The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Abstract
The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the “better” of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred. Most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote “sincerely” in the collective decision making, a seemingly innocuous assumption, given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative. However, in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference. In particular, sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. A satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably “do better” than individuals, therefore, has yet to be derived.
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Citations
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Self-citationInformation Pooling and Group Decision Making
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Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting
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Fearon, J. D. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr038 · Cited by 504
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What failure in collective decision-making tells us about metacognition
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“On this account, when participants are sincere in their opinions, the shared metacognitive awareness that informs the joint decision provides a noisy but still informative estimate of the true state of the world which can be used as a substitute for the missing feedback about decision outcomes [35].”
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Katz, D. M., & Bommarito, M. J. (2014) · Artificial Intelligence and Law · doi:10.1007/s10506-014-9160-8 · Cited by 117
Chen, J. H., Alagappan, M., Goldstein, M. K., Asch, S. M., & Altman, R. B. (2017) · International Journal of Medical Informatics · doi:10.1016/j.ijmedinf.2017.03.006 · Cited by 101
Must group agents be rational? List and Pettit’s theory of judgement aggregation and group agency.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Austen-Smith, D., & Banks, J. S.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1996-03
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 34-45
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2017687874
- Cited by
- 1,062
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 21.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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