular, sincerity notions developed in Brams and Fishburn (1978), Dellis and Oak (2006) and Dellis and Oak (2015) are conceptually compatible with (and they are actually stricter than) minimal sincerity, taking into account of course differences in the contexts of analysis.”
BackgroundAFTERWORD: KNOWLEDGE PRACTICES AND SUBJECT MAKING AT THE EDGE
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Effects of abstentions on voting procedures in three-candidate elections
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Self-citationApproval Voting and Incentives in Crowdsourcing
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Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
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“Approval Voting was popularized by Brams and Fishburn (1978).”
The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking
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Political space representations with approval data
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Ponce, D., Puerto, J., Ricca, F., & Scozzari, A. (2018) · Computers & Operations Research · doi:10.1016/j.cor.2018.05.014 · Cited by 13
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“Brams & Fishburn (1978) show that approval voting equals the Condorcet rule (a rule choosing the Condorcet winner or winners) when preferences are dichotomous.”
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“Dichotomous preferences are used in approval voting [112], in the proportional representation problem [113], in the matching problem [114], in the resource allocation problem [115, 116], in hedonic games [117], and other applications.”
BackgroundDilemma with approval and disapproval votes
González, S., Laruelle, A., & Solal, P. (2019) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-019-01194-6 · Cited by 12
Symmetry of simple games and permission of voters
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Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (1992) · Mathematical and Computer Modelling · doi:10.1016/0895-7177(92)90084-x · Cited by 12
Self-citationde Almeida, A. T., Frej, E. A., de Almeida, J. A., & Costa, A. P. C. S. (2025) · Group Decision and Negotiation · doi:10.1007/s10726-025-09926-z · Cited by 12
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Decentralized revenue sharing from broadcasting sports
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“Brams and Fishburn (1978) proved that messages (0, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 1) are weakly dominated strategies and thus we need to focus exclusively on messages (1, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 0).”
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Jafari, S., Zahiri, A., Haddad, O. B., & Tabari, M. M. R. (2022) · International Journal of Environmental Science and Technology · doi:10.1007/s13762-022-04171-2 · Cited by 11
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“Someof themost popular voting procedures in the literature are theBorda procedure (Borda 1781; Nurmi 2010), the Condorcet procedure (Condorcet 1785) and Approval voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978).”
MethodA characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives
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“In this paper, we present a new result for the axiomatic characterization of approval voting, a well known voting procedure introduced in Brams and Fishburn (1978).”
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“This is because with three voting alternatives, every weakly undominated ballot under AV is sincere (Brams and Fishburn 1978, Theorem 3).”
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Algaba, E., Béal, S., Fragnelli, V., Llorca, N., & Sánchez-Soriano, J. (2019) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108708 · Cited by 10
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Karanikolas, N., Bisquert, P., Buche, P., Kaklamanis, C., & Thomopoulos, R. (2018) · International Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Information Systems · doi:10.4018/ijaeis.2018070104 · Cited by 11
PeerNomination: A novel peer selection algorithm to handle strategic and noisy assessments
Lev, O., Mattei, N., Turrini, P., & Zhydkov, S. (2022) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2022.103843 · Cited by 14
“As common with approval voting [9], voters simply give a “yes” or a “no” to each candidate, potentially subject to a quota.”
BackgroundChoosing an electoral rule: Values and self-interest in the lab
Bol, D., Blais, A., Coulombe, M., Laslier, J., & Pilet, J. (2023) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2023.102602 · Cited by 10
Social choice and the status quo
Richelson, J. T. (1984) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00124942 · Cited by 10
Voting with evaluations: Characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
Macé, A. (2018) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.09.002 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Pennsylvania State University (US)
- ORCID
- Brams, Steven J.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1978-09
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 831-847
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W4253543286
- Cited by
- 446
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 33 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 28 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 6
- FWCI
- 31.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Keywords
- approval voting, strategy-proofness, dichotomous preferences, voter turnout, second-round election, two-party system
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.