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Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors
Open accessAbstract
We study the problem of financial contracting and renegotiation between a firm and outside investors when the firm cannot commit to future payouts, but assets can be contracted upon. We show that a capital structure with multiple investors specializing in short-term and long-term claims is superior to a structure with only one type of claim, because this hardens the incentives for the entrepreneur to renegotiate the contract ex post. Depending on the parameters, the optimal capital structure also differentiates between state-independent and state-dependent longterm claims, which can be interpreted as long-term debt and equity.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Berglof, E., & von Thadden, E.-L.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1994-11-01
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1055-1084
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2103746618
- Cited by
- 426
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 70.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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