Self-Reference and Self-Awareness
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“The strong 1PP is also pathological because out-of-body experiences are characterized by an error through misidentification (consistent selfidentification with the incorrect content of a global body representation [55,63]).”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [63]
Citations
Cited by
Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood
Blanke, O., & Metzinger, T. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003 · Cited by 1,060
“identification with the incorrect content of a global body representation [55, 63 ]).”
BackgroundThe “sense of agency” and its underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms
David, N., Newen, A., & Vogeley, K. (2008) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.004 · Cited by 506
“... in sensory feedback; Blakemore & Sirigu, 2003; Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Slachevsky et al., 2001), while neural signatures of such violations can be observed (David et al., 2007a; Chapter 4). Importantly, though, empirical investigations often focused on judgments or attributions of agency involving subjective…”
Perspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism
Recanati, F. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.001.0001 · Cited by 257
Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience
Thompson, E. (2005) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-005-9003-x · Cited by 322
“Authors in the analytic philosophical tradition have described it as a nonobservational form of self-awareness (Shoemaker 1968, 1984).”
BackgroundSpeaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge
Bar-On, D. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0199276285.001.0001 · Cited by 286
The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness
Legrand, D. (2006) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-005-9015-6 · Cited by 257
“... by the principle named “immunity to error through misidentification” (henceforth simply immunity): “to say that a statement ‘a is φ’ is subject to error through misidentification relative to the term ‘a’ means that the following is possible: the speaker knows some particular thing to be φ, but makes the mistake of…”
BackgroundTransparency and Self-Knowledge
Byrne, A. (2018) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198821618.001.0001 · Cited by 211
Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives
Legrand, D. (2007) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.04.002 · Cited by 163
Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference
Metzinger, T. (2003) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1023/b:phen.0000007366.42918.eb · Cited by 162
Gallagher, S. (2007) · Social Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17470910601183549 · Cited by 158
Schmid, H. B. (2013) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-013-9317-z · Cited by 166
“Or, in Sidney Shoemaker’s words: “selfawareness […] does not involve being presented to oneself as an object” (Shoemaker 1968, p. 60).”
BackgroundBetween brains, bodies and things:tectonoetic awareness and the extended self
Malafouris, L. (2008) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0014 · Cited by 134
Swinburne, R. G. (1981) · Cited by 134
Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind
Pippin, R. B. (1987) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.1987.10716447 · Cited by 129
Bodily self-awareness and object perception
Gallagher, S. (2007) · Theoria et Historia Scientiarum · doi:10.12775/ths.2003.004 · Cited by 129
Kant, Science, and Human Nature
Hanna, R. (2006) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.001.0001 · Cited by 184
Magidor, O. (2015) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/phpe.12065 · Cited by 140
Do infants have a theory of mind?
Rakoczy, H. (2011) · British Journal of Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-835x.2011.02061.x · Cited by 123
“…itself works in radically different ways in these two cases: we ascribe such states to others on the basis of (behavioural) evidence, but we ascribe them to ourselves (at least in the case of present occurrent states) without such reliance on behavioural criteria (Evans, 1982; Shoemaker, 1968)3.”
BackgroundConsciousness and Subjectivity
Miguéns, S., & Preyer, G. (2012) · De Gruyter eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783110325843 · Cited by 96
Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion
Billon, A. (2011) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2011.625117 · Cited by 99
“Thought insertion would be puzzling, then, because the patient’s reports seem incompatible with such an ‘‘immunity principle’’ (Shoemaker, 1968).”
BackgroundSelf-narrative in schizophrenia
Gallagher, S. (2003) · The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511543708.017 · Cited by 85
Higginbotham, J. (1995) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00012.x · Cited by 85
Generic one, arbitrary PRO, and the first person
Moltmann, F. (2006) · Natural Language Semantics · doi:10.1007/s11050-006-9002-7 · Cited by 92
Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Selfhood: a Reply to some Critics
Zahavi, D. (2018) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-018-0403-6 · Cited by 86
Experience and self-consciousness
Schear, J. K. (2009) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9381-y · Cited by 95
“To identify the vulnerability I’ll advert briefly to a form of the argument as it is offered by Shoemaker (1968) in the context of the problem of self-reference.”
