The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
Open accessAbstract
This paper considers a buyer-seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and/or random utility parameters. In such situations, it is known that contract renegotiation may prevent the implementation of first-best outcomes. In this paper, we show however that efficient investments and optimal risk-sharing can typically be achieved provided the initial contract is able to monitor the ex post renegotiation process. Specifically, we focus on the following two features of renegotiation design. First, default options in case renegotiation breaks down; second, the allocation of all bargaining power to either contracting party. Moreover, we show that these two features can be obtained in standard Rubinstein bargaining games through contractual provisions, such as specific-performance clauses and penalties for delay (or, equivalently, financial "hostages" refundable without interest).
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Citations
Cites
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Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
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Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time PreferencesPreprint
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Self-citationRenegotiation design under symmetric information
Aghion, P., Dewartripont, M., & Rey, P. (1989) · DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) · Cited by 15
Self-citation
Cited by
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Aghion, P., & Tirole, J. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118360 · Cited by 1,201
Self-citationFirms, Contracts, and Trade Structure
Antras, P. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355303322552829 · Cited by 1,194
Incentives Between Firms (and Within)
Gibbons, R. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0229 · Cited by 362
Fares, M., Magrini, M.-B., & Triboulet, P. (2012) · Cahiers Agricultures · doi:10.1684/agr.2012.0539 · Cited by 77
Metadata
- Authors
- Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M., & Rey, P.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1994-03
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 257
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2170478564
- Cited by
- 572
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 25.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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