Further Evidence of the Impact of Regret and Disappointment in Choice under Uncertainty
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Abstract
A preliminary experimental study of the relative impact of regret and disappointment on individual choice under uncert ainty is followed up and extended in various ways. Taken in conjuncti on with the earlier work, the new results provide further evidence of the limitations of von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory a nd indicate the potential power of the alternative models discussed. It is argued that there is sufficient weight of evidence to encourage further systematic investigation. Copyright 1988 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Loomes, G.
- Venue
- Economica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1988-02
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 217
- Pages
- 47
- ISSN
- 0013-0427 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2091984026
- Cited by
- 152
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 2.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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