The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive‐Signalling Approach,
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Abstract
The Modigliani-Miller theorem on the irrelevancy of financial structure implicitly assumes that the market possesses full information about the activities of firms. If managers possess inside information, however, then the choice of a managerial incentive schedule and of a financial structure signals information to the market, and in competitive equilibrium the inferences drawn from the signals will be validated. One empirical implication of this theory is that in a cross section, the values of firms will rise with leverage, since increasing leverage increases the market's perception of value.
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Capital Structure and Financial Risk: Evidence from Foreign Debt Use in East Asia
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Signalling by direct disclosure under asymmetric information
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Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory
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Mergers and acquisitions and bank performance in Europe: The role of strategic similarities
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Optimal Investment with Stock Repurchase and Financing as Signals
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“"3 The model here is similar to that of Ross [13, 14] in that both achieve a nondissipative or costless signaling equilibrium.”
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Corporate Leverage, Debt Maturity, and Credit Supply: The Role of Credit Default Swaps
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“4 years reported in Stohs and Mauer (1996) for 323 manufacturing firms over the 1980–1989 period and suggests that debt maturities of large firms have increased significantly over the past two decades.”
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Friske, W., Hoelscher, S. A., & Nikolov, A. N. (2023) · Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science · doi:10.1007/s11747-022-00879-2 · Cited by 249
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Capital structure of SMEs: a systematic literature review and bibliometric analysis
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Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with Asymmetric Information
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IPO Underpricing: A Meta–Analysis and Research Synthesis
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Signaling through private equity placements and its impact on the valuation of biotechnology firms
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“These findings are consistent with the view that debt financing minimises adverse selection costs as much as it signals positive private information about quality (Ross, 1977; Ryen et al., 1997) and serves as a commitment mechanism (Grossman and Hart, 1982) and disciplinary device (Opler and Titman, 1994).”
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The economics of the private equity marketPreprint
Fenn, G. W., Liang, J. N., & Prowse, S. D. (1995) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 233
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“Ross (1977) assumes that the manager's wage schedule is a contingent contract with a penalty for bankruptcy.”
BackgroundInfluentialDeterminants of corporate capital structure: evidence from an emerging economy
Eldomiaty, T. I. (2008) · International Journal of Commerce and Management · doi:10.1108/10569210710774730 · Cited by 181
“That is, as long as the agency problem arises from the presence of information asymmetry, Ross (1977)”
Metadata
- Authors
- Ross, S. A.
- Corresponding author
- Ross, Stephen A.
- ORCID
- Ross, Stephen A.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1977
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 23
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2146880834
- Cited by
- 4,168
- References
- 15
- Citations by year
- 2026: 170 · 2025: 223 · 2024: 232 · 2023: 260 · 2022: 226 · 2021: 229 · 2020: 227 · 2019: 163 · 2018: 145 · 2017: 148 · 2016: 135 · 2015: 133 · 2014: 127 · 2013: 124 · 2012: 115
- FWCI
- 105.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Bell Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Financial Reporting and Valuation Research
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Financial Analysis and Corporate Governance
- Keywords
- financial structure, Modigliani-Miller theorem, insider information, leverage, firm value, competitive equilibrium, information asymmetry
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.