The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive‐Signalling Approach,
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The Modigliani-Miller theorem on the irrelevancy of financial structure implicitly assumes that the market possesses full information about the activities of firms. If managers possess inside information, however, then the choice of a managerial incentive schedule and of a financial structure signals information to the market, and in competitive equilibrium the inferences drawn from the signals will be validated. One empirical implication of this theory is that in a cross section, the values of firms will rise with leverage, since increasing leverage increases the market's perception of value.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The text we found for this paper looks like another document, so the self-check wasn’t run.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares
Miller, M. H., & Modigliani, F. (1961) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/294442 · Cited by 6,558
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885326 · Cited by 4,987
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
Brealey, R., Leland, H. E., & Pyle, D. H. (1977) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03277.x · Cited by 4,055
Ross, S. A. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886087 · Cited by 827
Self-citationCompetitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution
Spence, M. (1974) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(74)90098-2 · Cited by 624
Risk and uncertainty: a fallacy of large numbers
Samuelson, P. A. (1963) · Cited by 604
The Effects of a Firm's Investment and Financing Decisions on the Welfare of its Security Holders
Fama, E. F. (2007) · American Economic Review · Cited by 298
On the Theory of the Firm in an Economy with Incomplete Markets
Ekern, S., & Wilson, R. (1974) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.2307/3003097 · Cited by 196
Cited by
Items 301–400 of 1,003
Contract Costs and Financing Decisions
Fama, E. F. (1990) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296494 · Cited by 169
The Effect of Leverage on Firm Value and How The Firm Financial Quality Influence on This Effect
Cheng, M., & Tzeng, Z.-C. (2011) · Cited by 230
An examination of voluntary versus involuntary security issuances by commercial banks
Cornett, M. M., & Tehranian, H. (1994) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)90019-1 · Cited by 138
The Relationship between the Level of Capital Expenditures and Firm Value
Trueman, B. (1986) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2330732 · Cited by 138
“1 See [3], [5], [1], and [2], respectively.”
Expectations of security type and the information content of debt and equity offers
Bayless, M. E., & Chaplinsky, S. (1991) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/1042-9573(91)90007-m · Cited by 137
Security Offerings**We thank Robert S. Hansen, Jay Ritter and Xueping Wu for suggestions.
Eckbo, B. E., Masulis, R. W., & Norli, Ø. (2007) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53265-7.50020-2 · Cited by 182
Sensitivity of firm size measures to practices of corporate finance: evidence from BRICS
Hashmi, S. D., Gulzar, S., Ghafoor, Z., & Naz, I. (2020) · Future Business Journal · doi:10.1186/s43093-020-00015-y · Cited by 157
“The explanation of this result may be supported from signalling theory of Ross [68].”
ResultSMEs capital structure: trade-off or pecking order theory: a systematic review
Martínez, L. B., Scherger, V., & Guercio, M. (2018) · Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development · doi:10.1108/jsbed-12-2017-0387 · Cited by 160
Corporate Finance over the Past 25 Years
Brennan, M. J. (1995) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3665531 · Cited by 171
Fixed Asset Revaluations and Managerial Incentives
BROWN, P., Izan, H. Y., & Loh, A. L. C. (1992) · Abacus · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6281.1992.tb00268.x · Cited by 134
Pareto Optimality and Competition
Stiglitz, J. E. (1981) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb00437.x · Cited by 177
Corporate finance—Theory and practice
Degeorge, F. (2006) · The International Journal of Accounting · doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2006.07.006 · Cited by 134
Corporate Dividend Policy: The Views of British Financial Managers
Dhanani, A. (2005) · Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · doi:10.1111/j.0306-686x.2005.00643.x · Cited by 160
Impact of financial leverage on sustainable growth, market performance, and profitability
Akhtar, M., Kong, Y., Haris, M., Ain, Q. U., & Javaid, H. M. (2021) · Economic Change and Restructuring · doi:10.1007/s10644-021-09321-z · Cited by 165
“2017; Ross 1977; Vithessonthi and Tongurai 2015).”
