Self-Reference and Self-Awareness
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“The strong 1PP is also pathological because out-of-body experiences are characterized by an error through misidentification (consistent selfidentification with the incorrect content of a global body representation [55,63]).”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [63]
Citations
Cited by
Items 501–600 of 642
A Note on References to Kant's Works
(2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.002.0007
Self and First-Person Perspective
Gallagher, S. (2022) · Palgrave philosophy today · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-11586-8_7
Engler, F. O. (2022) · J.B. Metzler eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-476-05854-6_67
Two Problems with Shoemaker’s Regress and How to Deal with Them
Niemeck, M. (2022) · Phenomenology and Mind · doi:10.17454/pam-2209
Sluga, H. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108349260.008
Stern, D. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108349260.017
Wittgenstein’s Discussion of “Use of Such a Word as ‘God’”
Biletzki, A. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108349260.011
Stern, D. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108349260.018
Wittgenstein on Rules and the Mental
Munz, V. A. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108349260.010
The Transcendental Argument for Universal Mineness: A Critique
Wehinger, D. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-022-00658-6
“(Shoemaker 1968, p. 561) I will use this version of the transcendental argument as the basis of my discussion.”
Influential(2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199276285.001.0001.002.004
(2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199276285.001.0001.002.003
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Apperception and Related Matters in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Opus Postumum
Brook, A. (2022) · Studies in Transcendental Philosophy · doi:10.18254/s271326680024029-1
(2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198821618.002.0003
(2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198821618.002.0005
Autoconsciência e predicação de si
Pereira, R. H. D. S. (2013) · Analytica Revista de Filosofia · doi:10.35920/arf.v11i2.532
Herausforderungen in der aktuellen Philosophie des Selbstbewusstseins – Die Heidelberger Schule
Kreuch, G. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-25097-2_2
Kreuch, G. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-25097-2_14
Ein kurzer Überblick über die Philosophie des Selbstbewusstseins
Kreuch, G. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-25097-2_1
Is (self‐)reflection a form of intentionality? Sartre's dilemma
Dozzi, M. D. (2023) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/ejop.12860
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Forbes, G. A. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192896445.003.0004
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Introduction: Metaphysical time, human time, and time in language
Jaszczolt, K. M. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192896445.003.0001 · Cited by 2
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Mozersky, M. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192896445.003.0007
de Saussure, L. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192896445.003.0005
The Soul: A Psychological Enquiry
Peters, F. (2023) · Journal of Cognition and Culture · doi:10.1163/15685373-12340173 · Cited by 1
The Cruel and Unusual Phenomenologies of Torture and Solitary Confinement
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Autonomy in the Self-pattern: Implications for Deep Brain Stimulation and Affordance-based Therapies
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.003.0008
Disorder, Dissociation, and Disruption in Self-narrative
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.003.0006
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.003.0003
Mindfulness in the Self-pattern
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.003.0010
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.002.0004
Dynamical Relations in the Self-pattern and Psychopathology
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.003.0005
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.002.0007
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.002.0008
Artificial Transformations of the Self-pattern
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.003.0009
A Threefold Method for Studying Self-pattern Dynamics
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.003.0004 · Cited by 1
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.003.0002 · Cited by 1
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.002.0003
Almada, L. F., & Romão, F. P. (2023) · Sofia · doi:10.47456/sofia.v12i2.43111 · Cited by 3
Zhu, L. (2024) · Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media · doi:10.54254/2753-7048/33/20231125
Ludlow, P. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823797.005.0001
Ludlow, P. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823797.002.0003
Ludlow, P. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823797.002.0005
Against an Epistemic Argument for Mineness
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Bar‐On, D., & Wright, C. (2023) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781394266524.biblio
Against the Pathology Argument for Self-Acquaintance
Bradley, A. (2024) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2024.2320841
“This type of awareness — awareness of oneself qua subject — must be carefully distinguished from awareness of oneself qua object (Shoemaker 1968: 556).”
