Self-Reference and Self-Awareness
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“The strong 1PP is also pathological because out-of-body experiences are characterized by an error through misidentification (consistent selfidentification with the incorrect content of a global body representation [55,63]).”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [63]
Citations
Cited by
Items 101–200 of 642
Bermúdez, J. L. (2020) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2019.33 · Cited by 20
Resolving some confusions over attention and consciousness
Taylor, J. G., & Fragopanagos, N. (2007) · Neural Networks · doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2007.09.007 · Cited by 21
de Gaynesford, M. (2004) · Theoria · doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2004.tb00986.x · Cited by 20
On philosophy and schizophrenia: the case of thought insertionPreprint
Feyaerts, J., & Kusters, W. (2022) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/jby3g · Cited by 20
Martens, J. H. (2018) · Journal of Social Philosophy · doi:10.1111/josp.12223 · Cited by 21
Inserted Thoughts and the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness
Gennaro, R. J. (2021) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-61721-9_7 · Cited by 19
Embodied subjectivity and objectifying self‐consciousness: Cassam and phenomenology
Zahavi, D. (2021) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/phib.12201 · Cited by 19
An expressivist interpretation of Kant's “I think”1
Freitag, W. M., & Kraus, K. T. (2020) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12350 · Cited by 19
Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness And Cognitive Science
Bermúdez, J. L. (2001) · Synthese · doi:10.1023/a:1012603425585 · Cited by 28
“This property of ‘I’-thoughts is sometimes described as their immunity to error through misidentification, where this means (roughly) that one cannot think an ‘I’-thought without knowing that it is in fact about oneself (Shoemaker 1968, Evans 1982).”
BackgroundLegrand, D. (2005) · L Évolution Psychiatrique · doi:10.1016/j.evopsy.2005.07.005 · Cited by 23
Taylor, J. G. (2005) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2005.10.011 · Cited by 18
Self-consciousness and nonconceptual content
Musholt, K. (2011) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9837-8 · Cited by 27
“…relative to the term ‘a’ means that the following is possible: the speaker knows some particular thing to be /, but makes the mistake of asserting ‘‘a is /’’ because, and only because, he mistakenly thinks that the thing he knows to be / is what ‘a’ refers to (Shoemaker 1968, p. 557).”
BackgroundSelf-knowledge and commitments
Coliva, A. (2008) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9322-x · Cited by 18
“2 See also Shoemaker (1968, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1996a) ; Heal (2002); Bilgrami (2006).”
Time and creation in Augustine
Knuuttila, S. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139178044.008 · Cited by 22
Immunity to Error through Misidentification
Romdenh‐Romluc, K. (2006) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b0-08-044854-2/04867-7 · Cited by 17
Perspectives on de se immunity
Verdejo, V. M. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03122-7 · Cited by 16
Making Sense of an Endorsement Model of Thought‐Insertion
Sollberger, M. (2014) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12067 · Cited by 22
“For a discussion and defence of this idea, see Shoemaker (1968). i.e., figures which are experienced to have paradoxical perceptible features such as inconsistent geometrical properties that no physically real object can have (Macpherson, 2010).”
BackgroundLudlow, P. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823797.001.0001 · Cited by 16
Direct Perceptual Realism II: Non‐Conceptual Content
Hanna, R. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0003 · Cited by 15
Self-Locating Content in Visual Experience and the "Here-Replacement" Account
Mitchell, J. (2021) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil2021118414 · Cited by 15
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Schlicht, T. (2017) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0968-4 · Cited by 19
Morgan, D. (2018) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzy080 · Cited by 15
Setiya, K. (2015) · Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.018 · Cited by 19
“Shoemaker (1968), drawing on Wittgenstein (1958: 66–7).”
Personal Identity and the Self
Madden, R. (2024) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009570497 · Cited by 16
Rowlands, M. (2016) · Animal Sentience · doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1110 · Cited by 46
Duncan, M. (2014) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.976648 · Cited by 17
Heal, J. (2014) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2014.941911 · Cited by 15
“Some classic discussions in this area are by Anscombe (1975), Evans (1982, chs. 6 and 7) and Shoemaker (1968).”
BackgroundBeyond free will: The embodied emergence of conscious agency
Mascolo, M. F., & Kallio, E. K. (2019) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2019.1587910 · Cited by 20
“Shoemaker (1968) suggests that “the word ‘I’ serves the function of identifying for the audience the subject to which the predicate of the statement must apply” (p. 55).”
