The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance'
Abstract
The positive theory of argues that Congress controls the bureaucracy. This article offers a critical assessment, in two parts. The first outlines the logical foundation of the theory, suggests why it is unsuited to an analysis of bureaucratic control, and argues that any conclusions of congressional dominance are logically unwarranted. The second addresses in detail the theory's best known empirical application-a study of the FTC, as reported in various articles by Weingast, Calvert, and Moran-and argues that it does not in fact support the theory's claims.
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Cites
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As três versões do neo-institucionalismo
Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. C. R. (2003) · Lua Nova: Revista de Cultura e Política · doi:10.1590/s0102-64452003000100010 · Cited by 324
Predicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift
Schillemans, T., & Busuioc, M. (2015) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muu024 · Cited by 290
Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Balla, S. J. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585488 · Cited by 281
Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy
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Metadata
- Authors
- Moe, T. M.
- Venue
- Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1987-11
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 475
- ISSN
- 0362-9805 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2035593435
- Cited by
- 441
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 22.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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