BackgroundPaying attention to consciousness
Taylor, J. G. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)01890-9 · Cited by 89
Self-Knowledge, ‘Transparency’, and the Forms of Activity
Moran, R. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0008 · Cited by 74
Leadership Discourse, Culture, and Corporate Ethics: CEO-speak at News Corporation
AMERNIC, J. H., & Craig, R. (2012) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-012-1506-0 · Cited by 73
“Although we hesitate to claim that a CEO’s over-use of the word ‘I’ signifies a ‘transcendental ego’ (Shoemaker 1968, p. 555), we contend that in an important annual communication document such as the signed CEO letter, the use of ‘I’ has potential to reveal important aspects of what the claimant…”
BackgroundTaylor, J. G. (2009) · Cognitive Computation · doi:10.1007/s12559-008-9001-8 · Cited by 76
Gallagher, S. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.001.0001 · Cited by 82
G.E.M. Anscombe on the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and Action
Frey, C., & Frey, J. A. (2017) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/phib.12101 · Cited by 65
Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification
Coliva, A. (2002) · Philosophy, psychiatry & psychology · doi:10.1353/ppp.2003.0004 · Cited by 60
“The distinction between de facto and logical IEM is due to Sydney Shoemaker (1968) and was originally understood as follows4: some selfascriptions such as bodily ones made on the basis of somatic proprioception are IEM in this world; they are IEM if they are made on the basis of information…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-Agency and Self-Ownership in Cognitive Mapping
Arzy, S., & Schacter, D. L. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.04.003 · Cited by 68
“To summarize, self-agency and self-ownership may be appreciated through their role in broader cognitive operations in which the narrative-self shapes the cognitive maps and interacts with them, including episodic simulation [35], mental orientation [56] (Figure 2A), or ‘selfreference’ [1,2,57,58].”
BackgroundLevine, J. (2010) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01385.x · Cited by 73
We are acquainted with ourselves
Duncan, M. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0431-8 · Cited by 56
“See, for example, Shoemaker (1968), Baker (2000), Nagel (1986), and O’Brien (2007).”
BackgroundBodily ownership, bodily awareness and knowledge without observation
Bermúdez, J. L. (2014) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anu119 · Cited by 56
Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness
Howell, R. J., & Thompson, B. (2016) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-016-0309-0 · Cited by 72
Augustine’s political philosophy
Weithman, P. J. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/ccol0521650186.017 · Cited by 55
Free Energy and the Self: An Ecological–Enactive Interpretation
Kiverstein, J. (2020) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9561-5 · Cited by 54
“My experiences have what some philosophers have called the logical feature of immunity to error through misidentification (Shoemaker 1968; Gallagher 2000).”
Backgroundde Vignemont, F. (2023) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009209717 · Cited by 57
“I can then judge that my legs are crossed and this selfascription is said to be immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person (Evans, 1982; Shoemaker, 1968): I cannot rationally doubt that those are my legs and nobody else’s.”
BackgroundMayer, J. D. (2008) · Imagination Cognition and Personality · doi:10.2190/ic.27.3.b · Cited by 78
“The philosopher Sydney Shoemaker (1968, 1994) refers to the lack of such knowledge as self-blindness.”
Peacocke, A. (2021) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12741 · Cited by 63
First-person reference in discourse: Aims and strategies
Jaszczolt, K. M. (2013) · Journal of Pragmatics · doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2012.11.018 · Cited by 48
Missing links in phenomenological clinical neuroscience: why we still are not there yet
Mishara, A. L. (2007) · Current Opinion in Psychiatry · doi:10.1097/yco.0b013e3282f128b8 · Cited by 48
How to share a mind: Reconsidering the group mind thesis
Szanto, T. (2013) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-013-9323-1 · Cited by 51
Reference and the first person pronoun
Glock, H., & Hacker, P. M. S. (1996) · Language & Communication · doi:10.1016/0271-5309(96)00001-8 · Cited by 45
Nida‐Rümelin, M. (2016) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-016-0328-x · Cited by 58
Collective Intentionality and Plural Pre‐Reflective Self‐Awareness
Zahavi, D. (2018) · Journal of Social Philosophy · doi:10.1111/josp.12218 · Cited by 50
Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation: The Nature of Inner Experience
Kraus, K. T. (2020) · Cited by 42
Inner Sense, Body Sense, and Kant's “Refutation of Idealism”
Cassam, Q. (1993) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.1993.tb00028.x · Cited by 42
“I” and “Me”: The Self in the Context of Consciousness
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“This idea was further developed by Shoemaker (1968) who introduced an arguably conceptual truth that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun, or IEM in short.”