BackgroundChanging One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement
Leite, A. (2016) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12332 · Cited by 15
Anderson, M. L., & Perlis, D. R. (2005) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-005-4068-0 · Cited by 15
In Defence of the Shareability of Fregean Self-Thought
Verdejo, V. M. (2019) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-018-0374-3 · Cited by 13
“…component has to do with sources of information about the thinker that are immune to error through misidentification of the thinker in question (Shoemaker 1968), whereas the action component concerns those features of self-thought that have a direct impact on and are considered to be essential…”
BackgroundIn Defence of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness: The Heidelberg View
Frank, M. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-022-00619-z · Cited by 21
Where Are You Coming From? A Place-Based Approach to Developing Leader Self-Awareness
Newstead, T., Eva, N., & Day, D. V. (2024) · Academy of Management Learning and Education · doi:10.5465/amle.2023.0213 · Cited by 20
Memory and Immunity to Error through Misidentification
Fernández, J. (2014) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-014-0193-4 · Cited by 14
Stopping points: ‘I’, immunity and the real guarantee
Coliva, A. (2016) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2017.1261999 · Cited by 13
“Indeed, to that kind of I-judgements, which, following Shoemaker (1968), I have claimed (Coliva 2006, 2012) are logically, and not merely de facto, immune to error through misidentification.”
BackgroundAnalysis of crater distributions in mare units on the lunar far side
Walker, A., & El‐Baz, F. (1982) · Earth Moon and Planets · doi:10.1007/bf00941559 · Cited by 13
The Feeling of Bodily Ownership
Bradley, A. J. (2019) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12657 · Cited by 16
The Space of Reasons as Self-Consciousness
Marcus, E. (2025) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2025.2515855 · Cited by 12
First-personal self-reference and the self-as-subject
Zahavi, D. (2007) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.06.004 · Cited by 12
Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Epistemology of De Se Thought
McGlynn, A. (2016) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0002 · Cited by 12
Bodily Awareness and Immunity to Error through Misidentification
Chen, C. K. (2009) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00363.x · Cited by 12
Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept
Palmira, M. (2020) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01411-z · Cited by 17
Body ownership and experiential ownership in the self-touching illusion
Liang, C., Chang, S.-Y., Chen, W.-Y., Huang, H.-C., & Lee, Y. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01591 · Cited by 13
“Shoemaker (1968) has articulated this idea by explaining that we are “immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns” (IEM).”
BackgroundReflection and Text: Revisiting the Relation Between Pre-reflective and Reflective Experience
Cai, W. (2013) · Human Studies · doi:10.1007/s10746-013-9287-8 · Cited by 12
Real people and virtual bodies: How disembodied can embodiment be?
Meijsing, M. A. M. M. (2006) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-006-9044-0 · Cited by 14
“(See Bermúdez, 1998; Evans, 1982; Shoemaker, 1968).”
BackgroundObserver memory and immunity to error through misidentification
Fernández, J. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-02050-3 · Cited by 12
Morgan, D., & Salje, L. (2019) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anz089 · Cited by 11
First-person thought and the use of ‘I’
Romdenh‐Romluc, K. (2007) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9194-5 · Cited by 11
“1 See, e.g., Bermudez (1998), Evans (1982), and Shoemaker (1968) .”
Self as cultural construct? An argument for levels of self-representations
Schlicht, T., Springer, A., Volz, K. G., Vosgerau, G., Schmidt‐Daffy, M., Simón, D., & Zinck, A. (2009) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080903409929 · Cited by 15
“Moreover, in contrast to the non-conceptual self-representation, such a conceptual self-representation is subject to the ‘‘error through misidentification’’ (Shoemaker, 1968): it is well possible that I see, for example, a green sleeve to my right and wrongly attribute this to me by thinking ‘‘I’m wearing a green shir…”
BackgroundInfluentialA Review of Models of Consciousness
Taylor, J. G. (2010) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-1452-1_10 · Cited by 11
“The fourth criterion is the most subtle of all, but yet is the most important to help “bridge the gap” between outer and inner experience (Levine 1983), to help solve the “hard problem” (Chalmers 1995), to give the sense of “what it is like to be” (Nagel 1974) and also to provide the “immunity to error through misiden…”
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Barry, E. (2016) · Journal of Medical Humanities · doi:10.1007/s10912-016-9384-6 · Cited by 11
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Niederbacher, B. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139178044.012 · Cited by 15
29 Imagination, Empathy, and the Quasi‐ De Se
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0030 · Cited by 9
The Self-Effacing Buddhist: No(t)-Self in Early Buddhism and Contemplative Neuroscience
Verhaeghen, P. (2017) · Contemporary Buddhism · doi:10.1080/14639947.2017.1297344 · Cited by 11
“That this sense of self is a primary aspect of experience can be derived from the ‘immunity to error through misidentification’ – barring psychopathology, I will not mistake my perceptions, thoughts, emotions … for anyone else’s (Shoemaker 1968).”
