The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive‐Signalling Approach,
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Abstract
The Modigliani-Miller theorem on the irrelevancy of financial structure implicitly assumes that the market possesses full information about the activities of firms. If managers possess inside information, however, then the choice of a managerial incentive schedule and of a financial structure signals information to the market, and in competitive equilibrium the inferences drawn from the signals will be validated. One empirical implication of this theory is that in a cross section, the values of firms will rise with leverage, since increasing leverage increases the market's perception of value.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ross, S. A.
- Corresponding author
- Ross, Stephen A.
- ORCID
- Ross, Stephen A.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1977
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 23
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2146880834
- Cited by
- 4,168
- References
- 15
- Citations by year
- 2026: 170 · 2025: 223 · 2024: 232 · 2023: 260 · 2022: 226 · 2021: 229 · 2020: 227 · 2019: 163 · 2018: 145 · 2017: 148 · 2016: 135 · 2015: 133 · 2014: 127 · 2013: 124 · 2012: 115
- FWCI
- 105.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Bell Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Financial Reporting and Valuation Research
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Financial Analysis and Corporate Governance
- Keywords
- financial structure, Modigliani-Miller theorem, insider information, leverage, firm value, competitive equilibrium, information asymmetry
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.