Self-Reference and Self-Awareness
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“The strong 1PP is also pathological because out-of-body experiences are characterized by an error through misidentification (consistent selfidentification with the incorrect content of a global body representation [55,63]).”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [63]
Citations
Cited by
Items 301–400 of 642
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Doyle, C. (2019) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.2019.1584937 · Cited by 1
“It also might possess unique epistemic statuses, such as immunity from error through misidentification (Shoemaker 1968) or immunity from ‘brute error’ (Burge 1996).”
BackgroundDrama Segitiga Karpman untuk Meningkatkan Kesadaran Diri Siswa terhadap Perilaku Bullying
Debipriamuda, B., Handarini, D. M., & Ramli, M. (2019) · Psychocentrum Review · doi:10.30998/pcr.116
“…berpikir realistis atas kemampuan diri termasuk kelebihan dan kekurangan yang dimiliki, serta menunjukkan kepercayaan diri merupakan sejumlah indikator bahwa seseorang memiliki kesadaran diri yang baik (Houghton & Neck, 2002; Keenan, Wheeler, Gallup Jr, & Pascual-Leone, 2000; Shoemaker, 1968).”
Being of Two Minds (or of One in Two Ways): A New Puzzle for Constitution Views of Personal Identity
Tzinman, R. (2019) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/papq.12291 · Cited by 1
On the Possibility of Multimodal Bodily Immunity to Error Through Misidentification
Orbán, K., & Wong, H. Y. (2020) · Studies in brain and mind · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-54092-0_21 · Cited by 1
Wittgenstein and His Students: 1929–1933
Klagge, J. C. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108349260.007 · Cited by 1
Wittgenstein on Ethics, May 1933
Richter, D. J. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108349260.012 · Cited by 1
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Thought Insertion without Thought
Patel, S. (2023) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-023-00689-7 · Cited by 1
“In the analytic tradition, immunity to error with respect to the first-person is the thesis that one cannot introspect a thought while also being in error about whose thought it is (Shoemaker 1968).”
On Pettit’s thought ascription to groups
Sirichan, K. (2024) · Asian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s44204-024-00160-z · Cited by 1
“The main characteristics of a singular thought are its immunity to error through misidentification and its ability to prompt or induce immediate action upon the self-identification of a subject (see Shoemaker, 1968; Perry, 1979).”
In Defense of Introspective Affordances
Gray, D. M. (2024) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-024-00734-z · Cited by 1
Récanati, F. (2024) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2024.2359493 · Cited by 1
“Regarding the phenomenon of IEM, introduced into the philosophical literature by Wittgenstein (1958), Strawson (1966) and especially Shoemaker (1968), a number of questions arise.”
Morgan, D. (2024) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2024.2367077 · Cited by 1
“See Shoemaker (1968) and (1970).”
Longuenesse, B. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192864215.003.0003 · Cited by 1
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Hermeneutics and reading Scripture
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“…on self-as-subject center on the so-called “immunity principle” (immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun, hereafter, IEM) and regard it as a purely conceptual or semantic issue (Shoemaker, 1968; Pryor, 1999; Coliva, 2006; Prosser and Recanati, 2012).”
BackgroundHow to infer what persistent things are up to – a Fregean puzzle for traditional Fregeans
Gersel, J. P. (2019) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2019.1610052 · Cited by 1
“5The idea is originally from Shoemaker (1968) and extensively developed in Evans (1982).”
BackgroundAnimals as Persons: The Very Idea
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“The broad sense involves the use of ‘‘I’’ to refer to the speaker as the person who speaks—that is, as an integrative self-organizing unity— the totality of the individual person appearing before you (Shoemaker, 1968).”
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“2 Shoemaker (1968); vd. Gomila (2002).”
Hanna, R. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0007 · Cited by 1
12 Index, Context, and Content
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0013 · Cited by 1
Byrne, A. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198821618.003.0003 · Cited by 1
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“2The view that some beliefs are Immune to Error through Misidentification, a term coined by Shoemaker (1968, 1970), traces back to Wittgenstein and, perhaps, even Kant, though those philosophers would say that only first-person beliefs (or judgments) are immune in this way.”
