The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?
Abstract
This paper studies the determinants of the value of voting rights in U. S. corporations. Results support the hypothesis that the price of a vote is determined by the expected additional payment vote holders will receive for their votes in case of a control contest. The size of this differential payment is a function of the probability that a vote is pivotal in a control contest and the magnitude of the private benefits obtainable by controlling the company. Simple proxies for these two factors explain up to 30 percent of the variation of the voting premium across companies and through time. My findings also suggest that the value of managerial perquisites are, at least partially, reflected in the price of votes.
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Citations
Cites
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408
Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003400 · Cited by 3,098
One-share-one-vote and the market for corporate control
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90044-x · Cited by 1,342
Palepu, K. G. (1986) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(86)90008-x · Cited by 1,308
Private benefits from control of public corporations
Barclay, M. J., & Holderness, C. G. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90088-3 · Cited by 1,164
The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience
Zingales, L. (1994) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/7.1.125 · Cited by 970
Self-citationHarris, M., & Raviv, A. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90045-1 · Cited by 670
Managerial ownership of voting rights
DeAngelo, H., & DeAngelo, L. (1985) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(85)90043-1 · Cited by 657
The market value of control in publicly-traded corporations
Lease, R. C., McConnell, J. J., & Mikkelson, W. H. (1983) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90019-3 · Cited by 359
Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games
Milnor, J. W., & Shapley, L. S. (1978) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.3.4.290 · Cited by 224
The Market Value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held Corporations
Lease, R. C., McConnell, J. J., & Mikkelson, W. H. (1984) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296274 · Cited by 145
Restricted Voting Stock, Acquisition Premiums, and the Market Value of Corporate Control
Megginson, W. L. (1990) · Financial Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6288.1990.tb00791.x · Cited by 131
The value of the corporate voting right
Horner, M. (1988) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/0378-4266(88)90051-9 · Cited by 110
Triggering the 1987 stock market crash
Mitchell, M. L., & Netter, J. M. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90071-8 · Cited by 109
Cited by
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.005 · Cited by 4,185
Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10766 · Cited by 3,545
Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00642.x · Cited by 2,509
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Zingales, L.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1995-11-01
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1047-1073
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W1965891660
- Cited by
- 596
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 32.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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