Self-Reference and Self-Awareness
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“The strong 1PP is also pathological because out-of-body experiences are characterized by an error through misidentification (consistent selfidentification with the incorrect content of a global body representation [55,63]).”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [63]
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“Shoemaker states and illustrates the “package deal” metaphor thus: “[…] in being aware that one feels pain one is, tautologically, aware, not simply that the attribute feel(s) pain is instantiated, but that it is instantiated in oneself ” (Shoemaker, 1968, p. 563f.; his emphases).”
Kant, the transcendental designation of I, and the direct reference theory
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Sebastián, M. Á. (2022) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00564-4 · Cited by 7
“Fichte argues that this “reflective” form of SI-self-awareness presupposes a more primitive form of pre-reflective self-awareness that is necessary for the reflecting self to be aware that the reflected self is in fact itself—see also Shoemaker (1968).”
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“It seems to make no sense, for instance, to wonder whether the pain I feel is my pain (Evans 1982, 179–191, 215–225; Pryor 1999; Shumaker 1968; Wittgenstein 1968, 68; on actions, see O’Brien 2012, 141 ff.).”
BackgroundIs conscious thought immune to error through misidentification?
García‐Carpintero, M. (2024) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2024.2351535 · Cited by 3
“4 Shoemaker articulates and illustrates this “package deal” metaphor thus: “[. . .] in being aware that one feels pain one is, tautologically, aware, not simply that the attribute feel(s) pain is instantiated, but that it is instantiated in oneself ” (Shoemaker 1968, 563f.; his emphases).”
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“First-person interoceptive psych judgments have the property immunity to error through misidentification (IEM, [19] dizzy or exhibits IEM: one cannot commit an error in identifying the Experiencer of the dizziness or pain as other than oneself.”
Background34 The Problem of the Essential Indexical
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“19 See the above discussion of Merlo (2017), Pryor (1999, p. 283) and Shoemaker (1968) —note 9 and associated text.”
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“17 Shoemaker (1968) is occasionally read as speaking to this question, but in the first instance his thesis is about the semantics of self-reference —viz., that there must be at least some self-reference that is identification-free—not self-experience.”
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“Accordingly, as I have argued in an earlier article, contrary to Shoemaker, we do not enjoy immunity from possible error through misidentification relative to first-person pronouns in their use to characterize primary experience [21, 27].”
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“9 Shoemaker would probably not agree with this modification of his argument; in his view, although mental predicates are absolutely immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun, bodily predicates are merely de facto immune. For further discussion of this issue, see Legrand (2006); Che…”
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“Ja jest kotwicą systemu referencji, która umożliwia dalszą referencję (Shoemaker 1968, s. 567).”
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“…of agency is sometimes described as a non-perceptual, non-observational awareness (Gallagher, 2004a, 2005, 2007; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012; cf. Shoemaker, 1968) or as pre-reflective experience or “feeling” of agency 1 It must be added that such more recent versions of the comparator model…”
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Brook, A. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610608.013 · Cited by 6
“Consciousness of self seems to use what Shoemaker (1968) called reference without selfidentification , the resulting consciousness seems to have what he called immunity to error through misidentification with respect to the first person, and the use of first-person pronouns seems to be, to use…”
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“Due to the work of Wittgenstein (1958), Shoemaker (1968), and others, it is well known that many of our beliefs are immune to this sort of error, at least when they are based upon certain kinds of grounds.”
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“Similar sentiments are found in Shoemaker 1968; 563; Goldman 1970: 60; Flanagan 1992: 193- 4.”
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“…through which we have a distinctively subjective perspective on ourselves can be traced back to Wittgenstein’s discussion of the use of I as-subject (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 67) and to both Shoemaker and Evans’ early formulations of the property (Evans, 1982:220; Shoemaker, 1969, p. 561).”
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“Still more, the reference to I is inherently immune to error through misidentification (Shoemaker 1968).”
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“This meaning is aptly expressed by Shoemaker (1968), who writes: In all first-person statements, including ‘‘psychological’’ or ‘‘experience’’ statements, the word ‘I’ serves the function of identifying for the audience the subject to which the predicate of the statement must apply if the statement…”
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“It has been said that these selfattributions are Immune to Error through Misidentification (IEM) (Shoemaker 1968).”
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“This principle is usually called “immunity principle” to mean “immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun” (Shoemaker, 1968, p. 559, 1984).”
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“3 ), Shoemaker (1968) and Evans (1982, p. 218).”
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“Because only one object that is in fact me can be presented through any internal way, one cannot be mistaken about which object one knows about (Shoemaker, 1968; Bermúdez, 1998; O’Brien, 2007; Recanati, 2007; Peacocke, 2008).”
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“Or 7 Some hold, though, that avowals are immune to a certain kind of error: “they are immune to error due to a misrecognition of a person, or, as I shall put it, they are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns” (Shoemaker, 1968 , p. 556).”
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“[2] By this distinction, Wittgenstein drew attention to a phenomenon that later has been dubbed immunity to error through misidentification (henceforth IEM) (see Shoemaker 1968).”
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“identifying the person referred to with “I” in statements like “I try to lift my arm.” Shoemaker (1968) called this immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun and Campbell (1999) argued that reports of passivity phenomena directly challenge this principle.”
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“Shoemaker (1968) makes a similar claim as well.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Shoemaker, S. S.
- Affiliations
- Cornell University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Shoemaker, Sydney S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1968-10-03
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 19
- Pages
- 555
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W71605458
- Cited by
- 642
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 56 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 54 · 2018: 59 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 15
- FWCI
- 0.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Keywords
- self-reference, self-awareness, self-knowledge
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