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The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies
Abstract
I present a formal model of the confidence vote procedure, an institutional arrangement that permits a prime minister to attach the fate of a particular policy to a vote on government survival. The analysis indicates that confidence vote procedures make it possible for prime ministers to exercise significant control over the nature of policy outcomes, even when these procedures are not actually invoked. Neither cabinet ministers, through their authority over specific portfolios, nor members of parliament, through the use of no-confidence motions, can counteract the prime minister's policy control on the floor of parliament. The analysis also illuminates the circumstances under which prime ministers should invoke confidence vote procedures, focusing attention on the position-taking incentives of the parties that support the government, rather than on the level of policy conflict between the government and parliament.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Huber, J. D.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1996-06
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 269-282
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2125563281
- Cited by
- 463
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 33.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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