The Normative Challenge for Illusionist Views of Consciousness
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Illusionists about phenomenal consciousness claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist but merely seems to exist.At the same time, it is quite intuitive for there to be some kind of link between phenomenality and value.For example, some situations seem good or bad in virtue of the conscious experiences they feature.Illusionist views of phenomenal consciousness then face what I call the normative challenge.They have to say where they stand regarding the idea that there is a link between phenomenality and value.If they accept that there is such a link, they might be committed to revisionary normative consequences (and some of them may prove to be uncomfortable).If they deny that there is such link, they might avoid revisionary normative consequences (without being guaranteed against them) but then they have to give reasons to deny that such link obtains, which is not a trivial task.The existence of the normative challenge does not show that illusionism is false, but it shows that illusionism might have important consequences in the normative domain, which have to be clarified.
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Cites
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“…to physical processes, even though such reduction will forever remain somewhat opaque— in some views, to the point that we should expect consciousness to persistently seem distinct from physical processes (Aydede & Güzeldere 2005; Balog 2012; Kriegel 2009; Loar 1997; Papineau 2002; Sturgeon 1994).”
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Cited by
Understanding artificial agency
Dung, L. (2025) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqae010 · Cited by 69
“However, there also has arisen vocal opposition to the view that sentience plays this normative role (Danaher 2020; Gunkel 2019; Kammerer 2019; 2022; Shepherd 2023).”
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Shepherd, J. (2023) · AJOB Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/21507740.2022.2148770 · Cited by 39
How to deal with risks of AI suffering
Dung, L. (2025) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2023.2238287 · Cited by 21
The scientific study of consciousness cannot and should not be morally neutral
Mazor, M., Brown, S., Ciaunica, A., Demertzi, A., Fahrenfort, J., Faivre, N., Francken, J. C., Lamy, D., Lenggenhager, B., Moutoussis, M., et al. (2023) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916221110222 · Cited by 17
Metadata
- Authors
- Kammerer, F.
- Venue
- Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- University of Michigan Library
- Published
- 2019-10-16
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 20201214
- ISSN
- 2330-4014 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3010946483
- Cited by
- 19
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 1.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
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