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Cited by 1,362Economic Theory and InstitutionsManagement and Organizational StudiesEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 122 of the 128 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet.

A Grammar of Institutions

Crawford, Sue E. S., Ostrom, Elinor·1995·American Political Science Review
DOI 10.2307/2082975
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Abstract

The institutional grammar introduced here is based on a view that institutions are enduring regularities of human action in situations structured by rules, norms, and shared strategies, as well as by the physical world. The rules, norms, and shared strategies are constituted and reconstituted by human interaction in frequently occurring or repetitive situations. The syntax of the grammar identifies components of institutions and sorts them into three types of institutional statements: rules, norms, and shared strategies. We introduce the grammar, outline methods for operationalizing the syntax, apply the syntax to an analysis of cooperation in collective dilemma situations, and discuss the pragmatics of the grammar for analyses of behavior within complex institutional settings.

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Crossref · 10.2307/2082975

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Citations

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5 of the 128 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. Popper, 1967, Le fondements philosophiques des systems economiques
  2. Ostrom, 1986, Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector
  3. Coleman, 1987, Economic Imperialism
  4. Mansbridge, 1990, Beyond Self-interest
  5. Frank, 1988, Passions within Reason
  6. Schauer, 1991, Playing by the Rules
  7. McGinnis Michael D. 1993. “Heterogeneity of Interpretation: Rule Repertoires, Strategies, and Regime Maintenance.” Presented at the conference on Heterogeneity and Collective Action, Indiana University, Bloomington.
  8. von Wright, 1951, Deontic Logic., Mind, 60, 58
  9. Weissing, 1991, Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals, and Markets
  10. Offe, 1980, Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational Form., Political Power and Social Theory, 1, 67

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Metadata

Authors
Crawford, S. E. S., & Ostrom, E.
Affiliations
Creighton University (US)
Venue
American Political Science Review
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
1995-09
Volume
89
Issue
3
Pages
582-600
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
DOI
10.2307/2082975
OpenAlex
W2037627831
Semantic Scholar
e2582728285ec5ceceeb904176b496cf94a46753
Cited by
1,362
References
128
Citations by year
2026: 59 · 2025: 80 · 2024: 47 · 2023: 72 · 2022: 68 · 2021: 98 · 2020: 101 · 2019: 123 · 2018: 74 · 2017: 49 · 2016: 55 · 2015: 61 · 2014: 55 · 2013: 53 · 2012: 54
FWCI
12.60
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 6576 d)
Locations
  • American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Management and Organizational Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Keywords
institutional grammar, institutions, rules, norms, institutional statements, cooperation, social norms, human interaction

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