Know Thy Knowing: On the Reflexive Form of Self-knowledge
Coseru, C. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191990472.003.0008 · Cited by 2
Rowlands, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.002.0006
Rowlands, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.002.0003
Rowlands, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.002.0004
Longuenesse, B. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845829.002.0006
Longuenesse, B. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845829.002.0004
Current Themes in the Philosophy of Psychiatry
Burdman, F. G. (2024) · Crítica (México D F En línea) · doi:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2024.1535
“Such an idea is of broadly to a classic paper by Sydney Shoemaker , who called it “immunity to error through misidentification” (1968).”
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Shutenko, A. I., & Shutenko, E. N. (2024) · XLinguae · doi:10.18355/xl.2024.17.03.09
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Bermúdez, J. L. (2024) · doi:10.21428/e2759450.6de7f0b9
No Self‐Reference, No Ownership?
Ritter, B. (2024) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/ejop.13008
Psychological immunity, bodily ownership, and vice versa
Serrahima, C. (2024) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2024.2412197 · Cited by 2
“Shoemaker (1968) coined the notion of immunity to error through mis-identification, which he traced back to Wittgenstein (1958), to refer to a special kind of epistemic security of some of our statements and judgments.”
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Errors through misidentification and the specialness of first-person thought
Coliva, A., & Palmira, M. (2025) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2025.2452766 · Cited by 1
“Memory-based self-ascriptions are the object of the dispute between Sidney Shoemaker and Gareth Evans.”
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Lamár, E. (2024) · Magyar Filozófiai Szemle · doi:10.70510/mfsz.19752
“Shoemaker 1968).”
The Hierarchy of Selves in Perception
Hochman, C. (2025) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-025-00780-1
“A judgment of this form is suscep - tible to error through misidentification if one’s grounds for the judgment are such that it is possible for one to know that something is F and be mistaken that the thing that is F is oneself (Evans 1982; Shoemaker 1968).”
Empowerment Group Intervention with Women Surviving Violence: Randomized Mixed-Methods Trial
Özmete, E., Gök, F., Serpen, A., Akgün, C., & Aktaş, E. (2025) · Research on social work practice · doi:10.1177/10497315251386751
“Shoemaker (1968) posited that when bodily reactions are integrated into conscious awareness, they reinforce a coherent sense of self.”
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Jaszczolt, K. M. (2025) · Theoretical Linguistics · doi:10.1515/tl-2025-2013
Current Brain Based Models of Consciousness
Taylor, J. G. (2013) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-7645-6_4
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Meier, L. J. (2026) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-025-09628-y · Cited by 1
“Some even regard incorrigibility as defining mark of the mental ([49], 565, [50]).”
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Morfis, K., & Hatzimoysis, A. (2026) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-026-10136-4 · Cited by 2
‘Subjectless’ Subjectivity: Anscombe and Sartre on Self-Consciousness
Li, Z. (2025) · Problemos · doi:10.15388/problemos.2025.108.7
“Shoemaker (1968) calls this feature of the first-person pronoun “immunity to error through misidentification” (hereafter, IEM), and, since then, it has become a clas - sic topic in analytic philosophy of the first person.”
Diehl, S. (2026) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-12323259
Grondin, V. (2013) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/f4ddd687zde5cz4872z98b6z351fac33c3bd · Cited by 2
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Self‐other asymmetries in young children's talk about the mind
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Self-disorders and first-person authority
Bellaar, R., & Feyaerts, J. (2026) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-026-10174-y
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Stoljar, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191897986.003.0017
Stoljar, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191897986.003.0016
Stoljar, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191897986.003.0008
Stoljar, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191897986.002.0004
Stoljar, D. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191897986.002.0005
Metadata
- Authors
- Shoemaker, S. S.
- Affiliations
- Cornell University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Shoemaker, Sydney S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1968-10-03
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 19
- Pages
- 555
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W71605458
- Cited by
- 642
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 56 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 54 · 2018: 59 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 15
- FWCI
- 0.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Keywords
- self-reference, self-awareness, self-knowledge
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.