BackgroundMoral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Question of Financial Structure
Darrough, M. N., & Stoughton, N. M. (1986) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb05051.x · Cited by 131
Dividend taxation and intertemporal tax arbitrage
Korinek, A., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2008) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.08.001 · Cited by 154
Managerial Ownership, Capital Structure and Firm Value: Evidence from China’s Civilian-run Firms
Ruan, W., Tian, G., & Ma, S. (2011) · Research Online (University of Wollongong) · Cited by 130
Wamugo, L., Muathe, S. M., & Kosimbei, G. (2014) · Cited by 168
Internal control information disclosure and corporate governance: evidence from an emerging market
Agyei-Mensah, B. K. (2016) · Corporate Governance · doi:10.1108/cg-10-2015-0136 · Cited by 170
The stock market reaction to dividend announcements: A UK study of complex market signals
Lonie, A. A., Abeyratna, G., Power, D., & Sinclair, C. D. (1996) · Journal of Economic Studies · doi:10.1108/01443589610106534 · Cited by 170
The Modigliani‐Miller Propositions After Thirty Years
Miller, M. H. (1989) · Journal of applied corporate finance · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6622.1989.tb00548.x · Cited by 146
Capital structure decisions: Evidence from deregulated industries
Ovtchinnikov, A. V. (2009) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.10.003 · Cited by 130
Bhattacharya, U., & Weller, P. (1997) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3932(97)00019-6 · Cited by 129
Gao, H., Xie, J., Wang, Q., & Wilbur, K. C. (2015) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jm.14.0273 · Cited by 128
Capital structure theory: Reconsidered
Ardalan, K. (2016) · Research in International Business and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2015.11.010 · Cited by 166
Tasnia, M., Alhabshi, S. M. S. J., & Rosman, R. (2020) · Journal of financial reporting & accounting · doi:10.1108/jfra-01-2020-0020 · Cited by 128
Tax Policy and the Dividend Puzzle
Bernheim, B. D. (1990) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3434 · Cited by 134
The board of directors and dividend policy: the effect of gender diversity
Pucheta‐Martínez, M. C., & Bel‐Oms, I. (2015) · Industrial and Corporate Change · doi:10.1093/icc/dtv040 · Cited by 145
“This is consistent with Ross (1977) and Bhattacharya (1979), who reported that companies with high levels of information asymmetries paid higher dividends because they may signal their future forecasts to stockholders.”
ResultLeverage, debt maturity, and social capital
Huang, K., & Shang, C. (2018) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.11.001 · Cited by 136
BANK DIVIDEND POLICY: EXPLANATORY FACTORS
Ross, N. D., Casey, M., & Newman, J. A. (2002) · Quarterly journal of business and economics · Cited by 126
Capital market liberalization and green innovation for sustainability: Evidence from China
Feng, G., Niu, P., Wang, J., & Liu, J. (2022) · Economic Analysis and Policy · doi:10.1016/j.eap.2022.06.009 · Cited by 127
Handbook of Financial Engineering
Zopounidis, C., Doumpos, M., & Pardalos, P. M. (2008) · Springer optimization and its applications · doi:10.1007/978-0-387-76682-9 · Cited by 133
Lu, H., Richardson, G. D., & Salterio, S. E. (2011) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01058.x · Cited by 136
“Given this low-cost Canadian setting, and following the classic disclosure argument that low-cost signals are not credible (e.g., Spence 1973; Ross 1977; Comment and Jarrell 1991), the crucial research question we address is whether these self-reported disclosures in MD&A are credible.”
InfluentialScreening on Loan Terms: Evidence from Maturity Choice in Consumer Credit
Hertzberg, A., Liberman, A., & Paravisini, D. (2018) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhy024 · Cited by 142
“…Club 1Examples of other contractual terms that have been shown in theory to have a screening role are inside ownership (Leland and Pyle (1977)), managerial incentives and capital structure (Ross (1977)), mortgage points (Stanton and Wallace (1998)), and prepayment penalties (Bian and Yavas (2013)).”
Pricing Strategy and Financial Policy
Dasgupta, S., & Titman, S. D. (1998) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/11.4.705 · Cited by 124
The determinants of corporate disclosure: a meta‐analysis
Khlif, H., & Souissi, M. (2010) · International Journal of Accounting and Information Management · doi:10.1108/18347641011068965 · Cited by 147
Litzenberger, R. H. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb03996.x · Cited by 122
Pyramiding vs leverage in corporate groups: International evidence
Faccio, M., Lang, L. H. P., & Young, L. (2009) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/jibs.2009.33 · Cited by 135
Imperfect Information, Credit Markets, and Unemployment
Stiglitz, J. E., & Greenwald, B. C. N. (1987) · European Economic Review · doi:10.7916/d8ff439b · Cited by 121
M’ng, J. C. P., Rahman, M., & Sannacy, S. (2017) · Cogent Economics & Finance · doi:10.1080/23322039.2017.1418609 · Cited by 140
“These lead to the development of alternative capital structure theories explaining the relevance of the capital structure in maximizing the firm value such as the trade-off theory (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973), agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), signalling (Ross, 1977), target adjustment behaviour (Myers, 1984; M…”
BackgroundEvans, J. H., & Patton, J. M. (1983) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(83)90009-5 · Cited by 120
Empirical Evidence on Dividends as a Signal of Firm Value
Eades, K. M. (1982) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2330903 · Cited by 147
The Pricing of Dividends in Equity Valuation
Hand, J. R. M., & Landsman, W. R. (2005) · Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · doi:10.1111/j.0306-686x.2005.00600.x · Cited by 138
“In such a situation, prior work has suggested that managers may use debt to signal their private information (Leland and Pyle, 1977; and Ross, 1977).”
