The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance'
Abstract
The positive theory of argues that Congress controls the bureaucracy. This article offers a critical assessment, in two parts. The first outlines the logical foundation of the theory, suggests why it is unsuited to an analysis of bureaucratic control, and argues that any conclusions of congressional dominance are logically unwarranted. The second addresses in detail the theory's best known empirical application-a study of the FTC, as reported in various articles by Weingast, Calvert, and Moran-and argues that it does not in fact support the theory's claims.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Moe, T. M.
- Venue
- Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1987-11
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 475
- ISSN
- 0362-9805 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2035593435
- Cited by
- 441
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 22.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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