BackgroundANIMALISM IS EITHER FALSE OR UNINTERESTING (PERHAPS BOTH)
Duncan, M. (2021) · American Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/48614005 · Cited by 9
Editorial: Predictive Processing and Consciousness
Miller, M., Clark, A., & Schlicht, T. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-022-00666-6 · Cited by 8
King, P. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139178044.023 · Cited by 13
Self-Conception: Sosa on De Se Thought
García‐Carpintero, M. (2013) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-5934-3_5 · Cited by 8
The Self File and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification
García‐Carpintero, M. (2013) · Disputatio · doi:10.2478/disp-2013-0017 · Cited by 8
A new argument for the phenomenal approach to personal persistence
Duncan, M. (2019) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01297-x · Cited by 9
“And in 7 See, for example, Shoemaker (1968), O’Brien (2007), Evans (2001), Howell (2006), and Gertler (2011, p. 215–217).”
Gray, D. M. (2013) · Schizophrenia Research · doi:10.1016/j.schres.2013.06.031 · Cited by 9
“And “My use of the word ‘I’ as the subject of my statement is not due to my having identified as myself something of which I know, or believe, or which to say, that the predicate of my statement applies to it” (Shoemaker, 1968, 558).”
I—Béatrice Longuenesse: Kant's‘I’in‘I Ought To’and Freud's Superego
Longuenesse, B. (2012) · Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2012.00206.x · Cited by 8
The limits of selflessness: semantic relativism and the epistemology of de se thoughts
Guillot, M. (2013) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0262-8 · Cited by 8
“Shoemaker (1968)28 makes a distinction between mere ‘circumstantial’ or de facto IEM, and ‘absolute’ or ‘logical’ IEM.”
BackgroundInfluentialXIII—Self-Knowledge as a Personal Achievement
Renz, U. (2017) · Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) · doi:10.1093/arisoc/aox012 · Cited by 8
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Smith, J. (2010) · Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00284.x · Cited by 8
Raymont, P., & Brook, A. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0033 · Cited by 11
VI?Kant on the Identity of Persons
Longuenesse, B. (2007) · Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00216.x · Cited by 7
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Bermúdez, J. L. (2013) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/ant002 · Cited by 7
King, P. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139178044.013 · Cited by 14
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Taylor, J. G., & Hartley, M. (2007) · IEEE Computational Intelligence Magazine · doi:10.1109/mci.2007.385363 · Cited by 7
“This has been shown to possess the important property of conferring ‘immunity to error through misidentification of the first person pronoun’[25]: if you say, ‘I am in pain,’ I cannot ask you if you are sure it is you who is in pain and not someone else? This is conferred by the mechanism b) in the list above.”
BackgroundThe missing pieces in the scientific study of bodily awareness
Kühle, L. (2017) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2017.1311999 · Cited by 6
“Although the self as bodily and the body as subject have been discussed by a number of thinkers aside from those I just mentioned (see Shoemaker, 1968, Wittgenstein, 2001, to name a few), it is important to note that the distinction I make here is very different.”
BackgroundThe Phenomenology of Bodily Ownership
de Vignemont, F. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805397.003.0012 · Cited by 8
Brakel, L. A. W. (2016) · Animal Sentience · doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1125 · Cited by 6
“” He holds that such pre-reflective self-awareness is both “immune to error through misidentification” (Shoemaker, 1968) and a necessary precursor to reflective consciousness and personhood.”
BackgroundEpisodic memory is not immune to error through misidentification: against Fernández
Michaelian, K. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02652-w · Cited by 7
Is the “Minimally Conscious State” Patient Minimally Self-Aware?