Kurniati, S. (2019) · Corporate Governance · doi:10.1108/cg-10-2018-0308 · Cited by 119
The effect of regulation on local government disclosure practices
Ingram, R. W., & DeJong, D. V. (1987) · Journal of Accounting and Public Policy · doi:10.1016/s0278-4254(87)80002-9 · Cited by 118
The Determinants of Capital Structure of Stock Exchange-listed Non-financial Firms in Pakistan
Shah, A., & Hijazi, T. (2004) · The Pakistan Development Review · doi:10.30541/v43i4iipp.605-618 · Cited by 118
“Ross (1977) says that managers have better knowledge of the income distribution of the firm.”
BackgroundResultMeasurement matters—A meta-study of the determinants of corporate capital structure
Hang, M., Geyer‐Klingeberg, J., Rathgeber, A., & Stöckl, S. (2017) · The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.qref.2017.11.011 · Cited by 127
Comparing alternative explanations for accounting risk-return relations
Deephouse, D. L., & Wiseman, R. M. (2000) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00100-1 · Cited by 117
“Another view is that leverage, since it places the firm’s future at greater risk, induces greater effort by managers who would be hurt by bankruptcy (Ross, 1977).”
BackgroundInfluentialDebt vs. Equity and Asymmetric Information: A Review
Klein, L. S., O’Brien, T. J., & Peters, S. R. (2002) · Financial Review · doi:10.1111/1540-6288.00017 · Cited by 151
Davies, W. E., & Giovannetti, E. (2018) · Technological Forecasting and Social Change · doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2018.03.011 · Cited by 134
“…assess the main question of whether crowdfunding serves to bridge these information asymmetries by providing opportunities to develop signalling strategies (Ross, 1977; Spence, 1974) through newly organized forms of credit exchanges taking place over ICT-enabled platforms (Lehr and Sharafat, 2017).”
BackgroundCórcoles, Y. R., Diéguez‐Soto, J., & Lizano, M. M. (2020) · International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management · doi:10.1108/ijppm-03-2019-0119 · Cited by 116
DEBT AND SENIORiTY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF HARD CLAIMS
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1994) · Cited by 116
Capital structure and firm performance in European SMEs: Does credit risk make a difference?
Li, K., Niskanen, J., & Niskanen, M. (2018) · Managerial Finance · doi:10.1108/mf-01-2017-0018 · Cited by 176
The cash flow and informational effects of employee stock ownership plans
Beatty, A. L. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00812-f · Cited by 133
Earnings and risk changes around stock repurchase tender offers
Hertzel, M. G., & Jain, P. C. (1991) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(91)90014-f · Cited by 115
Fact or fiction: Implicit government guarantees in China’s corporate bond market
Walker, T. J., Zhang, X., Zhang, A., & Wang, Y. (2021) · Journal of International Money and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2021.102414 · Cited by 114
“Perhaps, for the firms that are most likely to experience financial troubles, the existing debt level has a signaling effect for bond investors in terms of the firm’s future financial performance (Ross, 1977; Barclay, Smith, and Watts, 1995). Another interesting finding is that the GDP growth rate (GDP growth) has a p…”
BackgroundStreet Gang Recruitment: Signaling, Screening, and Selection
Densley, J. A. (2012) · Social Problems · doi:10.1525/sp.2012.59.3.301 · Cited by 199
Agyei-Mensah, B. K. (2017) · Corporate Governance · doi:10.1108/cg-11-2015-0150 · Cited by 133
Utomo, M. N., Rahayu, S., Kaujan, K., Irwandi, S. A., & 3 STIE, P. S. (2020) · Green Finance · doi:10.3934/gf.2020006 · Cited by 135
Breuer, M., Hombach, K., & Müller, M. A. (2021) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-2019-0433 · Cited by 125
Firm-Specific Human Capital and Optimal Capital Structure
Jaggia, P. B., & Thakor, A. V. (1994) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2527054 · Cited by 113
The economic modeling of strategy process: ?clean models? and ?dirty hands?
