Approval Voting
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Approval voting is a method of voting in which voters can vote for (“approve of”) as many candidates as they wish in an election. This article analyzes properties of this method and compares it with other single-ballot nonranked voting systems. Among the theorems proved is that approval voting is the most sincere and most strategyproof of all such voting systems; in addition, it is the only system that ensures the choice of a Condorcet majority candidate if the preferences of voters are dichotomous. Its probable empirical effects would be to (1) increase voter turnout, (2) increase the likelihood of a majority winner in plurality contests and thereby both obviate the need for runoff elections and reinforce the legitimacy of first-ballot outcomes, and (3) help centrist candidates, without at the same time denying voters the opportunity to express their support for more extremist candidates. The latter effect's institutional impact may be to weaken the two-party system yet preserve middle-of-the-road public policies of which most voters approve.
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“Approval voting is particularly useful for efficiently identifying the most acceptable choice [37], as it has been deemed the most “sincere and strategy proof” form of voting [38].”
From A refined compilation of implementation strategies: results from the Expert Recommendations for Implementing Change (ERIC) project (2015) · cites this paper as [38]
Citations
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“The Approval Voting is a scc on Di p A q ˚ defined by Brams and Fishburn (1978) as follows.”
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Computer simulations of approval voting: Positional in one dimension candidates' characteristics
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“This model was considered by Brams and Fishburn [6]; see also [1, 7].”
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“On the other hand, approval voting, introduced by Brams and Fishburn [4], only requires voters to show the good alternatives.”
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“AV allows voters to approve of as many alternatives as they wish, effectively deciding how many (and which) votes to cast (Brams and Fishburn, 1978, 1988).”
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“In our setting where preferences over candidates are strict, this approach is equivalent to the one persued by Brams and Fishburn (1978).8 For another equivalent extension see Ching and Zhou (2002, Lemma 1).9 Importantly, if we would define a strategy to be weakly dominated whenever it yields the…”
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“The approval voting, proposed by Brams and Fishburn (1978, 1983), elects the alternatives with the highest number of approvals.”
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“11 In social sciences, approval voting, 12 a labeling sys-tem similar to candidate labeling, has been extensively studied.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Pennsylvania State University (US)
- ORCID
- Brams, Steven J.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1978-09
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 831-847
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W4253543286
- Cited by
- 446
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 33 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 28 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 6
- FWCI
- 31.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Keywords
- approval voting, strategy-proofness, dichotomous preferences, voter turnout, second-round election, two-party system
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.