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The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs
Abstract
[Introduction] We live in exciting times. By 'we' I mean philosophers studying \nthe nature of causation. The past decade or so has \nwitnessed a flurry of philosophical activity aimed at cracking \nthis nut, and, surprisingly, real progress has been made. Two \ndevelopments are especially worthy of note. First, there has been a \nresurgence of interest in the counterfactual theory of causation, given \nits best-known formulation by David Lewis. Second, there has been \nincreasing philosophical interest in the techniques of causal modeling \ndeveloped and employed within fields such as econometrics, \nepidemiology, and artificial intelligence. These two developments \nhave been largely independent and addressed to different sorts of \nproblems. Work in the counterfactual tradition has been primarily \nconcerned with issues involving "token" or "singular" causation, while \nwork in the second tradition has tended to focus on issues concerning \n"type-level" or "general" causation.
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Citations
Cited by
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation
Woodward, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001 · Cited by 1,302
Wolff, P., & Barbey, A. K. (2015) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2015.00001 · Cited by 788
Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes
Halpern, J. Y., & Pearl, J. (2005) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axi147 · Cited by 779
Causal Models: How People Think about the World and Its Alternatives
Sloman, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183115.001.0001 · Cited by 677
Grounding in the image of causation
Schaffer, J. (2016) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0438-1 · Cited by 551
Schaffer, J. (2005) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-114-3-327 · Cited by 389
Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics
Moore, M. S. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256860.001.0001 · Cited by 362
Hitchcock, C., Knobe, J., & Journal of Philosophy, I. (2009) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil20091061128 · Cited by 350
Self-citationNonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle
List, C., Menzies, P., & Journal of Philosophy, I. (2009) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil2009106936 · Cited by 340
Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics
Cartwright, N. (2007) · London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511618758 · Cited by 335
Causal–explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions
Lombrozo, T. (2010) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2010.05.002 · Cited by 313
Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account
Woodward, J., & Hitchcock, C. (2003) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/1468-0068.00426 · Cited by 313
Self-citationWilson, A. (2018) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12190 · Cited by 267
Halpern, J. Y., & Hitchcock, C. (2015) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axt050 · Cited by 263
Self-citationCausal Responsibility and Counterfactuals
Lagnado, D. A., Gerstenberg, T., & Zultan, R. (2013) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.12054 · Cited by 191
“The structural model framework has led to several related accounts of actual causation (Halpern & Pearl, 2005; Hitchcock, 2001, 2007a,b; Pearl, 2000/2009; Woodward, 2003).”
BackgroundNormality and actual causal strength
Icard, T. F., Kominsky, J. F., & Knobe, J. (2017) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2017.01.010 · Cited by 155
What caused what? A quantitative account of actual causation using dynamical causal networks
Albantakis, L., Marshall, W., Hoel, E., & Tononi, G. (2019) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e21050459 · Cited by 67
Metadata
- Authors
- Hitchcock, C.
- Venue
- The Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2001-06
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 273
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W75331897
- Cited by
- 603
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 79.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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