Khanna, T., Gulati, R., & Nohria, N. (2000) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/1097-0266(200007)21:7<781::aid-smj119>3.0.co;2-2 · Cited by 55
Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Initial Public Debt Offerings
Datta, S., Iskandar‐Datta, M. E., & Patel, A. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00224 · Cited by 133
Institutional investors, corporate discipline, and the role of debt
Grier, P. C., & Zychowicz, E. J. (1994) · Journal of Economics and Business · doi:10.1016/0148-6195(94)90017-5 · Cited by 141
Factors that determine the reputation of private equity managers in developing markets
Balboa, M., & Martí, J. (2006) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2006.05.004 · Cited by 133
An empirical analysis of theories on factors influencing state government accounting disclosure
Cheng, R. H. (1992) · Journal of Accounting and Public Policy · doi:10.1016/0278-4254(92)90013-n · Cited by 111
Hysteresis and the Value of the U.S. Multinational Corporation
Christophe, S. E. (1997) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/209725 · Cited by 111
Why Do Firms Announce Open-Market Repurchase Programs?
Oded, J. (2004) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhh004 · Cited by 119
Market Liquidity, Investor Participation, and Managerial Autonomy: Why Do Firms Go Private?
Boot, A. W. A., Gopalan, R., & Thakor, A. V. (2008) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01380.x · Cited by 134
Capital Structure and Firm Value: Empirical Evidence from Ghana
Antwi, S., Emire, F., & Mills, A. (2012) · Cited by 109
Narsa, N. P. D. R. H., Afifa, L. M. E., & Wardhaningrum, O. A. (2021) · Heliyon · doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e13649 · Cited by 108
“Information asymmetry [69] usually presents management with the opportunity to manipulate.”
BackgroundInfluentialOverconfidence and optimism: The effect of national culture on capital structure
Antonczyk, R. C., & Salzmann, A. J. (2013) · Research in International Business and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2013.06.005 · Cited by 120
The Role of Debt and Preferred Stock as a Solution to Adverse Investment Incentives
Heinkel, R. L., & Zechner, J. (1990) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2330885 · Cited by 108
Scarlata, M., & Alemany, L. (2010) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0851-8 · Cited by 122
Hechavarria, D. M., Matthews, C. H., & Reynolds, P. D. (2015) · Small Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11187-015-9680-y · Cited by 127
“Increasing leverage increases the value of the firm because it signals to investors the stability and dependability of future cash flows (Ross 1977).”
BackgroundTHE CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF ISLAMIC BANKS UNDER THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OF PROFIT SHARING
Aldeehani, T. M., Karim, R. A. A., & Murinde, V. (1999) · International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance · doi:10.1142/s0219024999000157 · Cited by 106
THE IMPACT OF ESG PERFORMANCE TO FIRM PERFORMANCE AND MARKET VALUE
Junius, D., Adisurjo, A., Rijanto, Y. A., & Adelina, Y. E. (2020) · Jurnal Aplikasi Akuntansi · doi:10.29303/jaa.v5i1.84 · Cited by 106
“According to Ross (1977), companies also tend to disclose information to external parties due to information asymmetry between them and external parties, thus placing external parties such as investors and creditors in a less knowledgable position about companies’ prospects.”
Fehle, F. R., Tsyplakov, S., & Zdorovtsov, V. (2005) · European Financial Management · doi:10.1111/j.1354-7798.2005.00301.x · Cited by 121
An Equilibrium Analysis of Debt Financing Under Costly Tax Arbitrage and Agency Problems
Barnea, A., Haugen, R. A., & Senbet, L. W. (1981) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb00645.x · Cited by 126
“asymmetry considered by Ross [17], although we subsume it within the general class of agency problems.”