BackgroundThinking of oneself as the thinker: the concept of self and the phenomenology of intellection
Guillot, M. (2016) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2016.1176232 · Cited by 49
“As I argue in Guillot (2013), the phenomenal model has the potential to explain why the concept of self, when used in self-attributions of phenomenal properties, is also immune to what is known as “error through misidentification” (Shoemaker 1968); but showing this would lead me too far afield.”
BackgroundVoyer, B. G., & Franks, B. (2014) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/gpr0000003 · Cited by 54
“…of self-reference, especially in the context of language and self-awareness— humans’ capacity for selfintrospection, has been a topic of interest to philosophers, both in the traditional (e.g., Descartes, 1637/1965; Locke, 1689/ 1975) and modern philosophy literature (e.g., Shoemaker, 1968).”
BackgroundThe co-consciousness hypothesis
de Vignemont, F. (2004) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1023/b:phen.0000041894.48541.1c · Cited by 48
“There may even be a risk of confusing them and this conclusion challenges the usual assumption of “immunity to error through misidentification” (Shoemaker 1984).”
BackgroundCODAM: A neural network model of consciousness
Taylor, J. G. (2007) · Neural Networks · doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2007.09.005 · Cited by 42
Critical Study: Cassam on Self‐Knowledge for Humans
Boyle, M. (2015) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/ejop.12117 · Cited by 43
“For classic discussions, see Shoemaker 1968 and Evans 1982, Chapter 7.”
Nowak, E. (2020) · Peter Lang D eBooks · doi:10.3726/b16974 · Cited by 40
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Prosser, S. (2018) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12219 · Cited by 37
“On the phenomenon of IEM see Shoemaker 1968, and for more recent discussion see the papers collected in Prosser and Recanati 2012.”
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Daly, A., & Gallagher, S. (2019) · Psychopathology · doi:10.1159/000499315 · Cited by 51
De se thoughts and immunity to error through misidentification
García‐Carpintero, M. (2015) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0817-y · Cited by 36
Individualism versus interactionism about social understanding
Martens, J. H., & Schlicht, T. (2017) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-017-9499-x · Cited by 38
Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership
Lane, T. (2012) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-012-9252-4 · Cited by 33
“Philosophers long assumed that introspective access guaranteed one could not be in error as regards mineness (e.g., Shoemaker 1968).”
BackgroundSmith, J. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-004-4513-x · Cited by 33
“He writes, ‘‘to say that a statement ‘a is u’ is subject to error through misidentification relative to the term a means that the following is possible: the speaker knows some particular thing to be u, but makes the mistake of asserting ‘a is u’ because, and only because, he mistakenly thinks that the thing he knows t…”
BackgroundTransparency, expression, and self-knowledge
Bar‐On, D. (2015) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2015.1032334 · Cited by 50
Lauer, D. (2014) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics201442115 · Cited by 30
Parvizi-Wayne, D., Sandved-Smith, L., Pitliya, R. J., Limanowski, J., Tufft, M. R. A., & Friston, K. J. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1354719 · Cited by 44
“…recipient of those experiences who is not herself an object of awareness (i.e., a dative, not an accusative, of experience; cf., Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Shoemaker, 1968; Hurley, 1998; Panksepp, 1998; Zahavi, 1999, 2003, 2005, 2017, 2020; Damasio, 1999; Gallagher and Marcel, 1999; Gallagher, 2003,…”
Chappell, T. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139178044.016 · Cited by 31
Thinking about the body as subject
Morgan, D. (2018) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.2018.1482432 · Cited by 29
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Mann, W. E. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139178044.009 · Cited by 34
The Feeling of Agency: Empirical Indicators for a Pre-Reflective Level of Action Awareness
David, N., Stenzel, A., Schneider, T. R., & Engel, A. K. (2011) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00149 · Cited by 29
“That is, verbal reports may represent subjective and inaccurate measures because they can be subject to errors through misidentification (Shoemaker, 1968).”
