Cited by 320Evolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsChild and Animal Learning Development

The Enigma of Reason

MERCIER, HUGO, SPERBER, DAN·2017·Harvard University Press eBooks

Abstract

Reason, we are told, is what makes us human, the source of our knowledge and wisdom. If reason is so useful, why didn't it also evolve in other animals? If reason is that reliable, why do we produce so much thoroughly reasoned nonsense? In their groundbreaking account of the evolution and workings of reason, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber set out to solve this double enigma. Reason, they argue with a compelling mix of real-life and experimental evidence, is not geared to solitary use, to arriving at better beliefs and decisions on our own. What reason does, rather, is help us justify our beliefs and actions to others, convince them through argumentation, and evaluate the justifications and arguments that others address to us. In other words, reason helps humans better exploit their uniquely rich social environment. This interactionist interpretation explains why reason may have evolved and how it fits with other cognitive mechanisms. It makes sense of strengths and weaknesses that have long puzzled philosophers and psychologists...why reason is biased in favor of what we already believe, why it may lead to terrible ideas and yet is indispensable to spreading good ones....

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Crossref · 10.2307/j.ctv2sp3dd8

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  • Searching for information supporting one's beliefs and ignoring contradictory data is epistemically disadvantageous when what one takes to be reality is and stays different from what one believes it to be.

    “Confirmation bias is typically taken to work against an individual's truth tracking (Mercier and Sperber 2017: 215;Peters 2018: 15), and indeed searching for information supporting one's beliefs and ignoring contradictory data is epistemically disadvantageous when what one takes to be reality is and stays different from what one believes it to be.”

    From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Mercier and Sperber 2017

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Authors
MERCIER, H., & SPERBER, D.
Affiliations
  • Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
  • Central European University - Budapest Campus (HU)
Venue
Harvard University Press eBooks
Published
2017-04-17
OpenAlex
W2907590372
Cited by
317
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 12 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 54 · 2020: 89 · 2019: 65 · 2018: 36 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 4
FWCI
54.75
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Harvard University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
Keywords
reason, argumentation, social cognition, epistemic justification, reasoning biases, cognitive mechanisms, belief updating, cognitive evolution

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