BackgroundIntergenerational Transfers and Inequality
Stiglitz, J. E., & Bevan, D. L. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198799580.003.0010 · Cited by 105
Financial Market Imperfections and Productivity Growth
Greenwald, B. C. N., Kohn, M., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1989) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.3386/w2945 · Cited by 122
Does debt affect firm value in Taiwan? A panel threshold regression analysis
Lin, F.-L., & Chang, T. (2009) · Applied Economics · doi:10.1080/00036840802360310 · Cited by 104
“…Miller’s assumptions, particularly in the areas of corporate tax (Modigliani and Miller, 1963), personal tax (Miller, 1977), information asymmetry (Ross, 1977; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), agency cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Kim and Sorensen, 1986), bankruptcy cost…”
BackgroundFatores determinantes da estrutura de capital para empresas latino-americanas
Perobelli, F. F. C., & Famá, R. (2003) · Revista de Administração Contemporânea · doi:10.1590/s1415-65552003000100002 · Cited by 104
Capital Structure, Management Ownership and Large External Shareholders: A UK Analysis
Short, H., Keasey, K., & Duxbury, D. (2002) · International Journal of the Economics of Business · doi:10.1080/1357151021000010382 · Cited by 125
Anomalies in Financial Economics: Blueprint for Change?
Kleidon, A. W. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296381 · Cited by 110
Corporate voluntary carbon disclosure strategy and carbon performance in the USA
Datt, R. R., Luo, L., & Tang, Q. (2019) · Accounting Research Journal · doi:10.1108/arj-02-2017-0031 · Cited by 103
Information Asymmetry and Financing Decisions*
Bessler, W., Drobetz, W., & Grüninger, M. C. (2011) · International Review of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2443.2010.01122.x · Cited by 136
Tax Biases to Debt Finance: Assessing the Problem, Finding Solutions
Mooij, R. A. D. (2011) · IMF staff discussion note · doi:10.5089/9781463935139.006 · Cited by 103
John, K., & Mishra, B. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05108.x · Cited by 103
Szewczyk, S. H. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04689.x · Cited by 116
A Generalized Econometric Model and Tests of a Signalling Hypothesis with Two Discrete Signals
Acharya, S. (1988) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03947.x · Cited by 102
“For example, managers are hypothesized to signal the true value of a firm through (a) capital structure (Ross [29]) or (b) dividends (Bhattacharya [4], John and Williams [20], and Miller and Rock [26]), or the true value of a project through equity holdings (Leland and Pyle [24]).”
BackgroundCorporate debt and investment: A firm-level analysis for stressed euro area countries
Gebauer, S., Setzer, R., & Westphal, A. (2018) · Journal of International Money and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2018.04.009 · Cited by 114
“The benefits of debt include, inter alia, the tax deductibility of interest (Modigliani and Miller, 1963), the disciplining effect of debt in case of agency problems between firm managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982), and the signalling role of debt regarding firm productivity,…”
Family ownership and firm performance: evidence from Taiwanese firms
Shyu, J. (2011) · International Journal of Managerial Finance · doi:10.1108/17439131111166393 · Cited by 132
“By contrast, when the firm lacks good investment opportunities, dividend yield can be negatively related to firm performance ( Ross, 1977”
BackgroundSick, G. (1990) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.36.12.1432 · Cited by 100
How do Entrenchment and Expropriation Phenomena Affect Control Mechanisms?
Miguel, A., Pindado, J., & de la Torre, C. (2005) · Corporate Governance An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00445.x · Cited by 99
The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
van Ackere, A. (1993) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/0377-2217(93)90234-e · Cited by 99
An empirical analysis of incremental capital structure decisions under managerial entrenchment
de Jong, A., & Veld, C. (2001) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(00)00163-1 · Cited by 126
“This confirms the theory of Ross (1977) tha t deb t is used as a signal for quality.”
InfluentialFinancial Signalling by Committing to Cash Outflows
Ravid, S. A., & Sarig, O. H. (1991) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2331263 · Cited by 126
Corporate Reputations as Economic Assets
Fombrun, C. J. (2005) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1111/b.9780631218616.2006.00011.x · Cited by 110
Corporate green innovation: The influence of ESG information disclosure
Ruan, L., Yang, L., & Dong, K. (2024) · Journal of Innovation & Knowledge · doi:10.1016/j.jik.2024.100628 · Cited by 103
Metadata
- Authors
- Ross, S. A.
- Corresponding author
- Ross, Stephen A.
- ORCID
- Ross, Stephen A.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1977
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 23
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2146880834
- Cited by
- 4,168
- References
- 15
- Citations by year
- 2026: 170 · 2025: 223 · 2024: 232 · 2023: 260 · 2022: 226 · 2021: 229 · 2020: 227 · 2019: 163 · 2018: 145 · 2017: 148 · 2016: 135 · 2015: 133 · 2014: 127 · 2013: 124 · 2012: 115
- FWCI
- 105.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Bell Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Financial Reporting and Valuation Research
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Financial Analysis and Corporate Governance
- Keywords
- financial structure, Modigliani-Miller theorem, insider information, leverage, firm value, competitive equilibrium, information asymmetry
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.