Self-Reference and Self-Awareness
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“The strong 1PP is also pathological because out-of-body experiences are characterized by an error through misidentification (consistent selfidentification with the incorrect content of a global body representation [55,63]).”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [63]
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Cited by
Items 401–500 of 642
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0002
31 Unarticulatedness and the ‘Concerning’ Relation
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0032
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0041
39 Parametric Invariance and m ‐Shiftability
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0040
4 Branch Points for Moderate Relativism
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0005
Using “I” ‘as Subject’: Cartesian Reference or No Reference?
Bar‐On, D. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199276285.003.0002
The Epistemic Approach to Avowals' Security: Introspection and Transparency
Bar‐On, D. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199276285.003.0004
21 Quasi‐Perception and Quasi‐Memory
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0022
Direct Perceptual Realism I: The Refutation of Idealism
Hanna, R. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0002
41 The Anaphoric Mode: A Bühlerian Perspective
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0042
8 Temporal Operators and Temporal Propositions in an Extensional Framework
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0009
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0023
God’s eternal knowledge according to Augustine
Cavadini, J. C. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139178044.005 · Cited by 1
15 Content, Character, and Cognitive Significance
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0016
Manifest Realism II: Why Gold is Necessarily a Yellow Metal
Hanna, R. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0005
26 De Se Thoughts and Subjectivity
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0027
Text-Krisen und Medien-Erlösungen
Ellrich, L. (1999) · J.B. Metzler eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-476-05565-1_22
The Semantics and Pragmatics of Attitudes ‘de se’
Capone, A. (2016) · Perspectives in pragmatics, psychology & philosophy · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-41078-4_10
Phantoms and Movements, Or, Are We Really Just Our Brains?
Meijsing, M. A. M. M. (2007) · Theoria et Historia Scientiarum · doi:10.12775/ths.2003.006
Northoff, G. (2014) · doi:10.1007/978-1-137-40605-7_19
권홍우 (2017) · CHUL HAK SA SANG - Journal of Philosophical Ideas · doi:10.15750/chss..64.201705.005
Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo (consciente e inconscientemente) sin saber que las creo
Sebastián, M. Á. (2017) · Crítica (México D F En línea) · doi:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.180 · Cited by 1
De Se Beliefs, Self-Ascription, and Primitiveness
Wüstholz, F. L. (2017) · Disputatio · doi:10.1515/disp-2017-0012
“However, such an account of self-ascription would clash with the mere possibility of de se beliefs that exhibit ‘immunity to error through misidentification’ (Evans 1982; Shoemaker 1968).”
BackgroundPlural Pre‐Reflective Self‐Awareness and the Problem of the Body
Weir, R. (2018) · Journal of Social Philosophy · doi:10.1111/josp.12224
Desire, Intention, and Emotion
Byrne, A. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198821618.003.0007
Memory, Imagination, and Thought
Byrne, A. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198821618.003.0008
Byrne, A. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198821618.003.0006
Byrne, A. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198821618.003.0001
Byrne, A. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198821618.003.0004
The meaning of “I” in “I”‐thought
Huang, M. (2018) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12193
Saha, S. C. (2015) · Tattva - Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.12726/tjp.13.4
The Chimeric Self: A Neo Naturalist Bundle Theory of the Self
Compiani, L. (2019) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00202 · Cited by 3
“…| www.frontiersin.org 2 February 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 202 person,” as prescribed by analytic Wittgensteinian philosophy (Strawson, 1959; Shoemaker, 1968, 1994; Cassam, 1994, 1997; Perry, 2001, 2002); rather, nowadays, the goal is to naturalize subjective experience, phenomenal…”
Why We Need Interperspectival Content
Ludlow, P. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0001
Some Additional Metaphysical Questions
Ludlow, P. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0007
Interperspectival Content and Physical Theory
Ludlow, P. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0008
Some Alternative Accounts of Interperspectival Content
Ludlow, P. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0004
McLear, C. (2019) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/ejop.12433
Communication Using Interperspectival Contents
Ludlow, P. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0003
A-Series/B-Series Compatibilism
Ludlow, P. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0006
Computation, Information, and Interperspectival Content
Ludlow, P. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0005
Tense and Interperspectival Content
Ludlow, P. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0002
Rowlands, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0008
Rowlands, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0003
Naturalizing Self-Consciousness: The representationalist approach of F. Dretske
Kryvitchenko, O. O. (2018) · Grani · doi:10.15421/1718145
Other-Awareness: Mindreading and Shame
Rowlands, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0010
Rowlands, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0009
Pre-Intentional Awareness of Self
Rowlands, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0007
Animals as Persons and Why It Matters
Rowlands, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0011
Rowlands, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0002
Avowals: Expression, Content, and Truth
Bar‐On, D. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199276285.003.0008
Challenges in Current Philosophy of Self-Consciousness – The Heidelberg School
Kreuch, G. (2019) · Contributions to phenomenology · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-30789-9_2
A Brief Overview of Philosophy of Self-Consciousness
Kreuch, G. (2019) · Contributions to phenomenology · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-30789-9_1 · Cited by 1
Longuenesse, B. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845829.003.0002
Longuenesse, B. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845829.003.0001
Self-knowledge, Discriminability, and Demonstrative Thoughts
Yi, H. (2020) · Organon F · doi:10.31577/orgf.2020.27105
Self-Consciousness and The Self-As-Subject
Lougheed, T. (2014) · Carleton University's Institutional Repository (MacOdrum Library, Carleton University) · doi:10.22215/etd/2014-10476
What is wrong with Baldy? Radical non-referring view of “I”
Özaltun, E. (2020) · Enrahonar An international journal of theoretical and practical reason · doi:10.5565/rev/enrahonar.1284
Modern Philosophical Views of Self
Brakel, L. A. W. (2020) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-44645-1_3
Fiorin, G., & Delfitto, D. (2020) · Perspectives in pragmatics, psychology & philosophy · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-46317-5_28
Avowals and the project of inferentialism
Reichardt, B. (2020) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01497-w
“Wittgenstein assumes that the “immunity to error through mis-identification”—as Shoemaker (1968) later calls it—is dependent on the circumstance that the subjectusage of “I” is a non-referential, expressive way of speaking.”
