The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior
Abstract
Theory: The costs imposed by income tax and other citizenship duties provide powerful incentives to free ride, yet the likelihood of getting caught-the primary self-interested deterrent to free-riding-is unlikely to be known with much accuracy by most citizens. Thus the duty heuristic provides not only a direct motivation to comply, but also influences behavior through cognitive processes that bias self-interested beliefs about the advantages of free-riding. Hypothesis: Citizens' beliefs about their duty to obey laws of the state bias their information processing and judgements about the fear of getting caught and punished for disobedience, so citizens reporting greater commitment to obey tax laws systematically overestimate the expected penalty for noncompliance. Methods: Regression analysis of survey and tax-return data for 445 taxpayers. Results: Subjective risk of getting caught is more closely related to duty than to objective risk factors. Objective audit probabilities affect only taxpayers with greater temptation to cheat, but duty influences tempted taxpayers as much as ordinary taxpayers.
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“Surveys show that many individuals substantially over estimate audit rates and fines associated with tax evasion 1John T. Scholz and Neil Pinney 1995; Dick J. Hessing et al. 1992; Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 19982.”
From Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance (2009) · cites this paper as Scholz and Pinney 1995
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Metadata
- Authors
- Scholz, J. T., & Pinney, N.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1995-05
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 490
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1994957089
- Cited by
- 324
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 11.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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