The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior
Abstract
Theory: The costs imposed by income tax and other citizenship duties provide powerful incentives to free ride, yet the likelihood of getting caught-the primary self-interested deterrent to free-riding-is unlikely to be known with much accuracy by most citizens. Thus the duty heuristic provides not only a direct motivation to comply, but also influences behavior through cognitive processes that bias self-interested beliefs about the advantages of free-riding. Hypothesis: Citizens' beliefs about their duty to obey laws of the state bias their information processing and judgements about the fear of getting caught and punished for disobedience, so citizens reporting greater commitment to obey tax laws systematically overestimate the expected penalty for noncompliance. Methods: Regression analysis of survey and tax-return data for 445 taxpayers. Results: Subjective risk of getting caught is more closely related to duty than to objective risk factors. Objective audit probabilities affect only taxpayers with greater temptation to cheat, but duty influences tempted taxpayers as much as ordinary taxpayers.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Surveys show that many individuals substantially over estimate audit rates and fines associated with tax evasion 1John T. Scholz and Neil Pinney 1995; Dick J. Hessing et al. 1992; Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 19982.”
From Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance (2009) · cites this paper as Scholz and Pinney 1995
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,594
A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
(2017) · Macat Library eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781912282432 · Cited by 18,122
Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.30-6408 · Cited by 14,307
(1973) · DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) · Cited by 10,144
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
Shafer, G. R., Kahnerman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1984) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2288362 · Cited by 5,657
Leave, C. (1994) · Journal of the Operational Research Society · doi:10.1057/jors.1994.133 · Cited by 3,309
Passions within reason: the strategic role of the emotions
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-4535 · Cited by 2,967
Miller, G. A., & Cantor, N. (1982) · Social Cognition · doi:10.1521/soco.1982.1.1.83 · Cited by 2,816
Katz, R. S. (1982) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961197 · Cited by 2,468
Cited by
Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital
Brehm, J., & Rahn, W. (1997) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111684 · Cited by 2,421
Political Trust and Trustworthiness
Levi, M., & Stoker, L. (2000) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.475 · Cited by 2,190
The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe
Sabatier, P. A. (1998) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501768880000051 · Cited by 1,462
The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour
Kirchler, E., & Braithwaite, V. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511628238 · Cited by 1,206
V. Shah, N. K. (2001) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/105846001750322952 · Cited by 974
The Origins and Consequences of Public Trust in Government
Chanley, V. A., Rudolph, T. J., & Rahn, W. M. (2000) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1086/317987 · Cited by 881
Themes and Variations: Taking Stock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework
Weible, C. M., Sabatier, P. A., & McQueen, K. (2009) · Policy Studies Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2008.00299.x · Cited by 837
Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action
Scholz, J. T., & Lubell, M. (1998) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2991764 · Cited by 793
Self-citationTax morale and conditional cooperation
Frey, B. S., & Torgler, B. (2007) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2006.10.006 · Cited by 671
Luttmer, E. F. P., & Singhal, M. (2014) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.28.4.149 · Cited by 645
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-3678 · Cited by 643
FELD, L. P., & FREY, B. S. (2007) · Law & Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9930.2007.00248.x · Cited by 643
Social Capital and the Dynamics of Trust in Government
Keele, L. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00248.x · Cited by 584
Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations
Winter, S. C., & May, P. J. (2001) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.1002/pam.1023 · Cited by 575
Communication, Context, and Community: An Exploration of Print, Broadcast, and Internet Influences
SHAH, D. V., McLEOD, J. M., & YOON, S.-H. (2001) · Communication Research · doi:10.1177/009365001028004005 · Cited by 512
Liu, Y., Wang, A., & Wu, Y. (2021) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.126698 · Cited by 449
Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Brazil and South Africa
Lieberman, E. S. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615658 · Cited by 402
Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota
Blumenthal, M., Christian, C., & Slemrod, J. (2001) · National Tax Journal · doi:10.17310/ntj.2001.1.06 · Cited by 348
Weible, C. M. (2006) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muj015 · Cited by 347
Chetty, R. (2009) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.1.2.31 · Cited by 340
What Shapes Attitudes Toward Paying Taxes? Evidence from Multicultural European Countries*
Torgler, B., & Schneider, F. (2007) · Social Science Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6237.2007.00466.x · Cited by 309
The Fiscal Contract: States, Taxes, and Public Services
Timmons, J. F. (2005) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0015 · Cited by 300
Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany
Dwenger, N., Kleven, H., Rasul, I., & Rincke, J. (2016) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20150083 · Cited by 300
Analyzing the Role of Social Norms in Tax Compliance Behavior
Bobek, D. D., Hageman, A. M., & Kelliher, C. F. (2013) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-012-1390-7 · Cited by 291
Tax compliance and enforcement in the pampas evidence from a field experiment
Castro, L., & Scartascini, C. (2015) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.002 · Cited by 285
Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy
GORDON, S. C., & HAFER, C. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051634 · Cited by 281
Trust, Democracy and Governance: Can Government Policies Influence Generalized Trust?
Uslaner, E. M. (2003) · Generating Social Capital · doi:10.1057/9781403979544_9 · Cited by 168
Why we need a new theory of government
Levi, M. (2006) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592706060038 · Cited by 149
Metadata
- Authors
- Scholz, J. T., & Pinney, N.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1995-05
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 490
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1994957089
- Cited by
- 324
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 11.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.