Good Judgment in International Politics: Three Psychological Perspectives
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article explores three distinct psychological perspectives on good judgment in international politics. Advocates of one perspective (skeptics) argue that good judgment is extremely rare. The international political scene is so unpredictable that most people are inevitably wrong most of the time. Moreover, the skeptics argue that when prognosticators are right, their hits are largely the product of either luck or prudent use of probability theory. Advocates of the second perspective (complexifiers) argue that good judgment is closely linked to the ability to transcend common cognitive biases and errors that vitiate most intuitive predictions. Prognosticators who think in self-critical and integratively complex ways are less likely to accept facile historical analogies, to jump to conclusions from fragmentary evidence, to persevere with first impressions despite contradictory evidence, and to fall prey to overconfidence and certainty-of-hindsight effects. Advocates of the third perspective (simplifiers or fundamentalists) argue that good judgment is closely linked to the ability to focus on a few basic processes (rational responses to economic, technological, and geopolitical trends) and to ignore short-term distractions. Drawing on the results of a preliminary study of experts' forecasts in three policy domains (the future of AmericanSoviet relations and of the Soviet Union itself, South Africa, and the Gulf crisis), I argue that each perspective has components of validity and that the research challenge is to identify the conditions under which each is most useful.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
Jervis, R. (2017) · doi:10.1515/9781400885114 · Cited by 3,199
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. (1977) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.28.020177.000245 · Cited by 1,731
Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science
Simon, H. A. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956650 · Cited by 1,359
Accountability and complexity of thought.
Tetlock, P. E. (1983) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.45.1.74 · Cited by 995
Self-citationAccountability and the Perseverance of First Impressions
Tetlock, P. E. (1983) · Social Psychology Quarterly · doi:10.2307/3033716 · Cited by 513
Self-citation
Cited by
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence
Griffin, D., & Tversky, A. (1992) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(92)90013-r · Cited by 1,841
Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective probability
Tversky, A., & Koehler, D. J. (1994) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.101.4.547 · Cited by 1,167
Dunning, D., Meyerowitz, J. A., & Holzberg, A. D. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.020 · Cited by 678
Rage and reason: the psychology of the intuitive prosecutor
Goldberg, J. H., Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/(sici)1099-0992(199908/09)29:5/6<781::aid-ejsp960>3.0.co;2-3 · Cited by 472
Self-citationUnpacking, repacking, and anchoring: Advances in support theory.
Rottenstreich, Y., & Tversky, A. (1997) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.104.2.406 · Cited by 425
Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value
Chapman, G. B., & Johnson, E. J. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.008 · Cited by 410
Sloman, S. A. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.024 · Cited by 395
Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now
Gilovich, T., & Griffin, D. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.002 · Cited by 305
Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.022 · Cited by 289
Gruenfeld, D. H. (1995) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.68.1.5 · Cited by 282
Compatibility Effects in Judgment and Choice
Slovic, P., Griffin, D., & Tversky, A. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.014 · Cited by 232
Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations
Horowitz, M., McDermott, R., & Stam, A. C. (2005) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002705279469 · Cited by 177
Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem
Wilson, T. D., Centerbar, D. B., & Brekke, N. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.012 · Cited by 160
The calibration of expert judgment: heuristics and biases beyond the laboratory
Koehler, D. J., Brenner, L., & Griffin, D. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.041 · Cited by 146
Metadata
- Authors
- Tetlock, P. E.
- Venue
- Political Psychology
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1992-09
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 517
- ISSN
- 0162-895X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2325841826
- Cited by
- 94
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 33.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.