BackgroundBermúdez, J. L. (2005) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/0470018860.s00206 · Cited by 1
Dancy, J., Sosa, E., & Steup, M. (2010) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781444315080.ch19 · Cited by 1
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0001 · Cited by 1
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Beckett, Philosophy, and the Self
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Taylor, J. G. (2008) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-8387-7_111
“Any model worth its salt should be able to give a sense of ‘inner self’ as well as provide that self with ‘immunity to error through misidentification of the first person pronoun’ [11, 12 ].”
BackgroundCapone, A. (2013) · Perspectives in pragmatics, psychology & philosophy · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-01011-3_18
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BUFORD, C. T. (2008) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400802257747 · Cited by 1
“One way of making this point is by stating that the latter, but not the former, is immune to error through misidentification [Shoemaker 1968].”
BackgroundImpersonal Identity and Corrupting Concepts
Behrendt, K. (2005) · The Southern Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2005.tb01949.x
Neural architectures for thinking, reasoning and being conscious
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Centering on Demonstrative Thought
BUFORD, C. T. (2013) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-013-9448-z
Agency and First-Person Reference
Kapitän, T. (2012) · Crítica (México D F En línea) · doi:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2012.768
“…this last feature of first-person reference implies the well-known principle of immunity from error through misidentification relative to the first person (IEM), that is, that one cannot be mistaken that it is oneself that one refers to with the first-person pronoun (Shoemaker 1968, pp. 556– 557).”
BackgroundThrough Attention to Consciousness
Taylor, J. G. (2008) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-8387-7_59
“This precursor signal has been proposed [6, 7, 9, 10] as that generating the experience of ‘ownership’ or of ‘being there’ [17], and leading to the important mental property of ‘immunity to error through misidentification of the first person pronoun’ [ 18 ].”
BackgroundModeling Expressing on Demonstrating
Tumulty, M. (2011) · Journal of Philosophical Research · doi:10.5840/jpr_2011_9
Carruthers, G. (2011) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2011.563541
“These perceptual self-representations are thought not to involve identification of the self as they are immune to errors of misidentification (p. 77; see also Shoemaker, 1968).”
BackgroundBenbaji, H. (2013) · Dialogue · doi:10.1017/s0012217313000231
Perception, nonconceptual content, and immunity to error through misidentification
Cahen, A., & Musholt, K. (2016) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2015.1122548
7 Modal and Temporal Innocence
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0008
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0007
13 The Two‐Stage Picture: Lewis vs. Kaplan and Stalnaker
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0014
Introduction: The Special Security of Some “I” Talk
Bar‐On, D. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199276285.003.0001
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0028
25 What Is Wrong with Reflexivism
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0026
14 Rescuing the Two‐Stage Picture
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0015
35 Perry Against Relativized Propositions
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0036
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0019
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0029
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0037
“I”-Ascriptions: The Semantic and the Epistemic
Bar‐On, D. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199276285.003.0003
24 Reflexivity: Internal or External?
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0025
17 The Content of Perceptual Judgements
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0018
37 Implicit and Explicit De Se Thoughts
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0038
32 Three (Alleged) Arguments for the Externality Principle
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0033
30 The Context‐Dependence of the Lekton : How Far Can We Go?
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0031
10 Rebutting Richard's Argument
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0011
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0012
Content Externalism, Skepticism, and the Recognitional Conception of Self-Knowledge
Bar‐On, D. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199276285.003.0005
Manifest Realism I: A Critique of Scientific Essentialism
Hanna, R. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0004
23 The (Alleged) Reflexivity of De Se Thoughts
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0024
38 The Generalized Reflexive Constraint
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0039
16 Duality and the Fallacy of Misplaced Information
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0017
Philosophical Issue 3: What Makes a Thought My Thought?
Young, G. (2013) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9781137329325_8
The Distinctive Security Of Avowals: Ascriptive Immunity to Error
Bar‐On, D. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199276285.003.0006
Avowals: ‘Grammar’ and Expression
Bar‐On, D. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199276285.003.0007
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0004
2 Radical vs. Moderate Relativism
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0003
9 An Epistemic Argument against Temporalism
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0010
5 Modal vs. Extensional Treatments of Tense
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0006
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0020
Metadata
- Authors
- Shoemaker, S. S.
- Affiliations
- Cornell University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Shoemaker, Sydney S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1968-10-03
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 19
- Pages
- 555
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W71605458
- Cited by
- 642
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 56 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 54 · 2018: 59 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 15
- FWCI
- 0.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Keywords
- self-reference, self-awareness, self-knowledge
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