Picolas, C. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.539665 · Cited by 6
“I cannot and do not intend to cover here the quite extensive modern literature on the matter of self-awareness from Shoemaker (1968) on.”
BackgroundWittgenstein and Moore on Grammar
Stern, D. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108349260.002 · Cited by 6
Récanati, F. (2011) · Revue de métaphysique et de morale · doi:10.3917/rmm.104.0475 · Cited by 6
Arithmetic Judgements, First-Person Judgements and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification
Palmira, M. (2018) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-018-0395-2 · Cited by 6
Musholt, K. (2018) · Interdisciplinary Science Reviews · doi:10.1080/03080188.2018.1453245 · Cited by 11
“Nevertheless, the kind of immediate self-knowledge described above is considered to be fundamental by many philosophers, including myself (see, for example, Frank 1991; Shoemaker 1968; Musholt 2015 for further discussion).”
BackgroundThoughts on the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness.
Klein, S. B. (2020) · Psychology of Consciousness Theory Research and Practice · doi:10.1037/cns0000231 · Cited by 9
“Indeed, its reality is the thing of which we can be most certain (e.g., Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Georgalis, 2006; Klein, 2014a; Shoemaker, 1968; Strawson, 2009; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1993).”
BackgroundExperiential ownership and body ownership are different phenomena
Liang, C., Lin, W., Chang, T.-Y., Chen, C., Wu, C.-W., Chen, W.-Y., Huang, H.-C., & Lee, Y. (2021) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-021-90014-y · Cited by 9
Bermúdez, J. L. (2007) · Blackwell Publishing Ltd eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470751466.ch37 · Cited by 9
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Matthen, M. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511979279.003 · Cited by 8
Augustine’s political philosophy
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Higher-Order Thought, Self-Identification, and Delusions of Disownership
Maiese, M. L. (2017) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-017-0369-9 · Cited by 6
Ownership, Memory, Attention: Commentary on Ganeri
Zahavi, D. (2017) · Australasian Philosophical Review · doi:10.1080/24740500.2017.1411152 · Cited by 5
“the wellknown arguments by Shoemaker [1968]), if we ignore that issue, the question would then still be whether it is correct that reflexive self-awareness is insufficient to mark the difference between my experience and your experience.”
BackgroundSelf-Awareness: Acquaintance, Intentionality, Representation, Relation
Strawson, G. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-022-00639-9 · Cited by 5
Immunity to error through misidentification: some trends
Coliva, A., & Palmira, M. (2024) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2024.2371423 · Cited by 5
“Inspired by Frege (1918-9/1956) and Castañeda (1966, 1968), John Perry (1979) and David Lewis (1979) have argued that de se thought requires a revision of the standard theory of propositional attitudes.”
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Grünbaum, T. (2012) · De Gruyter eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783110325843.273 · Cited by 8
Wittgenstein on The First Person
Child, W. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199287505.003.0018 · Cited by 5
Klein, S. B. (2018) · Psychology of Consciousness Theory Research and Practice · doi:10.1037/cns0000142 · Cited by 11
“…by the experience itself: Interpretation of that to which the object refers may be inaccurate (e.g., despite our personal phenomenology, the sun does not travel around the earth), but the interpreter cannot be mistaken about how the intentional object appears (e.g., Gertler, 2011; Shoemaker, 1968).”
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Thompson, E. T. (2018) · Sophia · doi:10.1007/s11841-018-0671-8 · Cited by 6
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The Epistemological Problem of Other Minds and the Knowledge Asymmetry
Sollberger, M. (2017) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/ejop.12238 · Cited by 5
CONTENT EXTERNALISM AND THE EPISTEMIC CONCEPTION OF THE SELF*
Gertler, B. (2007) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2007.00121.x · Cited by 5
Augustine’s doctrine of deification
Meconi, D. V. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139178044.017 · Cited by 9
Thinking identity with difference: Society and theory
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Metadata
- Authors
- Shoemaker, S. S.
- Affiliations
- Cornell University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Shoemaker, Sydney S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1968-10-03
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 19
- Pages
- 555
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W71605458
- Cited by
- 642
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 56 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 54 · 2018: 59 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 15
- FWCI
- 0.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Keywords
- self-reference, self-awareness, self-knowledge
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