BackgroundUse as Subject and Use as Object of ‘I’ Revisited
Ritter, B. (2020) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-44634-5_13
“Two Kinds of Use of ‘I’”: The Middle Wittgenstein on “I” and the Self
Child, W. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108349260.009
First-person and the semantic roots of Moore’s paradox
Delfitto, D., & Fiorin, G. (2020) · Intercultural Pragmatics · doi:10.1515/ip-2020-3001
Person in a Social and Technological World
Alcaraz, A. Ł. (2020) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-60315-1_4
Current Accounts of Subjective Character and Brentano’s Concept of Secondary Consciousness
Niemeck, M. (2020) · Primary sources in phenomenology · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-48563-4_4 · Cited by 1
Foundational Mereology as a Logical Tool for Descriptive Psychology
Leclercq, B. (2020) · Primary sources in phenomenology · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-48563-4_8 · Cited by 2
Romdenh‐Romluc, K. (2021) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/ejop.12717
The ‘I’ in the Monad: Leibniz and the Essential Indexical
Corazza, E., & Genovesi, C. (2021) · JOLMA · doi:10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2021/02/004
Levy, S. (1990) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-10969-2_1
Sultana, M. (2021) · Forum Philosophicum · doi:10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.09
Meconi, D. V., & Stump, E. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139178044.027
Stump, E., & Meconi, D. V. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139178044.002
Bermúdez on Self-Consciousness
Garrett, B. J., & Joaquin, J. J. (2021) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-85517-8_21
Bochner, G. (2021) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/phib.12225
Subjektivität in Raum und Zeit – mit Blick auf Dieter Henrich
Koch, A. F. (2022) · Abhandlungen zur Philosophie · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-63683-1_5
Selbstbewusstsein und bewusstes Leben
Freundlieb, D. (2022) · Abhandlungen zur Philosophie · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-63683-1_9
Byrne, A. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198821618.003.0005
Ludlow, P. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0009
Kreuch, G. (2019) · Contributions to phenomenology · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-30789-9_14
Hanna, R. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0001
Rowlands, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0004
Bermúdez, J. L. (2017) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781119132363.ch34
Rowlands, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0006
de Fornel, M., & Verdier, M. (2014) · Éditions de l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales eBooks · doi:10.4000/books.editionsehess.12984
Self: Body Awareness and Self-Awareness ☆
Bermúdez, J. L. (2017) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-809324-5.05967-8
Rowlands, M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0005
Externalismus und Selbstkenntnis: Evans’ Kompatibilismus
Szanto, T. (2017) · Brill | mentis eBooks · doi:10.30965/9783957438034_016
THE DYNAMICS OF DE SE THOUGHTS
Muniz, P. H. G. (2017) · doi:10.17771/pucrio.acad.31525
Ludlow, P. W. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0010
Récanati, F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.003.0034
Self-Knowledge, “Transparency,” and the Forms of Activity
Moran, R. (2017) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190633776.003.0015
Byrne, A. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198821618.003.0002
Gesturing Beyond Modernism: Frank O’Hara, Metonymy, and the Performing Self
Levi, M. (2022) · American Studies in Scandinavia · doi:10.22439/asca.v54i1.6599
Viendo lo que es visto: la atribución de autoconciencia a los animales
de Castro, I. R., & Iglesias, A. V. (2022) · Sincronía · doi:10.32870/sincronia.axxvi.n82.38b22
Cartesian People 1: The Body a Machine
Meijsing, M. A. M. M. (2022) · Studies in brain and mind · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-09524-5_4
(2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.002.0003
(2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.002.0004
(2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.002.0003
(2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.002.0004
Metadata
- Authors
- Shoemaker, S. S.
- Affiliations
- Cornell University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Shoemaker, Sydney S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1968-10-03
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 19
- Pages
- 555
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W71605458
- Cited by
- 642
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 56 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 54 · 2018: 59 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 15
- FWCI
- 0.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Keywords
- self-reference, self-awareness, self-knowledge
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