Approval Voting
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Approval voting is a method of voting in which voters can vote for (“approve of”) as many candidates as they wish in an election. This article analyzes properties of this method and compares it with other single-ballot nonranked voting systems. Among the theorems proved is that approval voting is the most sincere and most strategyproof of all such voting systems; in addition, it is the only system that ensures the choice of a Condorcet majority candidate if the preferences of voters are dichotomous. Its probable empirical effects would be to (1) increase voter turnout, (2) increase the likelihood of a majority winner in plurality contests and thereby both obviate the need for runoff elections and reinforce the legitimacy of first-ballot outcomes, and (3) help centrist candidates, without at the same time denying voters the opportunity to express their support for more extremist candidates. The latter effect's institutional impact may be to weaken the two-party system yet preserve middle-of-the-road public policies of which most voters approve.
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“Approval voting is particularly useful for efficiently identifying the most acceptable choice [37], as it has been deemed the most “sincere and strategy proof” form of voting [38].”
From A refined compilation of implementation strategies: results from the Expert Recommendations for Implementing Change (ERIC) project (2015) · cites this paper as [38]
Citations
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- Keech, 1976, The Party's Choice
- Kiewiet, 1977, Approval Voting: The Case of the 1968 Presidential Election
- Fishburn, 1977, Aggregation and Revelation of Preference
- Borda, 1781, Histoire de l'Académie Royale des Sciences
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“Therefore, this paper adopts a multiple-choice question approach based on approval voting [17, 18] to extract the limited knowledge of workers.”
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“24 Similarly, approving all candidates, i.e., B i = A , is tantamount to abstaining as it concerns the outcome of a vote (Brams & Fishburn, 1978, p. 835).”
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“Specifically, Brams and Fishburn (1978) showed that Approval Voting is non-manipulable under two mild conditions on the extension of preferences to sets of candidates.”
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“This system has several potential advantages: it can reduce negative campaigning, prevent the spoiler effect, and increase voter participation (Brams and Herschbach 2001; Brams and Fishburn 1978).”
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“In Approval Voting , users determine their own p , while Negative Voting only allows users to express support or opposition (i.e., rank first or last) towards one candidate [17, 64].”
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“We start with one of the simplest rules: regular approval voting (AV) (Brams and Fishburn 1978).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Pennsylvania State University (US)
- ORCID
- Brams, Steven J.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1978-09
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 831-847
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W4253543286
- Cited by
- 446
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 33 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 28 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 6
- FWCI
- 31.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Keywords
- approval voting, strategy-proofness, dichotomous preferences, voter turnout, second-round election, two-party system
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