The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive‐Signalling Approach,
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Abstract
The Modigliani-Miller theorem on the irrelevancy of financial structure implicitly assumes that the market possesses full information about the activities of firms. If managers possess inside information, however, then the choice of a managerial incentive schedule and of a financial structure signals information to the market, and in competitive equilibrium the inferences drawn from the signals will be validated. One empirical implication of this theory is that in a cross section, the values of firms will rise with leverage, since increasing leverage increases the market's perception of value.
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The Optimal Concentration of Creditors
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How do legal differences and experience affect financial contracts?
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Can ESG Performance Mitigate Information Asymmetry? Moderating Effect of Assurance Services
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Capital control, debt financing and innovative activity
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Repurchase tender offers and earnings information
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DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE
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“Signalling theory proposes that companies that have significant levels of voluntary disclosure intended to decrease asymmetries in information and signal the quality and real value of firms by providing more information to parties who lack information (Morris, 1987; Ross, 1977) .”
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“Signalling Theory Spence 1973; Ross 1977 Information asymmetries often exist between parties.”
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Paulo Esperança, J., Matias Gama, A. P., & Azzim Gulamhussen, M. (2003) · Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development · doi:10.1108/14626000310461213 · Cited by 161
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“As in Ross [ 30 ], a cross-sectional regression of leverage and firm values will, according to this theory, have a positive slope.”
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Capital structure and profitability of the property and construction sectors in Hong Kong
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Managerial ownership and corporate diversification: a longitudinal view
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“Debt and equity are treated by tax authorities in markedly different 'For theoretical discussions, see Leland and Pyle (1977), Ross (1977), Stiglitz (1982), Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984), and Meyers and Majluf (1984).”
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Capital structure, free cash flow, diversification and firm performance: A holistic analysis
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Lyon, T. P., Lu, Y., Shi, X., & Yin, Q. E. (2013) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.06.020 · Cited by 156
“As pointed out by Ross (1977), only high-quality firms can sustain a high level of leverage (total debts divided by total assets) so firms can signal quality by choosing a high leverage ratio.”
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“Signaling Theory. is proposed by Ross (1977) in which the choice of debt-to-equity ratio is independent of the optimum concept and rather represented by the willingness of a firm in sending certain messages to the investors.”
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Taxation, Dividends, and Share Repurchases: Taking Evidence Global
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“Additionally, we introduce Tobin’s q (Q) as proxy for stock undervaluation and growth opportunities (e.g., Ross (1977), Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000)).”
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“By contrast, Ross [1977] and Leland and Pyle [1977] show that the size of the commercial debt can be interpreted by lenders as a signal of the stockholders’ belief in the good health of the company, as argued by Biais and Gollier [1995].”
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The Impact of Dividends, Debt and Investment on Valuation Models
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“This type of objective function is similar to Ross [10], who assumes the decision maker's two-part wage is tied to current value and to the success or failure of the firm in the future.”
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“Signaling theory revolves around the judicious use of signals which are consistent with the attainment of a particular and valued attribute that, in the absence of the signal, would be very difficult to unambiguously convey (Ross 1977).”
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The pecking order hypothesis: does it apply to start‐up firms?
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“The first one concerns the signalling role of debt in conveying inside information to the market (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977) and the other emphasizes the role of debt in alleviating the problem of suboptimalmanagerial behaviour (Myers andMajluf, 1984).”
BackgroundDeterminants of signaling by banks through loan loss provisions
Kanagaretnam, K., Lobo, G. J., & Yang, D. (2003) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2003.06.002 · Cited by 140
An Analysis of REIT Security Issuance Decisions
Boudry, W. I., Kallberg, J. G., & Liu, C. H. (2009) · Real Estate Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6229.2009.00255.x · Cited by 161
Nenu, E. A., Vintilă, G., & Gherghina, Ş. C. (2018) · International Journal of Financial Studies · doi:10.3390/ijfs6020041 · Cited by 172
Firm crash risk, information environment, and speed of leverage adjustment
An, Z., Li, D., & Yu, J. (2015) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.01.015 · Cited by 150
“The signaling theory of capital structure suggests that the stock market positively (negatively) reacts to an announcement of debt (equity) issuance (Ross, 1977; Noe, 1988).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Ross, S. A.
- Corresponding author
- Ross, Stephen A.
- ORCID
- Ross, Stephen A.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1977
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 23
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2146880834
- Cited by
- 4,168
- References
- 15
- Citations by year
- 2026: 170 · 2025: 223 · 2024: 232 · 2023: 260 · 2022: 226 · 2021: 229 · 2020: 227 · 2019: 163 · 2018: 145 · 2017: 148 · 2016: 135 · 2015: 133 · 2014: 127 · 2013: 124 · 2012: 115
- FWCI
- 105.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Bell Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Financial Reporting and Valuation Research
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Financial Analysis and Corporate Governance
- Keywords
- financial structure, Modigliani-Miller theorem, insider information, leverage, firm value, competitive equilibrium, information asymmetry
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.