BackgroundResultAuthorship and Control over Thoughts
Vosgerau, G., & Voss, M. (2014) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12065 · Cited by 38
de Vignemont, F. (2011) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2011.01688.x · Cited by 36
“Most accounts of immunity to error through misidentification have focused on self-ascriptions of mental states (Shoemaker 1968; Wright 1998; McGinn 1983; Peacocke 1999; Pryor 1999).”
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“Sydney Shoemaker (1968) famously argued, following Wittgenstein (1958: 66–67), for a robust immunity to error.”
BackgroundIntrospective misidentification
Langland‐Hassan, P. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0393-x · Cited by 33
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Experiential Awareness: Do You Prefer “It” to “Me”?
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“…is well known that they face some serious objections (Block (2007a, 2011a, 2011b); Caston (2002); Kriegel (2009); Neander (1998); Sebastian (2013); Shoemaker (1968)), but it is also true that HO theorists have tried to rebut them (Brown (2011); Rosenthal (2005); Rosenthal (2011a); Weisberg…”
BackgroundFirst-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism
Bar‐On, D. (2009) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-009-9173-y · Cited by 41
“2), Shoemaker (1968) , and Wright (1998), pp. 18– 20. 24 There is a ‘‘thin’’ sense in which I do identify myself as the subject of the ascription.”
BackgroundA Philosophical Perspective on the Relation between Cortical Midline Structures and the Self
Musholt, K. (2013) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00536 · Cited by 29
“Self-ascriptions of the first kind have special significance for self-knowledge, because they are often taken to be “immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun” (Shoemaker, 1968).”
BackgroundStump, E. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139178044.014 · Cited by 28
Review Essay of Dorit Bar‐On’sSpeaking My Mind
Byrne, A. (2011) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00500.x · Cited by 24
“Notice that expression2 is factive, in the sense that if one expresses2 a state M then it follows that one is in M. Expression1, it turns out later, is not factive; I may express1 pain, for instance by saying ‘Ow!’ when the dentist puts a fearsome-looking but in fact innocuous instrument in my…”
InfluentialAuthorship of thoughts in thought insertion: What is it for a thought to be one's own?
Seeger, M. (2014) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2014.942897 · Cited by 29
“Many philosophers hold that thoughts which are so immune are fundamental to self-consciousness (e.g., Bermúdez, 2000, 2007; Shoemaker, 1968).”
BackgroundInfluentialWittgenstein + Heidegger on the stream of life
Schatzki, T. R. (1993) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/00201749308602324 · Cited by 24
Expression, Truth, and Reality: Some Variations on Themes from Wright
Bar‐On, D. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.003.0007 · Cited by 24
“2, Shoemaker 1968, and Wright 1998, pp. 18–20.”
Pathologies in Narrative Structures
Gallagher, S. (2007) · Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement · doi:10.1017/s1358246107000100 · Cited by 24
Klein, S. B. (2015) · Psychology of Consciousness Theory Research and Practice · doi:10.1037/cns0000052 · Cited by 34
“In subsequent work, Shoemaker (1968) developed Wittgenstein’s observation into the now well-known proposition that first-person present-tense statements attributed to oneself are immune to error through misidentification.”
BackgroundBar‐On, D. (2010) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-009-0080-2 · Cited by 23
Externalism and Self‐Knowledge: Content, Use, and Expression
Bar‐On, D. (2004) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00477.x · Cited by 23
van Rooij, I., Behme, C., Gabora, L. M., & Legrand, D. (2007) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080701564271 · Cited by 23
Thought Sharing, Communication, and Perspectives about the Self
Verdejo, V. M. (2018) · dialectica · doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12250 · Cited by 22
The Cambridge Companion to Augustine
(2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139178044 · Cited by 36
Rowlands, M. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.001.0001 · Cited by 36
Consciousness and self-reference
Falk, A. E. (1995) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/bf01128194 · Cited by 21
Two Russellian Arguments for Acquaintance
Duncan, M. (2016) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2016.1255900 · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- Shoemaker, S. S.
- Affiliations
- Cornell University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Shoemaker, Sydney S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1968-10-03
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 19
- Pages
- 555
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W71605458
- Cited by
- 642
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 56 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 54 · 2018: 59 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 15
- FWCI
- 0.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Keywords
- self-reference, self-awareness, self-knowledge
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